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Foreword
Life cycles and long waves are based on two different concepts. In spite of this,
they both imply periodic - even harmonic - motions or changes. Both "models"
imply that fluctuations in economic growth are not merely random individual
incidents in history, but components of the development of the system as a
whole.
The life-cycle concept states that a system (a product) tends to follow the
same phases as that of the life of an individual: birth, growth, maturity, decline,
and death. Biology and ecology provide numerous examples of this type of
development. In social sciences the concept was first applied at the product level
and later to firms and industries. Following that, it was applied to the behavior
of individuals whose expenditure and saving patterns varied from generation to
generation (Modigliani).
Research on long waves dates back to the nineteenth century. Since that
time there has been repeated interest in the subject. This interest received a
new impetus from the work of Schumpeter which attributed a key role to radical
technological innovations. Further research focused on the frequency of innova-
tions and their relationship to economic growth, investment, and employment.
Several different approaches make up the various growth theories that
exist, of which some run parallel to each other while others are incompatible.
However, an examination of these theories can contribute to a better understand-
ing of the processes that generate economic change. This was the underlying
idea on which a workshop was based that was held in Montpellier, France, in
July 1987. It was jointly organized by the Centre Regional de la Productivite et
des Etudes Economiques (CRPEE) and IIASA. This workshop provided a forum
for an interesting exchange of views between scientists from several disciplines.
This volume contains a selection of the papers presented at the meeting that
illustrates both concepts in various forms.
R.B. Pry
Laxenburg, Austria
.December 1989

Introduction
The selected papers presented in this volume are from a workshop on long waves
and life cycles held in Montpellier, France, July 1987. It was intended to focus
on possible relationships between so-called "long waves" in the economy and
(shorter) "life cycles" in industry and technology. This book is of course only a
small "window" into the wide and interesting range of long-term dynamic
processes discussed at the workshop. Other topics presented at the workshop
included cultural developments (Korpinen), national evolution (Wibe), education
(Conus), ecological systems (Godron), social identity (MaIlman), and problems of
technology and finance (Boccara). There were also interesting methodological
papers presented on general systems theory (Miller and Passet).
Concepts of Long Waves and Life Cycles
When one studies the relation of two phenomena, especially such loosely defined
ones as long waves and life cycles, it is necessary to define them first or at least
to describe the current knowledge on them. There are several papers devoted to
this task.
It is possible to consider the paper by Yakovets as devoted to long waves in
spite of the fact that he does not explicitly use this term. Instead, he speaks only
of cycles and revolutions. He distinguishes between scientific, invention, innova-
tion, technological, investment, and educational cycles. Some could be loosely
related to cycles known from the works of Schumpeter, Kuznets, Juglar, and of
course Kondratieff. Yakovets discusses three degrees of impact of these cycles:
generations of the same technology; new scientific and technological directions;
and, most important, scientific-technological revolutions. This interpretation of
events helps to accommodate some of the theories developed in the late sixties
and the seventies in the USSR on the scientific-technological revolution. Yako-
vets stresses specifically the human factor - education. After reading his paper
one could almost say that Soviet social scientists have come full circle since Kon-
dratieff. Once again, they are emphasizing dynamic effects of economic and
social development processes.
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The paper by Escudier illustrates the methamorphosis of the notion of long
waves (in the economy) in Western economic thought. His presentation is valu-
able because it shows what semantic evolutions can occur (and did actually hap-
pen) when notions such as "long cycle" diffuse across various cultural and lan-
guage borders and through different disciplines. He ends by identifying basic
attributes of long economic cycles, namely, the regular repetition of certain
processes (albeit not as deterministic as in astronomy, for example, as stressed
already by Kondratieff) and the endogenous character of these repetitive
processes. Escudier (in agreement with Boccara) concludes that the long waves
are transformations rather than repetitions of previous stages. This brings into
the play various influences which in their turn strip the long economic cycles
(according to Boyer) of any deterministic character. In other words the descend-
ing phase is not to be considered as an unavoidable consequence of the growth
phase and vice versa.
The Tylecote paper continues with this train of thought. Tylecote argues
that long waves in the economy evoke various social processes and these in their
turn may enhance the changes (pro-cyclical) or weaken them (contra-cyclical).
He describes some possible causal relations of population growth and savings.
He also discussed the formation of policymakers' attitudes and their direct or
mediated feedback effect on the economy. These effects may not be significant
enough to cause a downswing or upswing when considered alone, but create an
interesting "fine structure" of forces influencing in their totality the dynamics of
economic processes. These generational factors are important in explaining
differences and peculiarities among regions and national economies.
To a certain extent Sinibaldi's paper can be considered as an illustration of
the generational ideas expressed in Tylecote's paper. Sinibaldi tries to interpret
the events of the last two decades, especially deficit spending, inflation, and
interest rates, in terms of long-wave theory. He argues, for example, that the
relation of inflation and interest rates shows a "hysteresis effect" because in the
inflation-growth phase the nominal interest rates lag behind inflation while in
decline they stay higher for a longer period of time. This seems to be confirmed
by economic data from the seventies and early eighties. Sinibaldi compares the
measures taken by decision makers during the late twenties and early thirties
with the handling of crises in the seventies. He argues that the Keynesian solu-
tion worked much better than the deflationary policies practiced 50 years ago.
These measures were sometimes taken by policymakers without help from
economists. According to Sinibaldi this proves that, when it comes to practice,
mainstream economic theory does not always have guaranteed solutions.
This is in agreement with Rosegger's paper. Rosegger presents a detailed
analysis of life-cycle theory in industry and trade with special regard to both
mainstream, neoclassical theory of technological change and various other
theories including long economic waves. He concludes (in line with Nelson and
Winter) that the technological gap between them remains in spite of many
attempts to bridge it. Rosegger continues with a thorough and well-documented
description of how the concept of life cycle in industry developed and discovers
that researchers first identified the decisive factors of life cycle (technology,
resources, inter-industry linkages) 60 years ago. These factors are still the
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subject of many studies. He also points out the contradictions one runs into
when studying real data. When real-life data is aggregated and smoothed to
eliminate "noise," one can also eliminate critical phenomena. When detailed
case studies are performed, on the other hand, one faces the problem of generali-
zation. Rosegger addresses also the main topic of the workshop, cross-
fertilization among disciplines, and finds that simplistic analogues might run
from dangerous to irrelevant but also that several disciplines such as psychology
and organizational behavior might bring rewarding inputs into life-cycle
research.
In the paper by Menshikov and Klimenko an attempt is made at finding
simple formal interpretation of the life-cycle concept and its relation to economic
variables like return on the capital stock per unit of time and expected accumu-
lated returns. They show that even simple models can bring some insight to the
dynamic of processes. They also introduce a more complex set of eight matrix
equations which, when tested on US input-output coefficients, generated cycles
with various periods. The equations do not yet allow for manipulation to select
cycles with particular periods.
Another way to describe the dynamic process in the economy is by a sys-
tem of differential equations for growth rate of labor productivity and growth
rate of capital intensity (capital stock per manhour). Solutions to these equa-
tions also show cyclic behavior with damping determined by structural
coefficients. It is possible to use these simple equations to test some hypotheses.
In real life the economy can also manifest very abrupt changes which can
be described by the instruments of catastrophe theory based on nonlinear
differential equations. Menshikov and Klimenko describe equations which mani-
fest both static and dynamic bifurcations and can be used to model abrupt
changes like "switching" between two equilibria or explosive shift. They work
with an equation of the fourth order and show that the results change qualita-
tively with the change of coefficient at the highest order of the variable (a l ) and
discuss the fitting of this model to real data.
Applications of Life-Cycles Concept
In their paper, Lee and Nakicenovic argue that life cycles might be a solution to
the old question "How to manage technologies?" They illustrate the point using
civil aviation, railroads, and primary energy substitution as examples. They
state that in spite of the fact that some general development patterns can be
identified, their use in business decisions is not simple and needs careful analysis.
This paper illustrates Rosegger's view that even when life-cycle theories are not
part of the mainstream economic theory, they play an important role in business
decisions.
A logical continuation of these ideas is presented in Brooks's paper which
reports on an interesting meeting in Washington, DC. He describes the views of
three well-known researchers in the field - Utterback, Teece, and Ergas - on the
technology life-cycle concept and its use on the level of productive unit, firms,
and national economy. Utterback introduces finer categories of life-cycle phases
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(growth, maturity, decline) when he distinguishes fluid pattern, transitional pat-
tern, dominant design, and specific pattern when the product line in question
becomes highly standardized. This is the time when the interest shifts from pro-
duct design to process design. He discusses the peculiarities of each phase.
Brooks further elaborates on Teece's ideas dealing with the question of why
many innovators are pushed out of the market by skillful imitators. Here avai-
lability of the so-called complementary assets plays a significant role. These
assets help to bring the innovative product efficiently and quickly to the market.
These assets are manufacturing capabilities and effective distribution-
maintenance-service channels. The latter asset is an important component of
national strategies as Ergas sees them. He distinguishes three types of strategies:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Heroic, high-tech, government supported.
Diffusion strategy which emphasizes the high value-added of product spec-
trum.
Combination of both strategies.
Users of these strategies include the USA, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and Japan.
Antonelli makes use of data from the archives of the Italian Association of
cotton weavers to test an interesting hypothesis. He argues that the S-shaped
curve of innovation diffusion is in reality the result of more subtle processes than
the "profitability pull" of standard theory. During the diffusion, the innovative
product (and or process) is adopted by more and more firms and while the early
adopters can guess on the profitability, the later entrants can base their decision
on accumulated experience. So "learning by doing" enhanced by "learning by
using" play a joint role. Those entering the process late may face the early
adopters who managed to capitalize on the innovation and may force latecomers
out of the market. In this situation, to be a small firm (and therefore more adap-
tive) does not seem to be a particular advantage, at least as the data from the
diffusion of shuttle-less looms in Italy confirms. This case study shows that sim-
ple epidemic model of innovation may ignore events important for decision mak-
ing at the firm level.
In their paper, Yu and He try to identify factors that cause substitution of
one energy technology for another based on analysis of cost and benefits to both
business and individual users of this technology. To get the whole picture one
has to consider not only direct and indirect costs, but also changing user prefer-
ences. This cannot be done without understanding the development of consump-
tion as a function of the affluence of the population. The authors illustrate this
development on US data (measured by per capita GNP). They try to explain,
for example, why the transitions in residential heating show similar patterns for
many countries and why the preferences of users went from primary energy
sources with lower direct cost to those with higher cost.
A similar situation occurs in industry. Yu and He present a textbook
example of technology life cycle and transitions in industrial motive power.
Again, secondary and indirect benefits played major roles in the transition from
steam power to electric motors. This all takes place, of course, against the back-
ground of general economic development.
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An analysis of similar transitions documented on data from steel and coal
industries is offered by Grilbler. He concentrates on turning points in economic
developments and correlates them with large technological changes in two key
industries. Grilbler demonstrates his ideas quantitatively, for example, through
the saturation phase of total output, market share of given technology and/or
state, productivity indicators. He also analyzes the share of individual countries
in the total world production. His approach presents a mature methodology,
part of which was developed and tested at IIASA.
His idea of clustering of saturations of leading technologies, markets, and
products is interesting. This clustering has its impact on other economic vari-
ables (prices) and also on social processes. These ideas are an extension of exist-
ing hypotheses. Together they may better explain the relations between techno-
logical change, life cycles of key technologies, and long-term tendencies of
economic development.
Whereas Grilbler tries to identify turning points in economic development
by analyzing empirical data series on steel and coal, Ayres constructs an analyti-
cal, formal model of optimal growth based on the nontraditional premise that
production factors can be measured by their information content (defined by
information theory). He defines an optimal control model for a utility function of
aggregate consumption where control variables are two kinds of investments and
technology (knowledge) growth rate. The optimal sequence of events exhibits
four phases where the "turning points" coincide with transition from one kind of
capital to the other. Price-productivity product manifests life-cycle-type pattern.
This proves that the cyclical character of economic processes is quite robust, and
relatively simple structures can manifest these processes.
Tchijov and Sytchova analyze input-output tables from Japan for the
period 1951-1980 to find the long-term changes in total labor requirements.
They assume that impact of technological development can be identified through
resource saving and work with three components - labor, fixed capital, and
material. They accordingly identify three types of technical progress. They also
propose the hypothesis that in the past few decades the differences in total labor
requirements among industries has diminished and that in this process of "equal-
ization" those industries with higher labor requirements were reducing this
requirement faster.
Changes in total labor requirements as a function of industrial output show
certain trend irregularities. Labor requirements declined most in the period
between 1951-1955 and in the following period somewhat less. They rose
slightly between 1970-1975 and declined significantly between 1975-1980. In
each period different types of technological progress were dominant starting with
labor and material saving and ending with fixed capital savings (1975-1980).
The data allow' analysts to speculate on the causes of this development. They
seem to be mainly price increases in the case of labor and material in the
1960-1980 period and fixed capital in the late seventies.
Intuitively life cycles and long waves could be more easily related through
innovation-induced industries and their impact on economic growth. This was
described almost 50 years ago by Schumpeter on the basis of innovation cluster-
ing. The idea evoked immediate criticism and discussion. This discussion
x Introduction
continues today, and the state of the art is presented by Kleinknecht. [He com-
pares and integrates the technological innovation databases of several leading
scholars and concludes that there are identifiable periods with both above and
below average rates of innovation.] In spite of this fact several interesting areas
are left for further research. Mechanism of restructuring of technological base of
capital accumulation triggered by depression, and linking innovation waves to
long-term profit rate changes are examples.
A detailed view of innovation case study in the long-wave context is
presented by Fontvieille and Prigent. They argue that conventional innovation
studies of both new products and processes are isolated from the whole produc-
tive process: a kind of in vitro instead of in vivo process. In the real economy
new fixed capital used (operated) by labor brings high profit rate, and the situa-
tion favors capital rather than workers. Workers respond by various ways that
reduce the profit rate and ultimately increase the need for innovation. This
creates a sequence of substitutions for new technology generations, each one
increasing the profit rate in comparison with the current practice. In the paper
the authors present the results of detailed research on underground transport in
French mines and describe different systems of transportation and their effect on
the workers.
In his well-documented paper, Nakicenovic tries to prove his dictum that
economic development is a sequence of substitutions and that these substitutions
for as well as saturations of old technologies can cluster. Nakicenovic tests these
hypotheses on several important areas like civil aviation, cars, infrastructures,
and energy. To detect ups and downs of economic development and saturation
of given technologies, he analyzes several indicators like market share, total out-
put measured in monetary units, and wholesale price indexes. Only by using this
"multiple perspective" mediated by several indicators can one gain the full pic-
ture of the situation, because one cannot expect perfect synchronization of the
saturation effect of individual key technologies. Nakicenovic's paper as well as
that of Griibler have a strong methodological message for those who want to
study long-term economic phenomena.
An interesting integrative view on the main points of the workshop are
presented by Brooks. His long-term practice and deep insight helped him to for-
mulate a scenario on how technology life cycles could cause long-waves in
economic performance. A new technology after a formative stage is gaining
momentum through several economic phenomena (economy of scale, learning,
and a set of indirect benefits) which create a positive (reinforcing) feedback.
This feedback is tight enough to counteract any interference by other technolo-
gies (even better ones) until the saturation and "externalities" do not weaken
this feedback. Brooks also elaborates on boundary condition for the validity of
this scenario. Brooks's idea is an interesting methodological guideline for further
studies.
Introduction xi
In this introduction we have only scanned individual papers and presented
their main highlights and as mutual relationships we have probably missed many
others, which readers can find for themselves. We hope to have provided readers
with some help to find those papers of most interest.
Tibor Vasko
Robert U. Ayres
IIASA
Laxenburg, Austria
Papers presented at the workshop and not included in the selection include the
following: P. Korpinen, "Long Cycles in Fine Arts: Towards a New Theory of
Style"; S. Wibe, "Empirical Evidence of Mancur Olson's Theory of the Rise and
Decline of Nations"; M.F. Conus, "An Approach to Long-Term Fluctuations in
Labor Force Qualifications: The Development of the French Educational Sys-
tem"; M. Godron, "The Evolution of Ecological Systems and Periodicity"; C.A.
Mailman, "Long Waves and Tempos of Social Identity Life Cycles"; P. Boccara,
"The Original Aspects of the Present Long Phase in a Systematic and Historical
Analysis of the Long Cycle: Technological and Financial Problems"; R. Passet,
"From Fluctuations to a New Future in the Making: Long-Term Economic
Forecasting"; A.V. Poletayev, "Profits and Long Waves"; I.M. Saveljeva, "Long
Waves and Labor Movement"; J.E. Cassiolato and R.R. Sampaio, "High Tech-
nologies, Long Waves, and the Newly Industrialized Countries"; J. Georgelin,
"French Inventions in the 19th Century: Their Relation to the International
Expositions"; S. Rasmussen, E. Mosekilde, and E.R. Larsen, "Innovation Bunch-
ing and the Socio-Economic Life Cycles."
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CHAPTER 1
Technology Life Cycles
and Business Decisions
Thomas Lee and Nebojsa Nakicenovic
1.1. Introduction
Solutions and problems are two inseparable partners in real life, in personal
affairs, in business, in science and technology, and in national and international
politics. Most of the time, problems search for solutions. Occasionally, a solu-
tion may be searching for problems.
In business, life is filled with problems searching for solutions. Business-
men are so eager for new promising solutions that they often overreact. When
they find that the promise is not there, they drop the "solution" like a hot
potato. The rise and fall of "Operational Research" is a shining example.
A major and perhaps the most difficult problem faced by business execu-
tives is: how to manage technological change? This problem has been searching
for a solution since the industrial revolution; but none has been found. However,
general patterns of regularities have been observed, e.g., production capacity for
a mature product tends to move gradually from high-wage to low-wage coun-
tries, which eventually become exporters to the high-wage countries.
A closely related phenomenon associated with mature industries is the
excess capacity problem. Today, there is excess capacity in petroleum refining,
steel, aluminum, automobiles, traction equipment, farm equipment, steam tur-
bines, generators, transformers, switchgear, shipbuilding, textiles, commodity
chemicals, semiconductors - the list is long. How did business executives let that
happen? Threats of excess capacity are on the horizon even for high-tech prod-
ucts such as commercial airliners, telecommunication equipment, and computers
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in all sizes except the very largest. There is no indication today that industries
not yet affected are aware of this danger enough to take actions before it is too
late.
When technologies compete for market share, there seems to be also a regu-
lar pattern, Le., the process follows an S-curve (often approximately the
mathematical convenient logistic curve). Fisher and Pry (1971) at General Elec-
tric Co. demonstrated this 26 years ago for binary competition (two technologies
competing against each other); Marchetti and others (1979) extended the con-
cept to multi-component systems and successfully applied the methodology to
energy substitution and a number of other cases.
These "regularities" have led to the suggestion that there may be indeed a
solution to the difficult question "how to manage technologies," Le., the concept
of technology life cycles. The underlying belief is that technologies behave some-
what like biological systems. There are embryonic, adolescent, and mature
stages (Figure 1.1). Behavior or characteristics, such as total market, technical
performance, cost, market share, and industry structure, vary from stage to
stage along the S-curve. Recognizing the need to manage differently for different
stages can be a key to success while ignoring it may invite disaster. Foster
(1986) has given a number of case histories of business failures due to either
ignoring or disbelieving the S-curve phenomenon in technological innovation,
e.g., how American Viscose lost out to DuPont in the competition between rayon
and nylon for tire cords and how DuPont subsequently lost out to Celanese in
the competition between nylon and polyesters for the same market.
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Figure 1.1. Improvement of technological performance in time shown as an S-shaped
growth path indicating three life cycle phases - the embryonic introduction, growth, and
saturation phase.
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Figure 1.e. Growth of railway network length in the UK (left) and the USA (right).
While the growth path follows an asymmetric S-shaped curve in the UK, in the USA it
is more symmetric with a gradual increase especially between the 18308 and the 18708.
(Sources: Griibler, 1987; Nakicenovic, 1987.)
Nevertheless, reactions to the S-curve concept are mixed. Believers tend to
consider it as a forecasting tool. When they apply this concept to the case of
technological diffusion, e.g., the competition between technologies for market
share, they tend to leave a fatalistic impression, Le., once a technology starts to
lose market share to another technology, nothing can be done to reverse that
trend. This fatalistic prediction, true or not, is hard for operating businessmen
to accept. No one wants to lie down and play dead. And in history, there are
enough examples to show that the trends can be reversed by product or process
innovation. Foster makes that point by using the S-curve for technical perfor-
mance. Whenever the rate of progress slows down, reflected in the sharp
increase in the cost-for-unit progress, one should be alert to new technological
advances.
However, if one follows this concept blindly, disasters can happen too.
Take the large steam turbine generator business: the rate of technical progress
slowed down after Philadelphia Electric's Eddy Stone experience long before the
oil embargo. But if utility and manufacturers continue to pump resources after
1973 to advance that technology, or any other technology for the same market
niche, they would be wasting a great deal of money (of course, this did happen)
because the market has disappeared. The market saturation shows up in a
different S-curve, unrelated to the one for technical performance.
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Disbelievers easily argue that there are exceptions to the S-curves. Figure
lot! shows such an exception. The growth of the railway network length in the
UK follows an S-shaped path, but not a symmetric one. Instead the growth rate
increased rapidly until the 18508 and then declined slowly for a period of 60
years. (In fact, the growth of the railway network in the UK follows an asym-
metric S-shaped curve called the Gompertz function.) This is an interesting
counterexample since the growth of railway networks in the USA and Germany
followed symmetric S-shaped paths. Figure 1.e also shows a more symmetric
growth path for the railways in the USA. Thus, disbelievers can argue that a
number of S-curves are not symmetrical; therefore, symmetrical S-curves are use-
less as forecasting tools. Planners in the electric power industry in the early
1970s certainly did not believe S-curves at all for electricity demand growth.
The consequences are well known to us: overcapacity and capital crunch.
In this paper, we address the question of "how to use S-curves" on a broad
basis. We will look at S-curves for total market, market share, as well as techni-
cal performance. We will show that when we look at a set of curves for the same
market niche, a great deal can be learned for business planning purposes. We
will discuss three specific uses for S-curves:
• Investment and R&D Decisions.
• Contingency Planning.
• Implications of Multiple S-curves.
1.2. Application to Investment and R&D Decisions
Investment in capacity expansion at the wrong stage of a life cycle can often lead
to excess capacity, depressed prices, and reduced profitability. History is filled
with such cases. We will illustrate this point with aviation, an industry 'which
may be on the verge of such a mistake.
Figure 1.9 shows the world air transport market, all operations, measured
in 106 passenger km/hr. On a linear plot it clearly exhibits an S-curve behavior.
Figure 1.-4 is the same information on a semilog plot. [We will plot the S-curves
on a semilog paper. A simple S-curve has a saturation level (K). For the vari-
able Xl (be it total market, cost, market share, etc.), we can express it as a frac-
tion of the saturation level: F = x/K. If F/(1-F) is plotted as function of time
on a semilog paper, a perfect S-curve will appear as a straight line. Saturation
level (K) is sometimes unknown, but it can be estimated from the data.] The fit
of the data to a logistic (or S-) curve is obvious.
On Figure 1.-4, we have also indicated the years of introduction for three
landmark aircraft, B377, B707, and B747. If the logistic trend continues, the
total market will saturate at about 200 x 106 passenger km/hr. The inflection
point apparently occurred in 1977, when the market reached 50% of the satura-
tion value.
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Figure 1.9. Growth of world air transport in billion passenger-km/year. (Source: Naki-
cenovic, 1987.)
What are the predictions that can be made from this plot?
• The market will reach 90% of its "ultimate" level about the year 2000.
• li.T, the time required for the market to go from 10% to 90% of the satura-
tion level, for the total market growth is about three decades (29 years).
While these implications are interesting, even more can be extracted if we
look at the evolution of the technical performance of passenger aircraft, shown
on Figure 1.5. Like the air transport market, the performance of individual air-
craft can also be measured in passenger kmJhr. Instead of following closely a
straight line, there is a band, the left line representing the performance of the
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Figure 1.f Growth of world air transport in million passenger-km/hr (from Figure 1.9)
plotting F/ (i-F) as a function of time on a semilog paper, where F is the fraction of the
estimated saturation level K. In this way, results that would otherwise appear as S-
shaped curves come out as straight lines, making them easier to interpret. (Source:
Nakicenovic, 1987.)
best aircraft. Let us stay with the left (upper) envelope of the band. The ulti-
mate performance appears to be 1.2 x 106 passenger-km/hr. The following are
additional implications when one combines the information in Figure 1.-1 and
Figure 1.5:
• The performance of the present 747 is almost halfway to the "ultimate"
level. A stretched 747 (perhaps the planned 500 series) may be all that is
needed. Certainly, this has serious implications on R&D d.ecisions.
• The "ultimate" market can be served by 170 stretched 747s or 340 planes
of the present vintage, if the aircrafts operate to capacity all the time. Of
course, this is not feasible for many reasons. There are about 600 747s in
service now, suggesting a 30% capacity utilization (assuming that 170
stretched 747s would be needed). What should the ultimate capacity utili-
zation be, we don't know. But it seems obvious that in the future, the need
for additional production capacity is not great. Yet at the present, both
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Figure 1.5. Improvement of passenger aircraft productivity in thousand passenger-
km/hr plotting F/(1-F) as a function of time on a semilog paper, where F is the fraction
of the estimated saturation level K. (Source: Nakicenovic, 1987.)
Japan and the EEC are trying hard to increase their penetration of the 747
market. Although they do not plan to build aircraft as large as the 747,
they could increase the volatility and competition in the market by offering
competitive smaller aircraft.
The above analysis is, by intention, grossly oversimplified. A more careful
analysis would segregate the total market according to distances and the aircraft
that serve these sectors. Yet it is not clear how a more disaggregated analysis
would alter the basic conclusion that the industry as a whole may be moving into
the state of overcapacity.
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It is also interesting to note that ~T for the evolution of technical perfor-
mance is 33 years, not very different from that for the total market. Associated
with the dynamic technical evolution of aircraft is cost improvement, which has
a significant effect on market growth. At the embryonic stage, the cost improve-
ment is easy to achieve. The market grows rapidly because of demand elasticity.
When a product moves toward the mature stage, improvement in technical per-
formance becomes more difficult or costly, the learning effect on cost slows down
and so does the market growth. It is therefore not surprising that ~T for a
purely technological attribute (performance) is not very different from the ~T
for a market attribute. The detailed reasons behind the actual closeness of these
two numbers in the example should be the topic of further research. The fact
that they are close implies that the total number of aircraft in service has been
relatively stable, especially when compared with a factor-100 increase on all
operations and aircraft productivity.
IT one had to make a choice between different modes of transportation for
investment purposes in the 1930s, the only information on air transport was the
characteristics of the Douglas DC-3. Comparing the performance, cost, and per-
sonal comfort of traveling by DC-3 with travel by railroad, one might easily
prefer to invest in the latter - if the relative rates of technical change were not
considered. Fifty years later, there is no direct way to travel by rail from coast
to coast in the USA. Looking at Figure 1.5, the reason for this is clear. The
young aviation technology in the 19308 has been improved by more than a factor
of 100. The already mature railroad technology showed little, if any, improve-
ment. In fact, the total length of the main tracks and thus the effective size of
the network decreased by about 30% ever since the 19308. The lesson: Neglect-
ing the technology life cycle phenomenon and consequently also the growth
potential of embryonic technologies can lead to disastrous investment decisions.
1.3. Contingency Planning: An Example
In 1975, Marchetti of IIASA studied energy substitution processes (Figure 1.6)
and predicted that after oil, natural gas may become the dominant energy supply
in the world (Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979). His prediction was made at a
time shortly after the oil embargo and the whole world was concerned with the
depletion of two valuable energy resources: oil and natural gas. President Carter
declared in 1976 that the energy problem was the moral equivalent of war. The
Fuel Use Act was passed to forbid the use of natural gas in industrial boilers.
The country adopted the energy policy of depending on nuclear and coal to
become energy-independent.
A massive energy R&D program was introduced to develop the use of coal:
coal gasification, coal liquefaction, fluidized bed combustion, and a host of other
technological options. Industries responded well to this call for energy indepen-
dence; among them, the General Electric Co. (GE). It spent several billion dol-
lars to acquire a major coal company - Utah International.
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Figure 1.6. The history of global primary energy substitution from 1860 to 1983. F is
the fractional market share of a given energy source in global primary energy consump-
tion and data are shown plotting F /(1-F) as a function of time on a semilog paper. In
this way, straight lines show the S-shaped growth and decline in market shares. Coal
and oil curve through a saturation phase that joins S-shaped growth to S-shape senes-
cence due to the fact that in a multicomponent substitution process not all competitors
can follow S-shaped growth and senescence paths at the same time so that one competi-
tor is saturating. Market shares of primary energy sources are projected through 2000
by making explicit assumptions about the market penetration rate of nuclear, a 1%
market share in 1965 and a 5% share in 2000. (Source: Marchetti and Nakicenovic,
1979.)
It was against this background that Marchetti was invited to present his
prediction to GE's executive officers. Halfway through his presentation, one of
the senior vice presidents stormed out of the meeting, angrily stating: "I don't
believe a word he said."
One of the authors had a subsequent conversation with that senior vice
president to point out that it is futile for business people to engage in a debate
on which prediction is correct. It is an endless debate. The proper questions to
ask are:
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• H the prediction is correct, what might the consequences be to the General
Electric Co.?
• H the potential consequences are severe enough, is a contingency plan (or
insurance policy) justified?
The answer to the first question was obvious: GE's steam turbine business
might be in serious trouble since the bulk of it was in the large steam turbine
sector, which supplied machines to large nuclear and coal-fired plants. On the
other hand, the stationary gas turbine business might grow.
The answer to the second question was rather obvious too: GE should
have acted to protect its stationary gas turbine business by investing in R&D
and by developing a creative international strategy.
Whether that discussion had a deciding effect on GE's strategy, we will
never know. In any event, GE did pursue gas turbine market leadership aggres-
sively. In 1983, 15 years later, the large steam turbine business in the United
States, for all practical purposes, collapsed. The gigantic plant in Schenectady
had to depend mostly on spare parts business. At the same time, the gas turbine
business prospered, not in the USA, but in international markets. GE's creative
gas turbine strategy, the "manufacturing associates" arrangement, propelled GE
to be the unquestionable number one supplier in the world. The dollar volume
ratio of gas turbine business to steam turbine business within GE reversed
almost exactly from that of 10 years ago.
We do not suggest that GE's success in the intervening 10 years in the gas
turbine business was due to smart contingency planning, because it was never
considered as such within GE. We report this conversation, therefore, only for
the purpose of illustrating the potential importance of contingency planning.
Ironically, GE's gas turbine business had a major set back in late 1985 and
1986, due to the drop in oil prices. A significant fraction of GE's gas turbine
business was in the Mideast. The drop in oil prices caused cancellations that
were not expected. Shouldn't there be a contingency plan for low oil prices in
GE's gas turbine division? The answer is (in retrospect) yes. However, we
suspect no such plan actually existed.
Let's now return to the aircraft example. Two questions that executives
and planners in the aircraft industry might debate are:
• Are Figures 1.,1 and 1.5 good forecasts for the total market?
• Is Figure 1.5 a reliable forecast for the performance of civil aircraft?
Based on previous arguments, we suggest that, instead, the proper ques-
tions to debate are:
• H Figures 1.4 and 1.5 are correct - knowing the behavior of the industry in
general - what is the likelihood that the industry as a whole will march into
a situation of excess capacity?
• H that happens, what are the implications for market share, price level, and
profitability?
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• Should the industry spend money on an aircraft that is more advanced
than a stretched 747?
By more advanced aircraft, we mean higher productivity than that of a
stretched 747 (say, higher than the planned 500 series). This means more
passengers (perhaps more than 1,000 passengers capacity) or higher speeds
(supersonic or hyper-sonic) or both. Emergence of more advanced aircraft could
imply a new growth curve that would eventually substitute current aircraft tech-
nologies with a promise of a much larger growth potential. This situation is simi-
lar to the choice between the railroad and the DC-3 in the 1930s.
One of the authors of this paper published a paper in Harvard Business
Review not long ago on R&D planning, Lee et al., (1986). In it, he proposed the
concept of "robustness" for examining the value of an R&D program against
possible (even not likely) environmental shocks. Contingency planning is a way
to improve the robustness of a strategic plan. Technology life cycle can be a
very useful concept for that purpose.
In business, the challenge is always to develop viable management stra-
tegies in the face of imperfect information. The S-curve concept helps to reduce
the imperfection.
1.4. Multiple S-Curves and Their Implications
Now we examine a few examples where the evolution cannot be described by a
single S-curve. These examples shed light on the question: Is the S-curve a reli-
able forecasting tool?
Figure 1. 7 shows the advances of capacity for the best aircraft engines on
the market. The fact that there are two straight lines parallel to each other
means:
• There are two S-curves (Figure 1.8), one sitting almost on top of the other,
each describing the evolution of a technology: the bottom one for piston
engines and the top one for jet engines.
• The rate of change of the technology and the characteristic time .6.T are
the same for both technologies, suggesting the existence of some social and
economic environment common to both technologies. In this case they
serve common markets, namely, civil and military aviation.
What useful implications can be extracted from Figure 1. n If one believed
in the predictive value of the logistic curve, say in the year 1930, one might have
concluded that the largest piston engine would saturate with a thrust of about
3,800 HP. Such a conclusion, by itself, would not have been too unreasonable.
But if one used it in conjunction with multi-component substitution curves for
all modes of transportation (Figure 1.Y), one might have been led to a disastrous
conclusion, based on the following logic.
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Figure 1.7. Advances of capacity for the best aircraft engines on the market, shown as
two S-shaped growth pulses by plotting F /(1-F) as a function of time on a semilog pa-
per, where F is the fraction of the estimated saturation level K. The first pulse (left)
shows piston aircraft engines and the second (right) the jet engines. (Source: Griibler,
1987.)
The aviation market in 1940 was rapidly increasing (Figure 1.9), but the
piston engine was nearing its ultimate technical performance. The "obvious"
strategy to capture greater market share is the learning curve strategy. This
strategy had not been formally articulated (as far as we know) by 1940, though
T.P. Wright formulated in 1936 the so-called labor cost-quantity curve, on the
basis of an analysis undertaken in 1922 (Wright, 1936). Actually, the Curtiss
Company's price determinations for the decade after 1922 were based on the use
of these curves that subsequently became well known as learning curves. To
exploit that strategy, one needs to have greater production capacity for piston
engines. Following this strategy would have been disastrous because of the
imminent appearance of a new technology: jet engines. The fact that saturation
of piston engines was approaching in the 1940s while the total market was still
growing should have alerted the planners of the possible emergence of new tech-
nologies. The job of the planner was made more difficult by combining the
dynamic behavior of both the market and the technology, but the risk of wrong
decisions can be minimized.
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Figure 1.8. Advances of capacity for the best aircraft engines from Figure 1.1. The first
(lower) S-shaped growth pulse shows the increase in horse power (HP) of piston aircraft
engines, while the second (upper) growth pulse shows the increase of take-off thrust (in
Kp) of jet engines. (Source: Griibler, 1987.)
A second example is shown in Figure 1.10, which shows the evolution of
transmission voltages in electric power systems. Again, there are two straight
lines, though with different slopes.
If a planner studied the situation in the late 1940s, he would have seen a
continuing growth of electricity demand (Figure 1.11), at an annual rate of 7%
and a "saturated" transmission voltage (Fisher, 1974). The obvious strategy
would again be to exploit the learning curve. If this strategy was followed, it
would have been disastrous.
What actually happened? In the early 1950s, the electric utility industry
discovered that by shifting a greater percentage of its capital resources into
transmission vis-a-vis generation, the net saving, due to lower generation needs,
is quite attractive from an overall viewpoint. This might well have occurred
because of saturation in the rate of improvement of power-generating technology.
When this resource allocation strategy was discovered, an international competi-
tion on "who builds the highest voltage first" began. This significantly altered
the economic environment and probably was responsible for the shorter ~T (19
years) for the second line.
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Figure 1.9. The history of transport infra-structure substitution in the United States
from 1830 to 1982. Market shares of transport infrastructures are projected through
2000. F is the fractional share of a given transport infra-structure length in total length
of all transport networks. (Source: Nakicenovic, 1987.)
It is interesting to note that the maximum voltage predicted by Figure
1.11, 819 KV, has not yet been exceeded. Some isolated attempt to develop vol-
tages higher than 1,000 KV have not yet led to commercial application. There
are indications in today's environment that power plants may change in the
future from large to small, from centralized to dispersed. Thus, the need for
higher transmission voltages may not appear for some time, although supercon-
ductive transmission may emerge as a new technology thereafter.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the previous examples:
• A single attribute S-curve is not a reliable or useful forecasting tool (and
may even be a misleading one). The most important reason is the possibil-
ity of a second wave, due to either new technology or a new economic
environment.
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Figure 1.10. Evolution of transmission voltage, shown as two S-shaped growth pulses by
plotting F j(I-F) as a function of time on a semilog paper, where F is the function of the
estimated saturation level K. The first pulse (left) shows the voltage increase to K =
295 KV and the second (right) the increase to K = 819 KV. We have added a third, hy-
pothetical increase in voltage that could be possible with the advent of superconductor
cables. (Source: Griibler, 1987.)
• A multi-attribute approach to technology dynamics can be useful for busi-
ness planning.
1.5. Conclusions
(1)
(2)
(3)
The S-curve offers a tool for recognizing the period when excess capacity
and technology saturation may become probable. This should be factored
in the formulation of business strategies, e.g., the learning curve strategy
may cease to be feasible.
S-curves may not be reliable forecasting tools; but they can be very useful
for contingency planning.
Saturation of a dominating technology in a growing market may signal the
emergence of a new competitor or successor technology.
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Figure 1.11. Generation of electric power over the past half century, for selected years
worldwide and for the United States. The trend lines correspond to uniform growth at
7.2% per year (100% per decade). World electric power generation has been growing at
about 8% per year. During the last decade both curves show signs of saturation imply-
ing an S-shaped growth process. (Source: Fisher, 1974.)
(4) A single S-curve is not as useful, for planning purposes, as a set of S-curves
dealing with different aspects of the same technology and market.
In short, S-curves can be useful, but we must learn how to use them intelli-
gently.
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CHAPTER 2
Aspects of the Life Cycle
in Industry and Trade
Gerhard Rosegger
2.1. Introduction
The story is told that Nassau Senior, who held the first chair of political econ-
omy at Oxford, once dared to offer a talk on the population problem. When
Malthus heard about this invasion of his intellectual terrain, he offered the fol-
lowing acid comment: "It is among the disadvantages of public lectures, that the
lecturer thought he was called upon to say something new, when there was noth-
ing new to be said." I was immediately reminded of this story when Professor
Ayres asked me to talk about the state of the art in life-cycle research. What
could I possibly say that is new to this audience, whose collective years of work
in the field I could not begin to estimate?
To make the task of saying old things at least manageable, I decided to
constrain my problem by sticking to the industrial economist's perspective,
instead of ranging into other social-science management concerns with life-cycle
phenomena. For the noneconomists in the audience, however, I must start with
an awkward confession, albeit one that will cause no surprise among the econo-
mists: what I am going to talk about has little to do with the kind of economics
we teach our students, at least in the United States.
Take the typical American textbook on elementary economic theory. In the
chapters on economic growth, the reader is told that - depending on which of
several dozen econometric studies one believes - technological advances account
for anywhere between half and three-quarters of all long-term increases in aggre-
gate real output. But then, in the chapters on the economics of the firm, which
presumably is the agent responsible for generating these advances, the reader
will find scant reference to the crucial role of innovation or, for that matter, of
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other strategic decisions. At best, there will be a diagram or two that show how
some mysterious deu8 ex machina, called "technological change," shifts produc-
tion functions about until a highly desirable state of affairs, called equilibrium, is
once again reached.
Some mention of Schumpeter may be made in connection with all of this,
but perceptive readers are bound to be confused about the role that his ideas
play in this orderly world of fully informed, optimizing firms. More advanced
students of micro-theory are admitted to further secrets. They learn about the
Cobb-Douglas and other forms of production function, and they learn what Har-
rod, Hicks, and Solow had to say about the precise nature of shifts in these func-
tions. They are also told that there are such things as bias and learning - ideas
that lend themselves to very elaborate kinds of modeling.
Friedlaender (1986, pp. 328-329) demonstrated the limitations of the
theory by posing the question how, five years hence, an econometrician might
measure the effects of the introduction of two recent innovations in the US auto-
mobile industry - quality-control circles and just-in-time inventories. The first
presumable will increase the marginal product of labor relative to that of capital,
and the second will show up as a reduction in working-capital investment.
Depending on the relative impact of these two quite distinct innovations, the
econometrician could end up by describing the combined effects of "technical
change" as labor-saving, neutral, or capital-saving. None of these ex post
descriptions, argues Friedlaender, would tell anything about what really hap-
pened.
It all comes down to the fact that human beings are strangely missing from
this well-integrated theoretical structure. One never knows who makes all these
important decisions, or where the necessary information comes from. Many
economists have, of course, been bothered by this peculiar picture of the world,
and so we have a more or less peaceful coexistence between what has become
known as the mainstream, neoclassical theory of technological change and a host
of heterodox models, among them various life-cycle theories.
This is not the place to deal with all of these, but in a cursory way it seems
fair to say that certain notions about the importance of the life cycle have
received more widespread attention than others. Thus, for example, Vernon's
(1966) model of the product cycle in foreign trade and investment, as modified in
his subsequent writings, can be found today in every text on international
economics. Nevertheless, life-cycle theories have always carried the stigma of
being ad hoc and - even more damaging - "partial-equilibrium" constructs.
It seems equally fair to conclude that more encompassing hypotheses, like
those dealing with the existence of technology-driven long waves, have run into
reactions ranging from agnosticism to rejection. Rosenberg and Frischtak (1983)
and Mansfield (1983) may serve as illustrative examples of this attitude.
Interestingly, both these critical surveys refer to the possibility that the
macroeconomic climate and "those deeper-rooted forces that shape the rhythm of
capitalist development" may influence the pace of technological advance. This
is, of course, precisely the problem addressed in a very persuasive way by Olson
(1982). To put the matter politely: at least in the United States, life-cycle
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research and related work have been no more than tolerated guests in the house
of mainstream economic theory, even while they have been warmly welcomed by
other disciplines, such as strategic planning, industrial management, and market-
ing.
This state of affairs would be perfectly understandable if, despite (or
perhaps because of) its very austerity, the neoclassical theory of technological
change had been especially helpful in bringing order and understanding to the
data of the real world. Such has hardly been the case. Stoneman (1983, p. 62)
concludes his excellent review of the theory of invention and innovation as fol-
lows:
The outcome of all this is to argue that there are strong theoretical reasons to
believe that from economic analysis we can make predictions as to the deter-
minants of the rate of technological advance and the nature of technological
advance in different industries, as well as saying something about the bias of
technological advance at the macro-level. However, empirical support for
many of these theories is not really as encouraging as one might hope.
Numerous diagnoses of the problem have been offered. These run all the
way from the observation that modern economics has become a profoundly ahis-
torical science to more complete analyses along Kuhnian lines. For our pur-
poses, however, it may be sufficient to accept what Nelson and Winter (1982)
have argued most convincingly - that no amount of well-intended attempts at
bridge-building can close the epistemological chasm between the neoclassical
economics and those models that purport to make technological and other stra-
tegic decisions the focus of explanations of the economic process.
This introduction, so brief that it is almost a caricature, must not end on a
negative note. First, we have to confess that the apparatus of neoclassical pro-
duction theory has provided us with a vocabulary and a grammar without which
our discourse would be difficult, indeed. Second, I would dissent from a sum-
mary judgment against the production-function paradigm, because it can deal
very well with induced innovations, that is, innovations triggered by changes in
relative input and output prices [see, for example, Binswanger and Ruttan
(1978)1. These are, of course, at the opposite pole from Schumpeterian innova-
tions. Third, it has provided the conceptual foundations for a host of normative
theories concerning the operational decisions of firms. And finally, as the recent
survey by Link (1987) demonstrates, many economists who in all likelihood con-
sider themselves solidly in the mainstream have made valuable empirical contri-
butions to our understanding of the relationship between technological changes
and industrial growth.
In addition, there is some pioneering theoretical work like that of Salter
(1960) and others, who attempted, with at least partial success, to incorporate
innovative activity into the traditional models of firms and industries. All, of
course, had to confront (or avoid) the difficulties created by the underlying
assumption that firms optimize on some well-defined objective. The more recent
literature on the economics of information, too extensive to cite here, may be
considered another thread in these developments.
22
2.2. Observations
lAle e"de, and Long Wcwu
By now, the observation that the difficulties I have just sketched can be traced to
the Newtonian roots of modern economic theory has become a platitude. In an
early essay on the subject, Kenneth Boulding (1957, p. 9) wrote: "Economics
has been, and still largely is, a sunless astronomy of commodities, seeking an
ever changing equilibrium in cycles not quite as regular as those of the planets,
but still moved by differential equations rather than by men." Despite the great
progress of mainstream theory during the past 30 years, that judgment seems as
valid now as it was then.
It does not, however, answer the crucial question: what kinds of theoretical
conceptions can life-cycle research put in place of the mechanistic ones? Before
turning to that question, I want to point out that the first wave of American
investigators, if I may call it that, does not seem to have been beset by any
doubts about the matter. To them, the driving forces and causal linkages were
quite obvious. Let me cite just a few representative examples.
Arthur Burns (1934) stated the logic of the case in elegantly simple terms.
He first observed that, "the conception of the indefinite growth of industries can
neither be supported by analysis nor by experience," and he also postulated that
there is no sound rational basis for "the notion that industries grow until they
approximate some maximum size and then maintain a stationary position for an
indefinite period" (p. 170). From these two premises he concluded that there is
an inherent tendency "for an industry to grow at a declining rate, its rise being
eventually followed by a decline" (pp. 171-172). Burns found his propositions
confirmed by a heterogeneous sample of some 30 industrial-output time series for
the United States. He did not discuss the nature of the processes underlying the
rise and decline of individual industries in any great detail, nor did he offer any
generalizations about their causes.
Earlier on, however, a set of hypotheses about the nature of these causes
had already been proposed by Kuznets (1929, p. 277):
AB an industry starts from small beginnings and develops rapidly to substan-
tial output, it is enabled to do so mainly by progress in the technical condi-
tions of production. But the effects of technical progress show an unmistak-
able tendency to slacken due either to retardation in technical progress or the
pressure of exhaustion of resources or both. Added to that is the check exer-
cised by groups of productive activity whose industrial arts do not improve as
rapidly and as significantly as in the industry in question.
That has a very contemporary sound to it. A sympathetic exegesis could
read into this paragraph not only a recognition of technological evolution as a
driving force of the life cycle, but also a statement on the importance of inter-
industry linkages for the cycle. Yet one must note that at least as many theoret-
ical questions are raised as are answered by such an interpretation. Where does
the "progress in the technical conditions of production" originate, and how is it
transmitted among the members of an industry? What causes the "retardation
in technical progress?" Is not "the pressure of exhaustion of resources" an effect
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of a lack of technological advances, rather than an independent cause of indus-
trial retardation? H one sees the interindustry transmission of retardation in
terms other than those of simple vertical linkages or technological complementar-
ities, what are the forces at work?
These are, of course, the same questions with which economists interested
in the life cycle are concerned even today. I list them here not to engage in a
cheap criticism of pioneering efforts, but rather to suggest that the search for a
more general theory of the life cycle, one that incorporates explicit answers to
these questions, is still going on. I would also propose that a less sympathetic
interpreter could say that, from a theoretical viewpoint, the early researchers did
no more than to add a few orbits to Boulding's "sunless astronomy of commodi-
ties."
This was not, however, the contemporary view in the profession nor that of
later interpreters. Consider the following quotes as evidence: "This study (of
Burns) has become a classic, and not much can be added to its findings.... A
declining rate of growth after a certain point is the general law in individual
industries, just as it is in organic growth" (Woytinski, 1953); and "exhaustion of
the possibilities of innovation contributes to the maturing and eventual decline of
industry. Kuznets and Burns used this line of reasoning in their explanation of
retardation in the rates of growth of individual industries, and I think they were
right to do so" (Fabricant, 1960).
The widespread acceptance of the early empirical results and of their plau-
sible theoretical explanation, together with the fact that the economics profession
had turned its attention to other problems, meant that interest in the life cycle
per se was on the wane for several decades. Therefore, a study by Gold (1964),
in which he updated the industry time series of Burns, made no great impression
on the received doctrine. Gold concluded on the basis of his empirical results
that, far from being preprogrammed by invariant patterns of technological evolu-
tion or by other factors, industry growth trajectories could take a number of
shapes. These ranged from long-term, steady-state expansion at one end of the
spectrum to recovery into rapid growth after prolonged, and seemingly terminal,
decline at the other. Gold et al., (1968) further extended this line of research by
demonstrating even more heterogeneous patterns among the firms of given
industries.
There may be a further reason for the inconclusiveness of all the early sta-
tistical evidence. As van Duijn (1983) pointed out, one problem was that these
studies "lump together many kinds of industries, from agricultural staples to
industrial inputs, from capital to consumer goods, and then look for one growth
pattern" (p. 28). His own findings "suggest the existence of an S-shaped growth
pattern up to the maturity of the industry, with various possible patterns
thereafter" [emphasis added] (p. 29). Whatever the other implications of van
Duijn's observation for the analysis of industry-level cycles, it certainly leads to a
methodological conclusion with which no one could disagree - we need to collect
and analyze as many data as possible on as many industries as possible.
Equally agreeable is the suggestion of Kleinknecht (1984, p. 147) that "the
level of aggregation is very important in the study of changes in the character of
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innovation." One is tempted to add that the higher the aggregation, the greater
the chances that all sorts of noise will drown out the phenomena one is after. It
is not surprising that the same point, together with an excursion into the prob-
lems of trend-fitting, was made by Edwin Frickey (1934), the scholar who was in
all likelihood the statistically most sophisticated contributor to the early life-
cycle studies.
I would add one more lesson from the experience of the first wave of
research: to the extent that our investigations have to rely on official statistics,
bound to unchanging definitions of an industry, we may miss some of the most
important longer-term phenomena. In the first place, such statistics do not
reveal the full extent of such structural changes in the various sectors of the
economy that occur as industries "spin off" or take on whole ranges of activity.
The impact of "high technology" is mentioned most frequently in this connec-
tion. There are, however, more homely examples: consider the extent to which
the hauling of crucial hard-copy information, replacement parts, etc., by com-
pany couriers has been taken over, in the United States, by several competing
overnight express-delivery services: an industry that did not even exist a decade
ago has turned into a multimillion-dollar business. Conversely, the integration
of computers into their products has propelled some machine-tool firms to the
technological frontier, even though statistically they will remain wedded to an
ostensibly "mature" industry.
Second, it may be that what is recorded as the behavior of an industry is in
fact driven by the unique effects of technological innovation on a single firm's
position in the market. Examples here are the Ford Model T and the Douglas
DC-3, both of which accounted for well over 70% of their respective industries'
success during the period of most rapid growth. Some economists would argue
that this latter possibility is adequately explored by the discipline of industrial
organization (I.O.); I would counter, however, that the traditional paradigm of
1.0. sees the arrow of causation pointing the other way - from a "given" indus-
try structure to the propensity for innovation.
Finally, an exclusive focus on the data of industry per se may cause us to
overlook the role of changes in institutional arrangements as crucial elements of
the life cycle (Rosegger, 1976). I am thinking here not only of political, legal,
and regulatory influences, but also of such factors as the voluntary standardiza-
tion of products and processes, the organization of capital markets, as well as the
frequently observed, more or less formal, interfirm cooperative arrangements in
research and development, production, and marketing.
The conclusion from these observations is obvious, and it is largely
reflected in the second wave of life-cycle research, which started up about two
decades ago: explanations of longer-term fluctuations in the fortunes of indus-
tries are not quite as straightforward as the pioneers thought. Guided by
Einstein's famous dictum that only theory can decide what one is able to
observe, economists and other scholars have ranged widely in formulating and
testing more complex hypotheses about the nature of the life cycle.
Gerhard ROIegger
2.3. Life-cycle Research
25
What should rightly follow now, in a state-of-the-art survey, is a comprehensive
look at the second-wave literature. In view of the flood of recent work this would
be a near-impossible task in the time allotted to me. Instead, I want to deal with
just a few matters that have aroused some interest in connection with this work.
My choice is very idiosyncratic, so it would be better to say that these matters
have aroused my interest.
2.3.1. What can we learn from other disciplines?
Turning away from Newtonian mechanics is one thing, finding new paradigms is
another. When we used words like evolution, diffusion, infancy, maturity, and so
on, we are obviously leaning on concepts that have been developed and used in
the biological sciences. Today, we could no longer get by without these concepts.
I must point out, however, that the longing for a "biological" rather than a
"mechanical" economics is nothing new. In fact, even the father of the neoclassi-
cal school, Alfred Marshall (1890), expressed this longing in his most famous
work (see especially p. 765 and Appendix C).
Recent progress in theoretical biology has made it possible to do more than
borrow a language. Increasingly, economic life-cycle research is able to draw on
models and hypotheses developed in evolutionary and ecological studies. This
has brought some very useful results, but there are hazards as well in such
cross-fertilization among sciences. As one of the pioneers in the formal modeling
of social processes, Anatol Rapoport (1956), pointed out a long time ago:
The use of the word "diffusion" in the social science indicates the awareness of
some similarity between the spread of, say, a technological artifact and the
spread of a solute through a solvent. Of course it may be argued that the use
of a metaphor does not establish the reality of the connection between situa-
tions compared and, in fact, may be seriously misleading.
Simplistic analogies are always dangerous, or they turn out to be so self-evident
as to be irrelevant. What insights, for example, are we meant to derive from
propositions like, "no living organism grows indefinitely" or "species can survive
only by differentiating themselves from other species?" This kind of bio-talk has
crept into some of the more superficial business writing on the life cycle, where it
is usually meant to add a "scientific" tone to otherwise trivial exhortations.
Digging a little deeper, however, I believe that we may find fascinating and
largely unexploited potentials for the modeling of industrial life-cycle phenomena
in the directions of work suggested by R.M. May (1976) [see also May and Seger
(1986) and R.Y. Jensen (1987)]. Their explorations of the complex dynamics of
time trajectories, which can result from apparently random, small-scale fluctua-
tions, are based on very simple equations, but they suggest a range of insights.
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These may well be obvious to persons of mathematical sophistication, but if so, I
have yet to find them reflected in the life-cycle literature.
IT nothing else, the work sheds new light on the possible variations in
behavior produced by that mainstay of life-cycle research, the logistic function.
In particular, there is the possibility that systematic changes in the coefficient
indicating the "potency of spread" (Rapoport, 1956) may allow us to identify
separate strategic regimes "inside" the seemingly smooth industrial growth
curves. Our own recent study on the impact of the entry and exit of makes on
the aggregate growth of the American and European automobile industries
(Rosegger and Baird, 1987) seems to provide at least some hints in this direction.
Similar patterns are suggested in the study of Gort and Klepper (1982).
I want to mention just two other disciplines from which life-cycle research
in economics may derive considerable fertilization: psychology and organiza-
tional behavior. IT we believe that the evolution of firms, and therefore of indus-
tries, is driven by the strategic decisions of individuals, we ought to accord an
understanding of these decisions high priority. Herbert Simon and the
behavioralist school have, of course, provided a bridge between the sciences of
man and the science of the firm. Here I am thinking, however, more specifically
of the role of creativity in invention and innovation. Economists have tended to
shy away from the subject, except in some of its most superficial, quantifiable
manifestations, such as patent activity. To the best of my knowledge, Haustein
and Maier (1985) are the only ones to have probed more deeply into the
"economic dimensions of creativity" (pp. 142-148).
In my own review of the factors influencing the supply of inventions
(Rosegger, 1986, pp. 112-117), in which I attempted to model inventing as pur-
poseful search, I derived many useful clues from the work of Austin (1978). He
proposes the hypothesis that the directions and outcomes of creative activity can
be characterized in terms of four different types of "chance," each of which
requires different intellectual (and by implication, organizational) approaches to
the search process. A suggestion along somewhat similar lines is provided by
Burton Klein (1979), when he defines dynamic efficiency as "maximizing the
probability of recognizing good luck, while minimizing the consequences of bad
luck" (p. 81), a definition that raises the question of how organizations might
best go about recognizing "good luck" and capitalizing on it. Answers not only
are important from the managerial viewpoint, but also may have a bearing on
our ability to deal with another big issue that has occupied recent life-cycle
research - the predictability of technological development.
2.3.2. Is technological progress preprogrammed?
Clearly, an ability to say something about the contours of likely technological
developments is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for assessing the
future directions of change in individual industries. The issue is controversial,
however, in both theoretical and empirical terms. Certainly the optimism of the
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1960s about the potential of technological forecasting, an optimism that was
never really shared by the economics profession, has given way to a more cau-
tious attitude.
The prevailing view among economists, including the followers of Schum-
peter, is probably best represented by Scherer (1984):
The distinction in an economic sense between invention and the development
process underlying innovation is best summarized in the difference between
two words "predictability" and "describability." Basic invention is truly
unpredictable ... on the other hand (a scientist) knows in appraising the
detailed problems of development that an answer will be obtained and can
only not describe what the answer will be [po 61.
I take this to imply that we can say something about the directions of technologi-
cal trajectories once they have started, but that their starting points are ran-
domly determined by the randomness of inventions.
An opposing view is taken by Ayres (1987, p. 7), who argues that "scien-
tists and engineers tend to be less pessimistic about the possibility of forecasting
what will be produced by R&D." His historical review aims to make several
points in support of the argument. For the purpose of analyzing the life cycle in
individual industries, the most important is Ayres's discussion of the role of
scientific or technological constraints: to the extent that these inhibit further
advances in a technology and thus condemn the industries tied up with the tech-
nology to maturity or even decline, it is possible to predict "what it would take"
to break through the constraint. Ayres's examples provide copious evidence for
the proposition, but they are not likely to persuade the agnostic economist, who
views history as a series of events that happened with a probability of 1.0 and
therefore are no longer of great interest, except on the whole and on average.
Our studies of long-term technological evolution (see, for example, Gold et
aI., 1984) have persuaded me that it may be quite possible to construct an
industry-level model of process innovation based on the proposition that incen-
tives come mainly from the pressure for the successive elimination of bottlenecks
created by preceding innovations. Needless to say, however, such a hypothesis
could tell nothing about the timing of these events or, indeed, about the speed of
diffusion after they have occurred (Gold et aI., 1970).
More generally acceptable may be the view that we are better at using our
current knowledge as a base for forecasting what is not likely to happen in the
development of products, processes, and industries. For example: 50 years ago,
storage batteries had capacities of approximately 30 watt-hours per kg of battery
weight; technological progress has pushed this limit to today's 70 watt-hours.
Even this remarkable improvement, however, is regarded as insufficient to per-
mit the development of an economically attractive, electricity-powered automo-
bile, government subsidies for R&D not withstanding. Will there be the kind of
"breakthrough" that is central to Ayres's argument? The economist is likely to
reply yes, if the (relative) price is right.
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In his delightful study of the seemingly irrational persistence, across time
and industries, of the QWERTY keyboard (a true "bottleneck" if there ever was
one) David (1986) proposes another hypothesis that students of the life cycle
must take quite seriously: every now and then in economic history,
"one damn thing follows another" ... it is sometimes not possible to uncover
the logic (or illogic) of the world around us except by understanding how it
got that way. A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one in which
important influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally
remote events, including happenings dominated by chance elements rather
than systematic forces. Stochastic processes like that do not converge
automatically to a fixed-point distribution of incomes. . . . In such cir-
cumstances "historical accidents" can neither be ignored, nor neatly quaran-
tined for the purposes of economic analysis; the dynamic process itself takes
on an essentially historical character [po 30].
No doubt there are numerous instances where the long-term development trajec-
tories of industries were determined by initial technological events that proved to
be what David calls "quasi-irreversible" (p.44). He draws on the work of Arthur
et aI., (1985) for an explanation of these trajectories in terms of the formal
theory of stochastic processes.
Unfortunately, the case study as a tool of research is held in low esteem by
the economics profession. Yet it is only through such detailed investigations of
sequences of particular technological events that we might learn more about their
role in industrial evolution. Modern economists have yielded the field to the his-
torians and, I would argue, have lost out in the resulting division of labor.
In discussing the problem of predictability, I have deliberately avoided the
issue that appears to have been discussed most extensively: whether
technology-push or demand-pull is the dominant force in the "programming" of
markets for new products and processes. I believe that no amount of data-
gathering and analysis will settle the argument, because it depends on the
assumption that there exists an a priori demand function for a commodity about
whose specific characteristics and price virtually nothing is known. Certainly the
standard demand function of equilibrium theory cannot bear the burden of these
assumptions.
The push and the pull occasioned by an innovation depend on how well its
characteristics satisfy some technical or other requirements of potential adopters,
including requirements about which they had no information until the innovation
appeared. These characteristics change rapidly in the early stages of the life
cycle and probably more slowly later on. At the same time the key variable in
the demand function, price, also changes in the process of diffusion, as do
relevant extraneous variables, such as real incomes. Therefore, shifts of a
demand function are indistinguishable from movements along a given function.
The effect on diffusion measures was demonstrated in a formal, empirical way by
Bonus (1973). Some innovations find a long-term niche in the market, and many
others do not; to debate ex post about the reasons for their success or failure in
terms of clearly separable "push" and "pull" forces seems to me a little like argu-
ing which blade of a pair of scissors does the cutting.
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The diffusion of major technological innovations involves the coordination of a
number of firms in different industries - arrayed vertically along the production
path, horizontally, as in marketing and distribution, or in more complex net-
works. Economic studies of the life cycle generally recognize this fact and trace
these linkages through the behavior of the relevant markets. Yet there is one
market whose coordinative function is hardly ever mentioned, the capital market.
We speak of "investment in innovation," but that term seems to be used as a
metaphor suggesting a managerial or organizational commitment, rather than
the commitment of one's own or someone else's savings.
The omission of financial factors from life-cycle accounts is all the more
surprising as Schumpeter himself drew a clear distinction between the roles of
the innovator and of the capitalist. Of course, the innovator is the more interest-
ing player in the game, and the financing even of large ventures is frequently
internalized in modern corporations. But, as any textbook will tell us, this latter
fact in no way reduces the capital market's impact on decisions. In a very real
sense, that market's attitudes can be said to be a key argument in the demand
for innovations.
Perhaps our reluctance to deal with this problem comes from a perception
that somehow investment in the radically new is substantively, and not just
qualitatively, different from the more routine commitment of financial resources
to other types of projects. When Keynes writes of "animal spirits" and when
Schumpeter resorts to terms like Krisenpsllchologie (crisis psychology) in explain-
ing investors' attitudes, there is at least a hint of such a difference. G.L.S.
Shackle (1972, p. 27) makes the same point in dramatic brevity: "Time is a
denial of the omnipotence of reason." However, von Mises (1966, pp. 112-113)
put the matter into what I consider a proper perspective: "Every investment is a
form of speculation. There is in the course of human events no stability and con-
sequently no safety. . . . Gambling, engineering and speculating are three
different modes of dealing with the future."
We deal with the future by expressing time preferences. This is not the
place to investigate the reasonableness of economic theory's standard assump-
tions about the structure of these preferences and their relevance for investment
decisions. These assumptions have been questioned a number of times, such as
by Gold and Boylan (1975), Gold (1977), and most recently by Ayres and Mori
(forthcoming). What matters for my purpose is the question whether longer-
term systematic changes in time preference do occur and how they might contri-
bute to life-cycle phenomena.
A quick answer is easy: low-time preference strengthens support for saving
and hence the accumulation of capital goods incorporating new technology, and
vice versa for high-time preference. This is a proposition frequently drawn on in
recent comparisons between the performance of the American and the Japanese
industrial sectors. For a more thorough answer one would have to dig deeper:
an era of high-time preference not only produces economic stagnation in the
direct sense of my quick answer, but also affects the political, social, and cultural
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climate, and therefore what Gordon (1969) in his essay on "The feedback
between technology and values" has called the"social forces driving research."
Economists are not very comfortable with notions like "values" and "social
forces." I would suggest, however, that if one ignores these broader implications
of time preference, one may fall into the trap of reifying technology and therefore
seeing it as the "independent" driving force of economic dynamics. Time prefer-
ence, abstinence, patience, waiting, speculation, long horizons, etc., are words
attempting to describe how we fold the future into decisions of the present. In a
capitalist economy, they imply that progress rests to a large extent on the will-
ingness of some people to give up certain current gratification (consumption), by
setting aside a portion of their incomes for uncertain gratification in the future.
In that sense, saving decisions matter as much as the technical artifacts
they help to produce. For purposes of explaining industrial life cycles, one could
of course simply say the "macroeconomic conditions" influence changes in
demand, investment, and output, but I propose that what really matters lies a
bit deeper. How deep, I do not know, nor have I any good ideas on how one
would go about probing these matters in an empirical way.
2.3.4. Stagnation VS. "post-industrialism"
The questions I have just raised lead quite naturally to the last issue I want to
discuss. Borrowing from yet another discipline, medical science, Kindleberger
(1979) asked the question whether there is such a phenomenon as an "economic
climacteric," a general, economy-wide transition into senescence. His historical
examples are persuasive, and his analysis suggests that there are processes at
work, among them a slowdown in the rate of technological advance, which may
cause national economies eventually to slide from industrial leadership to relative
insignifiance. Olson (1982) provides a much more comprehensive set of explana-
tions of the same phenomenon.
I believe that it is useful to distinguish these views from the more tradi-
tional hypotheses about technology-driven long waves. For one thing, long-wave
research attempts to find regularities, whereas the "sclerosis" theories concern
themselves only with the recurrence of certain symptoms. And for another, long
waves ought by their nature to be global, though perhaps phased nationally,
while the focus of scholars like Kindleberger, Olson, and others clearly is on tech-
nological and institutional forces at work inside individual countries. What both
types of hypothesis have in common is that they are testable, at least in princi-
ple.
Confusion about the nature and intent of this work, with some misinter-
preted data from life-cycle studies thrown in to muddy the waters even further,
has given rise to what I consider a most unfortunate set of untestable proposi-
tions about the nature of "post-industrialism." Individual contributors to this
literature usually are not very careful in defining the concept. They apparently
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mean to suggest that, at least in the developed parts of the world, a radical
change in the bases for economic activity has to occur, if it is not already occur-
ring.
Even a careful reader has difficulty synthesizing some common elements
from the many facets proposed for post-industrial society, but I take it that they
include at least the following: the accumulation of knowledge in place of the
accumulation of physical capital; innovations that improve the "quality of life"
rather than innovations that further increase real outputj the growth of services,
especially in the communications and leisure-time industries, in place of growth
in manufacturing and related activities; the development of technological and
administrative fixes for social problems; and an attenuation of the work ethic
and other bourgeois values.
I expect to be criticized for this simplification of a very complex set of
ideas, but it allows me to make my point: because life-cycle researchers' findings
could have tempted the post-industrialists into the fallacy of composition, the
former may have been unwitting contributors to some fundamental errors. First
and foremost, a quasi-moratorium on the accumulation of capital in the aggre-
gate would imply not only a halt to growth but a freezing of the existing compo-
sition of physical output, i.e., the structure of industries.
Furthermore, if an improvement in the quality of life is to include a more
wholesome environment, a goal with which it would be difficult to disagree, the
pursuit of that objective involves direct expenditures as well as shifts from more
to less environmentally harmful products and processes - in other words, invest-
ment.
Most important, however, knowledge accumulation for the economy as a
whole is not an alternative to capital accumulation. As Machlup (1962) demon-
strated, the two have always been complementary, and it is difficult to see how
this symbiotic relationship could be broken.
These points suggest that low rates of time preference are an essential
feature of a world that wants to improve the material lot as well as the social
and cultural well-being of its people. The relevant arguments are made per-
suasively, and from a number of different angles, in several collections of studies,
such as Olson and Landsberg (1973) and Landau and Rosenberg (1986). The
issue is not whether societies will continue to experience technological advance
and concomitant changes in industrial structure, but what kind of trade-offs they
are willing to make in affecting the directions of change.
To gain greater public understanding of this point would seem to be an
important social contribution that life-cycle researchers could make, especially at
times when an unreasoning hostility toward technology per se seems to be
fashionable in certain circles. Only cultural historians may be able to explain
when and why these waves of public sentiment threaten to swamp more bal-
anced evaluations of the opportunities and risks of innovation. As Brooks (1986)
demonstrated, the United States seems to have gone through at least three cycles
of changing public attitudes since World War II.
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2.4. Conclusion
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1 want to conclude by suggesting that life-cycle research can make a social con-
tribution, because 1 believe that a survey of today's state of the art must include
a new element: life-cycle research is changing from a rather esoteric field of
inquiry, albeit one from which many of us derive great intellectual pleasure, into
one that is perceived to have very utilitarian implications.
Helped along, no doubt, by some exuberant writings in the management
literature, economists now often are called upon to use their presumed under-
standing of the life cycle to give all sorts of practical advice - to corporate deci-
sion makers, to trade associations, to the designers of industrial policies, and to
international organizations. 1 am not certain that our "art" is quite up to the
task of meeting some of these rather high expectations. Yet we seem to be bear-
ing the burden of responsibility with good cheer and with the comforting feeling
that no one else is doing much better. Nevertheless, at this stage in our under-
standing of the life cycle's many facets, it may behoove us to remember Morris
Adelman's claim that every now and then, the hardest sentence for an economist
to pronounce is: "I don't know."
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CHAPTER 3
Role of the Technological Life Cycle in
Technology and Global Industry
Harvey Brooks
What I am going to do in this paper is to comment on certain issues that arose
in a conference I helped to organize in February 1986 for the US National
Academy of Engineering (NAE) under the title, "Technology and Global Indus-
try: Companies and Nations in the World Economy," (Guile and Brooks, 1987).
In broadcast terms, using language that Jim Miller explains in his paper on gen-
eral systems theory, we have a world in which two kinds of organizations coexist
- economic and political- which are to an increasing degree overlapping in their
organizational boundaries. Thus the underlying theme of the NAE symposium
was the "economic, social, and industrial organization issues brought forward by
confluence of new technologies, a high level of international interdependence, and
diverse concerns of nations and companies trading in world markets."
In my observations, however, I will confine my attention to the role of the
technology life-cycle concept (TLC) in this discussion. Out of eight major papers
presented in the symposium and published by the National Academy Press in
June, three - by James Utterback, David Teece, and Henry Ergas - made the
most extensive and basic use of the TLC concept. What I would like to do is to
comment briefly on some of the issues and questions that arose in relation to the
use of this concept in each paper.
First is the question of the nature of the TLC. Most of the illustrations of
the TLC were graphs without ordinates which, Professor Miller assures us,
would never have been accepted for publication by the editors of the Journal of
Behavioral Science. What is it that the ordinate in these graphs is supposed to
measure? Is it gross sales or market penetration of a new product, or a cluster of
closely related products? Or is it some combination of performance parameters
of a class of products?
There is also a question of what the unit of analysis is. Utterback (1987)
gives the most definite answer to this. In his paper he is primarily concerned
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with matching organizational capacities and structures within the firm to the
evolution of the TLC. The unit of analysis is what Utterback calls the "produc-
tive unit," which he defines as a product line and its associated production pro-
cess. This unit is narrower than a whole firm, or even a division of a firm, but
broader than a single innovative product. Thus it is neither a firm-specific nor a
technology-specific technology. For example, it would ordinarily include sup-
pliers of components and of capital equipment, especially if the production pro-
cess requires close collaboration and iterative interaction between the manufac-
turer of the product line and the designer and supplier of the production
machinery. From a technological perspective, therefore, the "productive unit"
involves a whole cluster of related innovations both downstream and upstream
from the main production process. To an increasing degree the productive unit
cannot even be confined within national boundaries, but is integrated multina-
tionally.
Utterback's paper is primarily concerned with the impact of the phase in
the TLC on the type of organization or social system best configured to manage
that particular phase. He divides the TLC into three main phases that he labels
the "fluid pattern," the "transitional pattern" in which the "dominant design" of
the product line emerges, and the "specific pattern" in which the product line
becomes highly standardized and the emphasis of both innovative effort and
management shifts from product design to process design.
In the fluid pattern there are numerous firms with rapid market entry and
exit, and competition mainly with respect to the product's technical characteris-
tics and performance. In this phase a highly adaptive, flexible organization is
required. Production tends to be labor-intensive with a high requirement for
engineers and skilled craftsmen while production equipment tends to be general
purpose rather than specialized. The "skunk works" is the optimal type of prod-
uct development organization for this phase.
As the dominant design begins to emerge, a large number of firms are
driven out of the field by competition. Innovative effort becomes more focused
on improving a few fundamental performance parameters of the product and on
process innovation with emphasis on price and reliability of the product. Pro-
duction equipment becomes more specialized and the organization more disci-
plined and hierarchical, with tighter integration both upstream with suppliers
and downstream with distributors and service organizations. What evolves is a
carefully articulated but increasingly rigid system in which it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to accept other than minor, incremental innovation. Production is
no longer by skilled craftsmen but by automated special-purpose equipment
operated by semiskilled labor, with increasing separation between brain work
and manual work. Further innovation becomes more and more disruptive to the
system in that it has repercussions throughout the whole system and not just on
a local element of the production process. This describes what Utterback calls
the specific pattern in which most economies of scale have been realized and
learning curve effects exploited.
One problem raised by Utterback's picture is how many product lines
within a corporation in different phases of the TLC just described can be accom-
modated within a single administrative structure belonging to a common
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organizational culture. Closely related to this problem is the vulnerability of
"mature" industries to innovative products or processes introduced by outsiders
whether in the same or another country. The openness of the international econ-
omy has increased the probability that this will happen unless the corporation
can be organized to respond rapidly.
David Teece (1987) approaches the TLC from a very different standpoint;
his paper deals with what he calls "appropriability regimes" - the capacity of a
firm or a nation to capture the economic benefits resulting from its ability to
innovate technologically, in other words the economic payoffs that a firm or
country can expect to derive from its R&D system. Teece stresses the observa-
tion that economic benefits do not necessarily accrue to the innovator and cites
many examples of major industrial innovations where the innovating firm was
subsequently driven out of the market by competition from skillful imitators.
Appropriability depends in the first instance on ability to limit the exploitation
by others of the idea on which the innovation is based - trade secrets or patent
position, for example, or just the difficulty of imitation. The more science-based
the technology, the more problematic the appropriability regime, and the more
important is access to what Teece calls "complementary assets" - resources
necessary for getting the innovation to market earlier and more effectively than
potential imitators. The most important complementary assets are excellent
manufacturing capabilities and effective distribution-maintenance-service chan-
nels. Complementary assets are most valuable when they are specialized to the
particular innovation so that they cannot be readily duplicated or simply
acquired on the open market, e.g., general-purpose manufacturing equipment
available from many different suppliers or distribution channels that handle
many related competitive products. Such general-purpose assets can be rela-
tively easily contracted for by a competitor. But, as indicated by Utterback,
both manufacturing and distribution tend to become more specialized as one
moves from the fluid pattern to the transitional pattern of the TLC, or, as Teece
calls it, the "preparadigmatic" to the "paradigmatic" stage. In other words the
required complementary assets become more and more specialized to the dom-
inant paradigm of the product line as one progresses through the technology life
cycle.
Both Teece (1987) and Ergas (1987) argue that large returns accrue to
incremental improvements on a dominant paradigm, with relatively low average
returns to the totality of firms in the preparadigmatic stage because of the rapid
entry and exit of firms and the extreme volatility of relative market shares
among the remaining competitors. While Utterback argues that a large advan-
tage accrues to firms that succeed in the preparadigmatic stage and discover the
dominant design first, Ergas suggests that, although this might be true for an
individual firm, it is probably not true for an economy that follows a general
strategy of emphasizing this stage, e.g., relying exclusively on heavy investment
in R&D and searching for radical innovations. In other words he argues that
such a strategy does not contribute to raising living standards of the work force
in the absence of an effective follow-on strategy. The innovator also runs the
risk of moving either too slowly or too quickly in acquiring exclusive access to
specialized complementary assets. IT he moves too quickly - overestimating the
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stability of the emerging dominant design, for example - his investment may be
inappropriate and later have to be scrapped. H he moves too slowly, he may
miss the window of opportunity in the market, allowing an imitator to take
advantage of complementary assets he controls to take away the market before
the innovator can gear up to penetrate it. Teece gives numerous examples of
cases where pioneers lost out to imitators because of the latter's superior access
to appropriate complementary assets, either because it had them in place in con-
nection with other related products or because it was more confident of the
arrival of the dominant design and put the necessary complementary investment
in place more rapidly. In this regard Teece particularly emphasizes manufactur-
ing skills, citing Japanese capture of portable radio, TV, auto, and standard
RAM markets as examples. But one also has to mention the skillful Japanese
exploitation of the efficient US continent-wide distribution systems such as Sears
Roebuck as an example of the exploitation of existing complementary assets
through producing a product that US manufacturers had neglected. Sears and
other mass merchandizers played a key role in the penetration of the US market
first by small black-and-white and later color TV sets made in Japan (Peck and
Wilson, 1982). The US auto dealer system played a similar role in Japanese
penetration of the US small car market. Conversely, the Japanese shrewdly
denied US innovators in semiconductor devices and computers access to comple-
mentary assets, such as distribution outlets, in the Japanese economy until such
time as domestic Japanese producers had learned the technology well enough
and realized sufficient scale economies in the domestic market to be able to
exploit their manufacturing superiority in the US export market.
Whereas Utterback approaches the technology life cycle from the stand-
point of the productive unit, and Teece approaches it from the standpoint of the
firm, Ergas (1987) approaches it from the standpoint of the whole national econ-
omy. In his chapter he distinguishes three national strategies. One stresses
operation in what he labels the "emergent phase" of heroic technologies with
heavy emphasis on national sovereignty (prestige or military), centralized deci-
sion making by government, and pressing the state of the art in technical perfor-
mance without too much regard for economics. In the past this has generally
represented the military-space-nuclear complex of technologies, with biotechnol-
ogy, deep-sea technology, and exotic materials being added to the list more
recently. According to Ergas the USA, France, and the UK are examples of
countries following this technology strategy. He suggests that France has been
the most successful and the UK the least successful in this strategy as judged
strictly from the standpoint of managerial performance - success in achieving
proclaimed technical objectives. On the other hand, while its managerial perfor-
mance has been middling, the USA has probably been the most successful in
deriving economic benefit from this heroic strategy primarily because of the
remarkable strength and diversity of its R&D establishment and its ability,
because of shear size, to pursue many alternatives in parallel (Ergas, 1987).
The opposite case is represented by the Federal Republic of Germany,
Sweden, and Switzerland and is described as a diffusion strategy in which pur-
suit of the TLC into the mature stage or specific pattern is emphasized. Here
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the idea is to utilize new technology from whatever source to achieve rapid incre-
mental improvement in existing industries, emphasizing the high value-added
end of the possible spectrum of products. For example, in the machine-tool
industry the average value-added represented by the West German product mix
is about three times the average for all OECD countries (Ergas, 1987). Ergas
suggests that this strategy of incremental improvement and high value-added of
relatively conventional products may generally be the most successful from the
standpoint of improving the living standards of the work force. Its weakness is
its vulnerability to attack through the introduction of a brand new paradigm. A
good example is what happened to the Swiss mechanical watch industry. It also
nearly happened with the West German machine-tool industry with the intro-
duction of electronics, but in both these cases the diffusion strategy, imple-
mented through an unmatched vocational training system, eventually enabled
the industry to restore its position - suggesting a high degree of "resilience" in
the diffusion strategy.
The diffusion strategy emphasizes wide diffusion of incremental technologi-
cal improvements throughout the whole industry as soon as they become avail-
able and it is administered under the direction of the existing industry, particu-
larly the apprenticeship system.
The third strategy, represented uniquely by Japan, is described by Ergas as
a hybrid between the diffusion and the heroic strategies. It consists of a mix of a
few heroic high-tech projects, centrally orchestrated by government with strong
industry input, and carefully chosen for their long-term commercial leverage
combined with an aggressive diffusion strategy over a broad area of more tradi-
tional technology and industry. Japan's greatest success has been in what Ergas
labels the consolidation phase of the technology cycle - the most rapidly rising
part of the curve following the appearance of the dominant design. It has been
able to exploit this phase primarily through emphasis on excellence in manufac-
turing combined with close integration between product design and manufactur-
ing. Japan has been able to enter the market early in the consolidation phase
partly through its unexcelled system for monitoring world developments, which
has enabled it to move quickly in acquiring key complementary assets as well as
protecting its domestic market while the selected technology was still in the
emergent phase. One conclusion of Ergas is that both the USA and Europe have
tended to stress excellence in R&D somewhat at the expense of diffusion. Even
in their heroic R&D projects such as the VLSI program and the fifth generation
computer project, Japan seems to treat their joint industry R&D efforts as much
as a learning process for the participating people who later return to their own
firms as for a source of original knowledge and technique.
The weakness of the Japanese strategy has frequently been pointed out by
the Japanese themselves. It is of two kinds. First, the newly emerging industrial
countries of Asia, the NICs, can use the same strategy as Japan, taking advan-
tage of their lower labor costs unless Japan can learn to move more rapidly
upscale toward the higher value-added end of the product mix - a strategy that
may put them even more in confrontation with Europe and the United States
and the rising trend of protectionism in these regions.
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CHAPTER 4:
Schumpeterian Waves of Innovation?
Summarizing the Evidence
Alfred Kleinknecht
There is one hypothesis, now out offashion, that I would like to back. That is
Schumpeter's theory of bouts of investment induced by major technical
discoveries. While the new methods are being installed, there is brisk invest-
ment and general prosperity, but, after a time, an overshoot is bound to occur,
so that excess capacity emerges and brings investment down. I should be
prepared to bet that, when the detailed history of the twenty-five years after
19.15 comes to be written, it will be seen to have had the character of a boom ...
while now there is a formidable overexpansion [Joan Robinson, 1979].
4:.1. Introduction: Schumpeter versus Kuznets
In his 1939 book, Business Cycles, Schumpeter argued that the long-run develop-
ment of industrial capitalism is characterized by waves of accelerated and
decelerated economic growth of some 50 years each. Schumpeter distinguished
three such waves:
• First wave: "Industrial Revolution Kondratieff" with an upswing from
1787 to 1814 and a downswing from 1814 to 1842.
• Second wave: "Bourgeois (or Railway) Kondratieff" with an upswing from
1843 to 1869 and a downswing from 1870 to 1897.
• Third wave: "Neo-mercantilist Kondratieff" with an upswing from 1898 to
1924 and a downswing from 1925 onward.
A bold extrapolation of the above scheme would lead us to consider the
period between the two World Wars as well as the 1970s and 1980s as down-
swings of the third and fourth Kondratieff waves, while the 1940s up to the early
1970s would be regarded as the upswing phase of the fourth Kondratieff. A
renewed upswing of the world economy would then have to be expected some-
time in the 1990s.
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According to Schumpeter (1939), each of the above-named upswings can be
linked to the emergence and rapid growth of new industrial activities, which
were initiated by radical innovations. The subsequent downswings are due to
the exhaustion of innovative growth impulses. In order to produce fluctuations
which are visible in macroeconomic data, radical innovations should not be ran-
domly distributed over time but should come about in clusters or waves.
In his famous review of Schumpeter's Business Cydes, Kuznets spoke of a
"host of crucial questions and disturbing doubts" (Kuznets, 1940, p. 262). His
criticism referred to three topics in particular. Firstly, Schumpeter had failed to
give evidence that long waves not only are a price phenomenon, but also exist in
"real" indicators of general economic activity (see Kuznets, 1940, p. 267);
secondly, Schumpeter's explanation of the alleged long waves implied some
bunching of radical innovations which still remained to be empirically proved
(see Kuznets, 1940, p. 263); thirdly, Schumpeter had also failed to give a con-
vincing explanation of why such a bunching should occur (see Kuznets, 1940, p.
262ff.).
In retrospect, it seems fair to admit that Kuznets has been essentially right
on all three points of critique. As theorizing on long waves more or less stag-
nated during the 1950s and 1960s, the critical questions raised by Kuznets have
remained unanswered. On the other hand, Schumpeter's theoretical proposi-
tions, if correct, are likely to have some obvious and far-reaching consequences
for our understanding of long-run economic growth.
In this paper I shall give particular attention to the second point of
Kuznets's critique: Is there any evidence of a discontinuous occurrence of radical
innovations? _K\lznets's first point has been addressed elsewhere, leading to the
conclusion that in a number of industrial core countries there is indeed evidence
of a significant long-wave pattern in indicators of general economic activity, at
least during the last hundred years (Bieshaar and Kleinknecht, 1984; see also the
comment by Solomou, 1986b, and the reply by Bieshaar and Kleinknecht, 1986).
Moreover, Kuznets's point of how to explain a possible bunching of innovations
has been discussed extensively in Kleinknecht (1987). The explanation presented
there ("depression-trigger" hypothesis), although still being debated (see, e.g.,
Coombs, 1987), is beyond the scope of this paper.
4:.2. The Debate on Basic Innovation Clusters
In recent years, various attempts have been made to collect long-run historical
innovation indicators, and particularly to distinguish a few radical breakthroughs
in technology from the large stream of smaller piecemeal changes.
To put it metaphorically: there is a real difference between innovators who
introduce improved horse cars and those who abolish horse cars by introducing
railways or automobiles. A number of imaginative notions have been introduced
to describe this difference in more general terms. For example, Dosi (1982)
recommends that innovations that establish new "technological paradigms" be
distinguished from innovations that occur within existing paradigms. Others
speak of "basic innovations" versus "improvement innovations" (e.g., Mensch,
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1975; van Duijn t 1983; Haustein and Neuwirth, 1982) or of "New Technology
Systemstt (Clark et aI., 1983) or of "New Technological Webstt (Roobeek, 1987)
or simply of "Majortt or "Radicaltt innovations.
An early attempt by Mensch (1975) to verify the hypothesis that "basic
innovationstt occur in clusters has been received with skepticism (see, e.g.,
Scholz, 1976; Mansfield, 1983). In their detailed criticism, Clark et aI., (1981)
pointed to serious problems in Mensch's database. They refer to topics such as
the representativeness of his data source, his selection procedure, and the deter-
mination of innovation years (see Clark et aI., 1981, p. 148f.).
Their critique has triggered more intense research efforts on long-run inno-
vation patterns, which I have treated elsewhere more exclusively (Kleinknecht,
1987). The results of my examination of various independent sources of long-run
innovation indicators eventually confirmed that Clark et aI. have been right in
criticizing the fact that the original Mensch list of "basic innovationstt did indeed
underestimate the frequency of basic innovations during the "early upswingtt
phase of the long waves; in other words, the discontinuity in the rate of major
innovations does not manifest itself in narrow clusters during the depth of the
depressions (18808, 1930s) as hypothesized by Mensch, but in virtual waves of
major innovations.
A stylized scheme of economic long waves as derived from the econometric
test of long waves by Bieshaar and Kleinknecht (1984, 1986) as well as from
inspection of innovation data (see Kleinknecht, 1987) is given in Table 4.1.
Table -1.1. Scheme of upswings (+++) and downswings (- - -) oflong waves.
Economic wave
Innovative wave (12-year lead)
1873- - -1893+++1913- - -1939+++1974- - - .
1861- - -1881+++1901- - -1927+++1962- - - .
In view of the evidence derived from various data sets (including their own
data), Clark et aI. have meanwhile admitted that there might indeed exist a
bunching of innovations, while advocating a different causal explanation (see
Clark et aI., 1983, p. 74f.).[1]
Following that line, emphasis now seems to shift toward how to explain the
observed bunching of innovations (see, e.g., the comment by Coombs, 1987).
Apart from that development, however, there has recently been a contribution
by Solomou (1986a, 1986b) which again radically questions the empirical evi-
dence. The next section will be dedicated to that critique.
4.3. The Solomou Critique
Solomou (1986a, 1986b) examined samples of "basic innovationstt by Mensch
(1975) and van Duijn (1983) as well as a sample of "important innovationstt by
Kleinknecht (1981) as derived from Mahdavi (1972). He concluded that these
data are compatible with his random-walk (or random-shock) hypothesis rather
than with a long-wave perspective. Besides doing some statistical explorations,
which will be dealt with further below, Solomou makes several critical remarks
on the nature of the data. These can be summarized as follows:
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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In assembling data on basic innovations one is adding up cases of different
importance; certainly, some cases are more "basic" than others and hence
some weighting procedure would be desirable.
The randomness of Mensch's selection procedure may be doubted (see, e.g.,
the critique by Clark et aI., 1981, p. 148f.).
H the argument about a relationship between market structure and innova-
tion is valid, then market structure changes between the nineteenth and the
twentieth century would make any intertemporal comparison of innovation
rates a problematic exercise.
Since the majority of innovation cases had its origin in the USA, world
innovation rates should be linked to the alleged Kuznets-cycle pattern in
American economic growth.
Before responding in more detail to points (1) and (2) (which appear to be rea-
sonable points of critique), a few remarks need to be made on points (3) and (4).
As to market structure and R&D activity, the classical survey by Kamien
and Schwartz concludes that empirical studies (being based on shaky data, of
course) give only little support to a positive relationship (1983, p. 104). More-
over, "Investigation of the supposition that large firms have the best innovative
talent have disclosed almost the exact opposite. The largest firms appear to be
far less efficient innovators than smaller rivals" (Kamien and Schwartz, 1983).
But even if valid, in a long-run historical perspective, changes in market
structure would probably have to be conceived as a rather continuous and
irreversible process. Consequently, the argument could probably explain a trend
increase in innovation rates rather than the type of wave pattern that will show
up in our data further below [2] - except if one would argue that market struc-
ture changes occur in long waves (this would indeed be a remarkable contribu-
tion to the current long-wave debate!).
Solomou's argument about linking world innovation rates to the Kuznets-
cycle pattern in American economic growth [point (4)] is misleading in at least
two respects. Firstly, there are reasons to believe that the Kuznets cycle is a sta-
tistical artifact, due to problematic filtering effects that result from the use of
first differences in detrending economic time series (see Bieshaar and Kleink-
necht, 1986, p. 190£.). Secondly, provided that the Kuznets cycle exists at all,
there seems to be some agreement that it is restricted to the period before World
War I (see, e.g., the discussion in Rostow, 1975), while US world market
hegemony has emerged during the twentieth century only and is most obvious
after World War II.
While rejecting points (3) and (4), the first and second point of the critique
should be taken seriously. It is a problematic exercise to add up innovations of
quite different importance and complexity, and the rate of innovation observed
may be biased by the personal whims and preferences of the compiler. For
example: a compiler may include cases of "basic" innovations that other com-
pilers would classify as "minor" cases; or, a researcher may use problematic
sources and investigate certain historical periods more carefully than other
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periods. On the other hand, trusting the personal integrity of researchers, one
might hope that such biases (although unavoidable) will remain within accept-
able limits. In the following, I shall add up the sets of innovation data by
Mensch (1975) [3] and van Duijn (1983), adding another set of basic innovation
data by Haustein and Neuwirth (1982), which has not been considered by Solo-
mou (1986a, 1986b).
In doing so, it is hoped that a possible biu from personal judgment by an
individual compiler will be reduced. The adding up of all cases from the three
samples implies some weighting procedure, since cues that are included in all
three samples (and which can therefore most confidently be considered as
"basic" innovations, since all three authors agree upon these cases) are counted
three times. Cases that are included in two out of the three sources (which
might still be considered as relatively "safe" cues of basic innovations) are
counted twice. The category of basic innovatioll8 that is reported by one of the
three sources only (and which is most likely to cover a number of doubtful cases)
is counted only once. Because of the implicit weighting procedure, we would
expect the resulting "supersample" to give a more reliable indication of long-run
innovation patterns than the isolated consideration of an individual source could
do. The supersample is displayed in Figure 4.1.
To get an idea about the reliability of the supersample, it is interesting to
see how far the three underlying sources overlap. A schematic presentation of
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Figure -1.1. All basic innovations from three sources (supersample) from 1800 to 1968.
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Figure -I.e. Overlap between three samples of basic innovations from 1800 to 1968.
overlaps is given in Figure -1.£. It should be noted that the numbers in Figure
4.£ may be subject to some counting errors, which are due to the nature of the
data: quite frequently, different sources use a slightly different description of the
same innovation case; besides, counting is sometimes complicated because two
sources may have considered a different aspect of the same type of innovation
(e.g., one source is covering the first commercially successful steamship, while
the other source takes the year of the first Atlantic crossing on a steamship).
Moreover, even for identical events, often diverging innovation years are given
(fortunately, most differences in innovation years remain within the range of a
few years). In spite of such problems, Figure 4.£ may give at least a rough indi-
cation of the overlap between the three sources.
It can be seen in Figure 4.£ that the Mensch (1975) sample shows strong
overlap with the other two samples, while the van Duijn (1983) and the Haustein
and Neuwirth (1982) samples have only a modest overlap. This can be explained
by the fact that the Mensch sample (being published earlier) has been known to
van Duijn and to Haustein and Neuwirth, while the latter two have been compil-
ing their samples independently of each other. It is remarkable to see that a
number of the Mensch cases have not been included in the samples of the other
two compilers, which indicates that they must have examined the Mensch sam-
ple quite critically.
It should be noted that when forming the supersample, I deliberately did
not interfere with the data, which means that no case was added or omitted;
even in the case of diverging innovation years, no innovation year was changed.
Besides the above-described supersample, other exercises were done that are not
documented here. For example, when adding up all the cases from the three
sources and omitting those cases that are named in one source only, a pattern
similar to that in Figure 4.1 was obtained.
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While the supersample certainly is an improvement as compared with the
individual sources, it should be noted that the wave pattern in the time distribu-
tion of basic innovations does not depend on weighting. This will become clear
from our test on the significance of differences in mean innovation rates for vari-
ous a priori periods, which brings us to another point of the Solomou critique.
Solomou is right in arguing that for testing the significance of long-run
innovation patterns, a test on differences in means between certain a priori
periods is more appropriate than the runs test as applied by Mensch (1975). It is
also correct, that the cyclicity of innovation waves (Le., their endogenously
caused regular recurrence) cannot be proved by any quantitative test, simply
because of the low number of waves observed (any proof of cyclicity being left to
a theoretically convincing endogenous explanation of the turning points). As
Solomou rightly points out, however, one can test a "weak" Kondratieff
hypothesis, testing whether observable innovation patterns behave according to
what one would expect from a long-wave view (ibid., p. 102).
In doing so, I shall apply a one-sided t-test, testing whether the mean
number of innovations during the upswing (+++) periods in Table -1.1 is
significantly higher than during the downswing (- - -) periods (and vice versa).
The t-test (which is not exactly a student t) is defined as follows:
Xl - x2
6~ ~
-+-N l N 2
where: Xl and x2 are the sample means, 6~ and 6~ are the sample variances, and
N l and N 2 are the sample sizes.
Because of the smaller sample sizes, the use of a t-test for this statistic is
more cautious (giving lower levels of significance) than the use of a z-test (as has
been done by Solomou, 1986a, p. 108). Moreover, since the hypothesized direc-
tion of the differences is clearly determined, a one-sided test will be applied. As
in Solomou's test it is assumed that the variance during the subsequent upswings
and downswings is not equal. In the case of the t-test, this assumption implies a
considerable loss of degrees of freedom, following the "safe rule" as outlined in
Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1977, p. 214).
Table -I.e documents the results from application of the t-test to the super-
sample. The test was also applied to the three sources individually, the results
being reported in Table -I.A1 of the Appendix. Documentation in this paper is
restricted to the results that were achieved when handling a 12-year lead of the
innovation wave over the economic wave as hypothesized in Table -1.1. To test
the robustness of the results with regard to slight variations in lead times, a 10-
and a 15-year lead was also tried. The results differed only slightly, so that the
same conclusions could have been drawn, using a slightly different periodization.
Table -I.e confirms that the fluctuations observed in Figure -1.1 above can clearly
be distinguished from statistical random fluctuations.
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Tobie -l.£. Calculations of t-test for upswings and downswings of long waves: the super-
sample.
Period Mean SD SE t -t/alues d./. Prob.
1861-1881 2.6667 2.1525
0.8006 1.843 20 0.039
1881-1901 4.1428 2.9712
0.7441 2.481 20 0.011
1901-1927 2.2962 1.8976
0.6291 3.370 26 0.001
1927-1962 4.4166 3.0740
0.7979 2.491 6 0.024
1962-1968 2.4285 1.6183
In interpreting Table -I.e, one has of course to be aware that, even if our
weighting procedure does imply some improvement, it certainly cannot satisfy all
possible objections uttered by skeptics. As has already been indicated above,
nobody who has ever been working in the field of innovations research, needs to
be reminded of the numerous problems concerning topics such as the representa-
tiveness of sources, the randomness of selection principles, the distinction
between "major" and "minor" events, an appropriate sample size, or the deter-
mination of innovation years.
If, in spite of all these problems, we want to arrive at a somewhat safe
judgment about Schumpeter's above-sketched hypothesis, we should compare
evidence from as many sources as possible. Fortunately, owing to the painstak-
ing work by Baker (1976), there is still another long-run technology indicator
that has been collected independently of the above basic innovation sources, and
which will be considered in the following.
4.4. Testing the Baker Data
While the above data on basic innovations consist of years when the first suc-
cessful commercialization of new products or processes, perceived to be of funda-
mental importance, occurred, Baker (1976) collected about 1,000 "breakthrough"
patents which refer to 363 important items (these items range, in alphabetical
sequence, from the addressograph up to the zip fastener). It should be men-
tioned that the basic innovation data are, in principle, world innovation data,
whereas Baker's breakthrough patents are mainly patents registered at the Brit-
ish Patent Office. It can nonetheless be argued that they might be taken as a
world innovation indicator, since "The United Kingdom's role in the interna-
tional world of commerce has been of sufficient importance throughout the his-
tory of the patent system to ensure that most inventions of significance would
have been subject of patent applications in this country" (Baker, 1976, p.21).
As compared with "direct" innovation data, the Baker patent data have
three notable drawbacks. Firstly, the year of publication of a breakthrough
patent on a new item is not necessarily identical with the year of the innovation
(Le., the first successful commercialization of the item), although it should come
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reasonably close to it. Secondly, the Baker sample covers a certain number of
key patents that are related to radical inventions rather than innovations.
Thirdly, a few cases are related to improvement rather than to "basic" innova-
tions (see also the discussion in Kleinknecht, 1987).
These points are likely to constitute a bias in favor of a random-walk pat-
tern. Consequently, we would expect fluctuations, as hypothesized in Table -1.1,
to be less accentuated in the Baker data than in "pure" innovation data. A com-
parison between the Baker data in Figure -1.9 and the supersample of basic inno-
vations in Figure -1.1 seems to confirm this.[4] Nonetheless, the results from
application of the above-defined t-test to the Baker data, being documented in
Table -1.9, confirm that the hypothesized fluctuations are still significant, even
though significance levels are generally a bit lower than in Table -1.2.
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Figure -1.9. Product-related breakthrough patents from Baker (1976), according to
cl8BBification in Kleinknecht (1987).
From Tables -1.2 and -1.9, as well as from the test on the individual sources
in Table -I.A1 (Appendix), it can be concluded that between 1881 and 1962 there
is evidence of three successive periods of above- and below-average rates of inno-
vations, the differences being distinguished from random variations at high levels
of significance. Judging from the (somewhat more reliable) supersample in Table
-1.2, this holds even for the period from 1861 to 1968.
As to the very last period (1962-1971), it is of course right that it is often
only in retrospect with a certain time lag that one can decide what are "major"
innovations or "minor" ones. Hence, the result from Table -1.2 can be taken only
as a very preliminary indication of a decline of innovation rates during the 1960s.
Nonetheless, judging from conventional wisdom, it does not seem to be too bold
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Table -1.9. Calculations of t-test for upswings and downswings of long waves: the Baker
data.
Period MeaR SD SE t-vtUue d.!. Prob.
1861-1881 2.9523 1.4992
0.4832 0.985 20 0.160
1881-1901 3.4285 1.6300
0.4853 1.722 20 0.052
1901-1927 2.5925 1.7155
0.5761 3.262 26 0.002
1927-1962 4.4722 2.8333
0.8331 1.046 9 0.200
1962-1971 3.6000 2.1705
a prognosis that the 1960s and 1970s will eventually turn out to have been a
period of poor innovation performance, followed by a renewed upsurge of radical
innovation in the 1980s and 19908. This would also be a logical implication of
my theoretical explanation of innovation waves that is beyond the scope of this
paper (see Kleinknecht, 1987, for an extensive discussion).
Although a theoretical explanation is important for the issue of cyclicity of
the observed waves, this paper is restricted to the statistical evidence that has
been questioned by Solomou (1986a, 1986b). Summarizing the above considera-
tions, we can say that Solomou, being right in his critique of Mensch's cluster
hypothesis (and its statistical support) draws the wrong conclusions.[51 Innova-
tion flows have not been constant. Besides a twentieth-century wave of radical
innovations, there is evidence of a period of accelerated innovation activity in the
18808 and 1890s, followed by a deceleration up to the late 1920s, which Solomou
will not be able to explain by whatever exogenous shock event.
Solomou's random-walk hypothesis may hold, however, for the period of
early capitalism. Optical inspection of the various time series suggests that, up
to the mid-nineteenth century, the flow of innovations in aggregate data experi-
enced only a monotonous increase. This suggests that Schumpeter's innovation
long-wave hypothesis as a macroeconomic phenomenon is valid only for
developed capitalism.[6]
4.5. Suggestions for Further Research
This paper was restricted to empirical evidence of long waves in the incidence of
major innovations, which is of course closely related to the issue of long waves in
economic life. The explanation of innovation waves that has been put forward in
Kleinknecht (1986, 1987) has been discussed controversially. However, "alterna-
tive" explanations that stress the importance of "science push" and institutional
change (Clark et aI., 1983; Coombs, 1987), or which focus on the "social struc-
ture of accumulation" (Gordon et aI., 1982) are not necessarily inconsistent with
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my argument about a restructuring of the technological base of capital accumu-
lation being triggered by a prolonged depression. However, an explanation that
integrates the various views would be a task for another paper.
Another interesting issue would consist of linking innovation waves to
long-run profit rates. The idea of long waves in aggregate profit rates has
recently been advocated by several theorists, such as Fontvieille (1985), Menshi-
kov and Klimenko (1985), Poletayev (1985), and Reati (1986). In a disaggre-
gated analysis of West German manufacturing profit rates from 1950 to 1977, I
have argued that sectors that can be closely related to the twentieth-century
wave of major innovations did exercise during the 1950s (and in part during the
1960s) a counteracting influence against a rapid fall of the aggregate profit rate
(Kleinknecht, 1987a). Doing such an analysis for other countries and periods
(and, if possible, at a finer level of aggregation), might shed a new light on the
discussion of the tendential fall of the profit rate.
Interpreting the innovation waves from the viewpoint of demand theory
may be another research topic, being particularly attractive to Keynesian
economists. In explaining why innovation waves may cause waves of expansion
and contraction in the economy, one would have to consider that launching of an
innovation involves considerable investment in R&D, in know-how, and eventu-
ally in the buildup of production facilities; the powerful multiplier effects that
result from such investments may be conceived as a positive function of the
degree of radicalness of an innovation, the amount and impact of subsequent
(major and/or minor) innovations, and the degree of market success (diffusion).
Of course, the boom created by such innovation multipliers (which may
end in an overshooting such as described in the above quotation by Joan Robin-
son) still needs to be adequately modeled before it can be integrated into long-
run macro-models.
The relationship between demand and innovation still has another implica-
tion. To the extent that the "demand-pull" hypothesis (which is not necessarily
inconsistent with my "depression-trigger" hypothesis) is valid in explaining inno-
vation, it has an impact on government demand management that has been
largely neglected even by Keynesian economists. Government demand, besides
having the multiplier effects that are well known from the textbooks, may
influence the flow of innovations (and in doing so create extra demand by means
of the above-mentioned "innovation multiplier"). Of course, from a Schum-
peterian viewpoint, one would not advocate macroeconomic demand impulses.
The latter may be (in part) even counterproductive in that they (also) contribute
to preserve existing product lines. Rather one would advocate specific demand
impulses that are directed toward assisting the emergence of new industrial
activities; i.e., government demand may systematically increase the chances of
new technological options to survive in the process of Darwinian selection on the
marketplace. Such a demand policy would have the advantage of not only
increasing effective demand as such, but also of allowing political choices con-
cerning socially desirable new technologies.
The above-sketched arguments may indicate that the hypothesis of innova-
tion waves, if correct, calls for a lot of research still to be done.
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Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Discussing innovation data on the twentieth-century chemical industry, they con-
cluded: "All of this supports the notion of bunches of basic inventions and innova-
tions leading to the take-off of new industries.... It does not, however, demon-
strate any direct connection between this process and the 'trigger' of depression"
[Clark et a1., 1983, p. 74f.].
A similar argument is likely to apply with respect to other long-run structural
changes, such as the rise of the professional R&D lab during the twentieth cen-
tury.
For the twentieth century I took the Mensch data as revised by Clark et al., (1983,
p.68f.).
It should be mentioned that the Baker data in Figure 4.9 and Table 4.9 refer to
product-related breakthrough patents. The process-related patents show a
different pattern. A detailed discussion and documentation of the classification of
the Baker cases by product versus process patents can be found in Kleinknecht
(1987, ch. 4).
The main difference between my results and those by Solomou does not seem to be
due to the use of a different test formula, but rather to a different periodization.
For example, Solomou applies the Mensch (cluster) periodization to the van Duijn
data. Since the latter show a (broad) wave pattern rather than a narrow cluster
pattern, it is not surprising that Solomou finds an almost perfect random-walk
pattern (see Solomou, 1986a, p. 109).
Recent work at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis at Laxen-
burg, Austria, suggests that the diffusion paths of specific technologies (e.g., in the
energy and transportation sector or in the steel industry) seem to fit into the
framework of Kondratieff long waves, even during those periods in the eighteenth
and nineteenth century for which evidence of macroeconomic long waves is poor;
see Marchetti (1986), Nakicenovic (1986), or Griibler and Nakicenovic (1987).
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Appendix
Table -I.A1. Calculations of t-test for upswings and downswings of long waves.
BtUlic innovations according to van Duijn (1989)
Periods Mean SD SE t -value d./. Prob.
1861-1881 0.8571 0.7928
0.3278 0.871 20 0.192
1881-1901 1.1428 1.2761
0.3137 2.225 20 0.019
1901-1927 0.4444 0.7510
0.2428 2.287 26 0.015
1927-1962 1.0000 1.1710
0.2478 2.824 9 0.015
1962-1971 0.3000 0.4830
Basic innovations according to Haustein and Neuwirth (198e)
Periods Mean SD SE t -value d.f. Prob.
1861-1881 0.8571 0.9102
0.4208 2.149 20 0.022
1881-1901 1.7619 1.7001
0.4042 2.343 20 0.015
1901-1927 0.8148 0.8337
0.2873 2.191 26 0.019
1927-1962 1.4444 1.3404
0.4008 0.428 10 insignif.
1962-1972 1.2727 1.1037
Mensch's eOth-century btUlic innovations tUI revised by Clark et aI. (1989)
Periods Mean SD BE t -value d./. Prob.
1901-1927 0.4814 0.8024
0.2411 3.302 26 0.002
1927-1962 1.2777 1.1112
0.3507 2.013 7 0.040
1962-1968 0.5714 0.7867
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CHAPTER 5
A Theory of Growth Rate Discontinuities
Robert U. Ayres
5.1. Introduction
The circumstances of accelerating use, and possible near- or medium-term
exhaustion, of fossil energy resource - together with major uncertainties as to the
feasibility, cost, and timing of downstream substitutes - constitute a challenge
for economic analysis. Several frameworks are possible. The case where technol-
ogy offers no substitution possibility was examined many years ago by Gray
(1914) and Hotelling (1931). Decades later, Nordhaus (1973) considered a vari-
ant case in which the supply curve becomes infinite at some finite price, where
the so-called "backstop" technology takes over and provides unlimited energy
availability. Stiglitz (1974, 1979) assumes technological progress occurs at a con-
stant rate, regardless of policy, indefinitely.
Dasgupta and Heal (1974, 1979) introduced a different twist. In their ear-
lier models, the new technology eliminates the need for the resource, but it
arrives exogenously and costlessly at some uncertain time in the future. In more
recent work these authors, as well as Kamien and Schwartz (1978, 1982) and
others, have examined variations in which the new development itself becomes
endogenous and costly. In the context of energy analysis, these models largely
retain the backstop concept, the focus being on a single, millennial, breakthrough
technology and on optimal policy during the interim period. A useful recent
summary of the status of this literature has been given by Huettner (1981).
A simple framework adopted in the present paper differs from some of
those cited above in several ways.[I] First, no technological millennium, in the
Nordhaus sense, is envisaged. Rather, technical progress is identified with a
Reprinted from JoumoJ 0/ Environmental Economic, and Management 16 (1988):439--461. Copy-
right © 1988 by Academic PreBs, Inc.
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continuously increasing function of technological knowledge, T, which is taken to
be an explicit, endogenously determined factor of production. Second, all factors
of production, including technological knowledge, are assumed to be forms of
condensed or "embodied" forms of information. Information is used in the
technical sense introduced by Hartley (1928) and elaborated by Shannon (1948),
Brillouin (1953), and others. The substitutability (or interconvertibility) of fac-
tors of production follows naturally. Third, following from the above, both
resource inputs and outputs of the production process can also be thought of as
forms of condensed information and measured in "bits." The ratio of aggregate
outputs (e.g., GNP) to input thus becomes a natural Generalized measure of the
state of technology at a given time.
Much more can be said on the last point. It is one to which many econo-
mists raise objections, almost reflexively. However, many of the common objec-
tions are rooted in intuitive and rather imprecise uses of the concept of informa-
tion. The following section is intended to provide some explanatory background
material on this topic. It can be skipped by any reader who is either (a) already
moderately comfortable with concepts of standard information theory (as used
by engineers and physicists) or (b) willing to suspend disbelief and accept - for
purposes of argument - that all economic quantities (labor, capital, resources,
outputs) can be quantitatively measured in the same physical unit ("bits").
One caveat is essential at this point. The assertion that all economic quan-
tities can be measured in bits does not preclude their also being measurable in
value units (e.g., dollars). The two kinds of units need not be proportional, any
more than the relative prices of two materials necessarily coincide with their
relative masses. The model introduced later does not seek to maximize the abso-
lute information content of economic output. It does seek to maximize the utility
of that information output. Thus, a subtle and possibly controversial feature of
this model is that it assumes the existence of such a utility function, Le., a con-
sistent relationship between the information embodied in final products and ser-
vices produced by the economy and the utility thereof. IT there is to be a debate,
it should probably focus on whether such a utility function can consistently be
determined.
5.2. Information
Technically speaking, information is a measure of uncertainty (Shannon, 1951),
of negative entropy or negentropy (Brillouin, 1953), or of distinguishability or
generalized distance (Tribus & McIrvine, 197I). The more distinguishable or
nonrandom a subsystem is, the more information it embodies. This is true of
telegraphic or telephonic messages, wireless transmissions, photographs, atomic
or molecular assemblages, materials, shapes, and physical structures. It is also
true of organizations and social systems.
Methods for numerical computation of information content are available for
communications applications and for homogeneous physical-chemical systems.
Computational schemes can be developed, in principle, for the more complex
cases. In general, the information content of a manufactured thing corresponds
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roughly to the number of symbols or words that would be required to describe it
efficiently (e.g., in a computer program).
Solar radiation is information-rich because it is highly distinguishable (in
terms of equivalent black-body temperature) from the low-temperature back-
ground radiation. High-quality metal ores contain information because their
composition is highly distinguishable from the surrounding earth's crust; purified
metals contain even more information for the same reason; and so on.
Knowledge is a useful subset of information that can be regarded as a factor
of production. Not all information is knowledge, but all knowledge is informa-
tion. "Useful," in this context, merely means that it contributes to the produc-
tion of useful goods and services. A more extended discussion of the relationship
between information and knowledge has been included as Appendix A.
While knowledge can be assumed to increase, in principle, without physical
limit (if one continues investing in R&D), its impact on productivity is assumed
to be subject to diminishing returns. Both the assumption of concavity - or
diminishing returns - and the assumption that technological knowledge is
endogenous to the productive system are in contrast to views in some of the
extant economic growth literature. However, one important notion underlying
the approach described in this paper is that natural resources, labor, physical
capital, and knowledge are all condensed forms of information and therefore
mutually substitutable, within limits to be discussed later.
In fact, it requires no great leap of the imagination, at this point, to inter-
pret physical capital stock as knowledge (Le., useful information) embodied in
material form. Similarly, various skill levels of labor can readily be interpreted
as knowledge embodied in human workers. When capital equipment depreciates
due to wear and tear, the (useful) information content embodied in its design
(form and function) is gradually lost. As a cutting tool loses its physical edge, its
distinguishability is obviously decreased, as is its economic productivity.
The interpretation of capital and labor as embodiments of knowledge does
not alter the desirability of taking into account the fact that the economic system
also depends on a continuing flow of available energy or essergy. Available
energy (essergy) is the ultimate resource, in the same sense that all other
material resources can be extracted from the earth's crust, in principle, if enough
energy is available. Energy (essergy) flux from the sun is, of course, the ultimate
source of all localized negentropic (information) accumulation on the earth. This
being so, the solar energy flux is, in effect, a flux of information. Similarly, the
earth's store of fossil fuels can be regarded as a stock of information. Some of
the latter can be captured and embodied by biological and/or technological
processes in other (even more condensed) forms, such as capital goods or prod-
ucts.
5.3. Technical Efficiency and Technological Knowledge
The essential equivalence of resources and energy is widely accepted (e.g.,
"energy is the ultimate resource"), and the equivalence of useful or available
energy and information (negentropy) has already been discussed. Thus, in the
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final analysis both economic inputs (resources) and economic outputs (goods and
services) can be viewed as forms of information. These forms differ primarily in
terms of the extent to which information is embodied in composition, structure,
shape or form, and knowledge content or quality.
The model discussed hereafter assumes that the modern economic system
as a whole is a kind of information processor, which continuously converts mas-
sive amounts of crude information (negentropy) into a much smaller quantity of
refined information. The latter takes the form of knowledge stocks and human
services. [2] Both kinds of information flow are measurable in bits per sec. The
processing efficienclJ of the economic slJstem can be defined as the ratio of infor-
mation output flux to information input flux. This statement is both trivial and
truly profound, as will be seen.
It is convenient at this point to introduce a variable E( T), where T is a
measure of technological knowledge T, such that E is constrained to the range
zero to unity. For reasons that will be clearer subsequently, it is convenient to
think of E as a generalized efficiency measure. It is convenient to let
E = [1 + exp(To - T)]-l, (5.1)
where To is a large number (by assumption) such that E = 0.5 when T = To.
Evidently if To is large, E is very small for small values of T (T<< To) and
asymptotically approaches unity for very large T (T> > To). Solving for T,
T = To + In(E/l - E). (5.2)
The growth of the stock of technological knowledge T can be presumed, for pur-
poses of the model, to follow a simple law, viz.,
t = J, (5.3)
where J is the annual creation (or destruction) of new knowledge. J is a function
of time, of course. The rate of embodiment (or fixation) of knowledge in capital,
labor, products, etc., is presumably proportional to the rate of acquisition of new
knowledge owing to R&D over some prior period.
The productivity measure E satisfies a nonlinear differential equation, viz.,
E = E(l - E)J, (5.4)
where J (previously defined) is the aggregate annual rate of addition to the stock
of knowledge. It can be seen that E is an elongated more or less S-shaped curve.
It is exponentially rising, at first, but after passing a point of inflection, it enters
a concave region of saturation, asymptotically approaching unity. IT J is a con-
stant, it may be noted that the solution to equation (5.4) is the familiar logistic
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curve. This qualitative behavior is, incidentally, characteristic of most individual
technology measures over time.
As technical efficiency E asymptotically approaches unity (Le., progress
continues for a very long time), the economic system generates the maximum
possible output of final services, per capita, from a given resource (crude infor-
mation) flux. Nothing whatever is implied about the need for physical materials,
as such, since materials can always be recycled from the environment if enough
energy is available.
5.4. An Optimal Economic Growth Model
I now introduce an explicit optimal growth model incorporating many of the con-
cepts outlined in preceding paragraphs. In this model, it is assumed that labor
force is an exogenous variable proportional to population and independent of
other economic variables. For the sake of concreteness, let
L = bN, (5.5)
where N is the total population.
It is conventional in the economic literature to make the usual Malthusian
assumption, for convenience, that population N grows exponentially over time,
at a constant rate g. This seems simplistic (on biological grounds) and unneces-
sary. A more reasonable assumption seems to be that humans can, and eventu-
ally will, regulate their population to the level that can be supported by the phy-
sical environment. In fact, the rate of world population growth has declined
significantly in the last 20 years. A simple differential equation having roughly
the desired asymptotic behavior is
N= gN(l- N/fi), (5.6)
where N is the maximum population theoretically sustainable by conventional
agriculture, given existing world soil characteristics, rainfall, insulation, and
topographic conditions (Pearl, 1922). One need not be concerned at present with
the numerical value of N.[3] I will focus attention, subsequently, on aggregate
production and consumption, with the understanding that per capita measures
are derivable from them.
Next, consider the stock of fixed (constant vintage) invested capital K.
The usual assumed accumulation law is
K= 1- dK, (5.7)
where I is the current level of investment and d is the rate of physical deprecia-
tion, assumed to be constant, for convenience. The nonnegativity of investment
I 2: 0 implies that fixed capital cannot be consumed although the stock can
decline as a result of depreciation. For internal consistency, K measures the
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quantity of constant-vintage capital referred to in a given vintage year (e.g.,
1985). It is, of course, true that successive technological improvements will tend
to increase the capabilities of machines and/or structures built at later times.
Thus, a given quantity of constant capital will be equivalent in productive capa-
bility to a smaller qua~tity of current capital, at any future time. This perfor-
mance improvement reflects the continuous embodiment of new technological
knowledge. The specific mathematical form describing the embodiment of tech-
nology in capital need not be considered at this stage.
For purposes of this model, it is necessary to define two distinct kinds of
capital K 1 and K 2• By assumption, K 1 is used in the production of final goods
and services while K 2 is used in the direct capture of solar energy (renewable
resources). This is assumed for convenience to be a capital-intensive activity,
though it could also be labor-intensive. Thus, we define
K = K 1 + K 2•
Similarly, capital investment has two components:
I = II + 12,
(5.8)
(5.9)
In the model, crude information (essergy) resources are required to drive
economic activity. The quantity of essergy R needed is a function of the total
output of goods and services by the economy, II(K, L, E), where E = E(T).
Given the view that economic output II(K, L, E) can be measured in terms of
information (bits) and resource input R is also a measure of information input, it
makes sense to define E as the dimensionless ratio of aggregate outputs II to
aggregate essergy inputs R (both measured in bits)
E =.!lR' (5.10)
Note that this ratio is necessarily less than unity because energy becomes
increasingly unavailable (i.e., entropy increases) at each stage of the production
process from materials extraction to final assembly. As entropy increases, stage
by stage, the total information (negentropy) contained in product-plus- environ-
ment necessarily decreases. Thus, equation (5.10) has physical content. In fact,
the condition II/R < 1 is required by the second law of thermodynamics. Evi-
dently, the essergy resource requirement at any time is precisely
R - II
E' (5.U)
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The supply of essergy R at any given time may come from either of two
sources, viz., fossil fuels or some renewable source (such as biomass) originating
in the solar flux. In reality fossil fuels are not free by any means, since they
must be extracted, processed, and distributed. However, for purposes of the
model, it is interesting to assume the existence of an initial stock 80 of essergy
that can be extracted costlessly at any desired rate until it is exhausted.[4] Use-
ful essergy can also be extracted from the sun, but only in proportion to the
amount of capital K 2 invested for that purpose. To be consistent with the
viewpoint adopted above, it is also convenient to divide aggregate production
itself into two components
II = II 1{K1, L, E(T)} + II2 {K2}, (5.12)
where II2 is the output of the "renewable essergy" sector. The latter can be con-
ceptualized as a set of unmanned solar satellites and ground stations, embodying
capital K 2 (although it might equally well be some other kind of infrastructure).
Since the solar-powered utility sector consumes no essergy, equations (5.10) and
(5.11) can be simplified by substituting III for II. The essergy resource supply at
any time can be written
R = - 51 + C2K 2, (5.13)
where 51 (a negative number) is the rate of change of the stock 81 of fossil
essergy and C2 is a parameter.[5] Equation (5.13) can thus be rewritten to elim-
inate R, viz.,
- 51 = II11 E - C2K2• (5.14)
The total amount of exhaustible resources extracted over time is limited to the
size of the original stockpile, viz.,
00 00
81(0)=- J 51dt = J(lId E - C2K2)dt.
o 0
(5.15)
using equation (5.14).
An assumption adopted in some of the recent energy and economics litera-
ture is to treat the resource (essergy) flux R as a state variable (analogous to K)
and thus as a factor of production.[6] This is compatible with the observed fact
that the aggregate essergy flux is roughly proportional to the output II of goods
and services [equation (5.11)]. For recent empirical evidence in favor of this
view, see Cleveland et al., (1984).
64 [Ale Cycle. and Long Wave.
However, notwithstanding the fact that essergy is essential for production -
a point emphasized by Dasgupta and Heal (1974, 1979) - I believe that to
include it as a factor of production on a par with capital and labor would involve
some undesirable double counting of factors. Essergy is both an intermediate
and a final good. It is embodied to a small extent in materials; but for the most
part, intermediate essergy is used to operate capital equipment. To a large
extent energy (essergy) is a complement not a substitute for other factors. [7]
Hence, to increase the essergy supply without changing capital or labor would
have little or no impact on total output. I assume, in effect, that essergy availa-
bility is not a limiting factor in the medium term, though it might be a con-
straint in the very short run (less than 10 years) or the very long run (millions of
years).
It is intuitively obvious that investment in capital stock of the second type,
K 2 , is infeasible until a considerable conventional productive capacity exists.
Thus, investments in the earliest period must be either in "ordinary capital" K 1
or in knowledge T, depending upon which is more productive at the time. It is
not quite obvious which of these two comes first. (It is a problem not unlike "the
chicken or the egg" conundrum) Quite possibly the optimal choice is to invest
simultaneously, as will be seen later.
Starting with our already industrialized economy, it is clear that both K 1
and T are essential. There can be no production without a finite stock of both
ordinary capital and knowledge. On the other hand, we have not yet begun to
invest to a significant degree in building up the stock of extraordinary capital
(K2) needed to provide renewable (non-fossil) essergy in the future.[8]
5.5. Formulation as an Optimal Control Problem
It is appropriate now to introduce a utility function U( Y) in which Y is aggre-
gate consumption and what is consumed is information in some condensed form.
This is the point in which many economists may choose to differ with the
assumptions in this paper. It is not clear, a priori, that such a utility function
can be consistently defined. I have already commented briefly on the equivalence
of goods to embodied information. Goods, in turn, generate services, which con-
tribute to the maintenance, extension, and enjoyment of life. The purpose of life
itself is arguable, but human life - after early infancy - seems to be intimately
concerned with awareness or consciousness. Awareness, in turn, is impossible
without sensory stimulus and response. The fact that a TV set or book
"delivers" information services to consumers is obvious. It is perhaps slightly
less obvious that a house or car also delivers services (via the senses) and these
services are also equivalent to information. In any case, I assume that services
constitute a form of information flux, in the same sense that knowledge is a form
of information stock.[9]
Having said this, one can make the usual assumption that U( Y) is strictly
concave and twice differentiable. It follows that U'( Y) is a decreasing function
of Y. To be consistent, I now define current consumption in terms of production
and investment:
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In any realistic case one can assume that Y ~ 0, where II + 12 + J < III' It
remains to ascertain the optimal path for consumption and the three types of
investment.
An optimal consumption-investment policy requires that one maximizes an
integral (representing welfare) over time, subject to a number of constraints.
The expression to be maximized is
II
W = Jexp(-ot)U(Y)dt + a1K1(z) + a2K2(z)
o
+ agT(z) + a48 (z),
(5.17)
where 0 is an assumed intertemporal discount rate or interest rate and z, fixed in
advance, is the end of the planning period. In this case z is taken to be very
large, but finite. The constants aI' a2' ag, and a4 are inserted to guarantee that
the terminal conditions for an optimal solution will be satisfied. They are chosen
to put a prohibitively high penalty on negative values of the state variables at
the terminal point. Apart from this, the ai need not be specified further (see
Arrow, 1968).
The integral W in equation (5.17) must be maximized subject to a number
of formal restrictions, including the first-order constraints on state variables, viz.,
(5.1) or (5.4), (5.7), (5.8), (5.9), (5.11), (5.17), and (5.13); plus the nonnegative
investment conditions II ~ 0, 12 ~ 0, J ~ 0; and the nonnegative rate of fossil
resource extraction (8 ~ 0). The latter can be expressed in integral form, as in
equation (5.15).
It should be noted that the assumed population growth equation (5.6) is
completely independent of the rest of the system and affects the optimal path of
consumption only to the extent that the total of available output must be shared
among the entire population at any given time. It is also noted that the current
resource (essergy) flux is not a state variable inasmuch as it is absolutely depen-
dent on the total output of goods and services, which defines the demand for
resource inputs. It can therefore be eliminated from the equations.
As already pointed out, I have assumed four kinds of "stocks": productive
capital (K1), energy capital (K2), knowledge (T), and fossil essergy (81), The
technical efficiency variable E is defined by (5.1) in terms of knowledge T, and
vice versa (5.2). The solutions to the optimization problem are derived in
Appendix B. It is interesting that the equations are separable and the shadow
price trajectories can be derived explicitly.
5.6. Implications
The implications of the model can best be seen by examining the behavior of the
four shadow price variables PK1 , PK'Z' P T, and Ps over time. The important
thing to observe is that both PK1 and PT are initially declining functions of time,
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while Ps and PK2 are initially increasing. The shadow prices at the starting
time t = 0 need not be identical, but the optimal investment policy is always to
invest in that form of capital whose shadow price times marginal productivity
(or price-productivity product) is highest. As a stock increases, its shadow price
comes down, and conversely.
Now it is worthwhile to examine the behavior of the four shadow prices:
Ps equation (5.41), PK2 equation (5.42), PK1 equation (5.44), and PT equation
(5.46). From the structure of equation (5.41), it can be seen that Ps is a mono-
tonically increasing function (exp ot) with a monotonically decreasing function
that will eventually become negative (after the end of the planning period Z).
The product clearly increases to maximum, followed by a smooth decline.
From equation (5.42), which has the same structure, it is clear that the
shadow price PK2 of capital invested in alternative (or renewable) resource pro-
duction has the same qualitative behavior as Ps. In brief, it rises monotonically
to a maximum, then declines smoothly and monotonically toward the end of the
planning horizon.
The expression (5.44) for PK1 is more complicated, and it has a different
behavior. The first term is a monotonically decreasing function whenever the
exponent is negative, which is true whenever the marginal productivity of capital
K 1 is large enough for long enough. During periods of investment in
K 1 (II > 0), QK1 must vanish identically and the integral in the second term (in
braces) of equation (5.44) is necessarily positive. Thus, during periods of active
investment, PK1 is the product of a decreasing exponential function times a term
(in brackets) that starts at a constant, rises rapidly at first (because of the
integral over Ps, which is initially increasing), but approaches a maximum as the
argument of the integral approaches zero. In short, PK1 is, roughly, a declining
exponential multiplied by an increasing "8 curve." It is complex enough, how-
ever, to have "wiggles," corresponding to periods if (or when) the integral over
marginal productivity of capital of type K 1 falls below a critical level, such that
the exponent shifts from negative to positive.
It can be seen that the structure of equation (5.46) is similar to the struc-
ture of equation (5.44), and the behavior of PT is qualitatively similar to that of
PKt"
Thus, at the beginning of the planning period, two of the shadow prices
(Ps, PK2 ) are increasing and two of them (PK1 , PT) are decreasing.
It is common sense to assume that at the beginning of the period PK1 and
PT are large and PS, PK2 are zero or negligible. (IT this were not the case, there
could never be any investment in ordinary productive capital K 1 and/or
knowledge t 1 without which there could be no economic output from which sav-
ings can be extracted for any subsequent investment in alternative resources.)
Given the assumption that PK1 and PT are initially large but declining, while Ps
and PK2 are initially small but increasing, an intersection in trajectories is inevit-
able.
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Whenever two price-productivity products (PPPs) intersect, the optimal
policy is to shift investment from one to the other form of capital, until the
curves cross again, and so on. In principle, such investment switches may occur
arbitrarily often. The welfare loss that would result from a compromise policy of
investing simultaneously in two (or three) types of capital is therefore negligible.
Hence we can safely assume, hereafter, that the two declining PPPs, PK1 and
PT , are identical, at least during the early period of unrestrained growth.
It can be seen, now, that the optimal sequence of events, in general terms,
consists of four distinct phases:
Phase I (0 ~ t ~ t1) is characterized by declining PK1 and PT and invest-
ment, alternately or simultaneously, in two types of productive capital
K 1 and T. During this phase either II > 0 or J > 0, or both. But,
during Phase I, PK2 is increasing monotonically and 12 = O. Time t 1
is defined by the condition PK1 = PT = PK2 ' It can be shown
without difficulty that this must occur before the final exhaustion of
fossil resources (t,).
Phase II (t 1 ~ t ~ t2) is a transitional period, during which investment is
exclusively directed at building up the alternative energy capital K 2•
Thus 12 > 0 and II = 0, J = O. During this phase PK2 continues to
increase, but at a decreasing rate, until it reaches a maximum value,
before beginning to decrease. Meanwhile, PK1 and PT also change
slope. The two shadow prices PK1 and P T (and the corresponding
PK1 and PT) do not coincide during this phase because the stock of
productive capital K 1 depreciates, whereas the stock of technological
knowledge T does not. Thus, on physical grounds one would expect
PK to increase and P T to remain constant. Time t 2 is determined by1
the condition PI(. = PK .2 1
Phase III (t 2 ~ t ~ t3) is a second transitional period, during which the optimal
investment policy is a combination of K 1 and K 2 , either simultane-
ously or in alternation. This continues until both PK1 and PK2 have
declined to the point where they again equal PT' This defines time t 3 .
Phase IV (t 3 ~ t ~ z) is the final phase during which PK1 = PK2 = P T all
decline more or less simultaneously (i.e., in concert) to zero
(II > 0, 12 > 0, J > 0). It is convenient to equate this point with z,
the end of the planning period.
The sequence of phases is shown schematically in Figure 5.1. The implications
for economic growth are shown in Figure 5.1!. It is important to observe that
during Phase II, while investment is devoted exclusively to the buildup of K 2
(energy capital), the stock of ordinary capital K 1 is actually declining, whence
total output of ordinary goods and services TIl must also decline. A feasible (but
suboptimal) policy is to invest simultaneously in K 1 and K 2 (as in Phase III), so
as to just compensate for depreciation of K l' It might even be feasible to
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maintain a slow rate of increase in III by investing simultaneously in all three
forms of capital (as in Phase IV). Obviously either policy would stretch out the
transition resulting in a somewhat lower level of output in Phase IV and a lower
final level (at z).
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There are two significant implications of this result. First, a long-run
optimal policy [given the specification of welfare in equation (5.22)] is inherently
discontinuous, at least as regards investment policy. [10] It is not optimal to
invest in energy capital K 2 at early stages of the economic life cycle while the
stock of fossil resources S is still large; and it is not optimal to invest in K I dur-
ing the first part of the transition; finally, it is not optimal to invest in knowledge
T after time t l until K I has been restored to its previous level. It follows from
the shifts in optimal investment policy that economic growth will tend to follow
an irregular path. In particular, sharp discontinuities in growth rate would be
experienced, including a change from positive growth rate (slope) to negative
growth rate at time t l .
The reason for the discontinuities on the optimal path has been character-
ized by Arrow as "myopia." It must be remembered that the control model
implicitly postulates an investment decision algorithm based on shadow prices
and marginal productivities. In principle, these variables are continuously moni-
tored in real time, and investment for the next period are shifted to whatever
form of capital currently corresponds to the largest shadow price-productivity
product (PPP).
Of course, growth rate discontinuities in the real world tend to be painful
(and a more realistic utility function might attach higher utility to paths exhibit-
ing less discontinuous behavior, ceteris paribus). An easier way out of the
difficulty (suggested by Arrow) is to postulate a "central planner" with some
foresight. The planner would be allowed to smooth over potential discontinuities
by starting each investment shift somewhat early and extending it beyond the
point of theoretical intersection of shadow prices. There would be a small wel-
fare loss relative to the pure (myopic) optimum, but the planner could try to bal-
ance the welfare loss with the pain (loss) due to discontinuities.[ll]
Second, the model inherently accounts for (i.e., predicts) structural changes
in the economy. In the simple version described above, a new sector is created
beginning at time t l . In the generalized version, discussed later, it can be seen
that this sector-creation process can be repeated many times. It may be noted
that this seems to be a completely new feature of the present growth model.
Earlier equilibrium and growth models of Harrod (1936), Domar (1956), or von
Neumann (1945) are not compatible with structural change of the kind predicted
here.
5.7. A Multiperiod Generalization
On reflection, the rather specialized model analyzed above can probably be gen-
eralized quite easily. The key feature of the model, as described, is the exhaus-
tion of a stock of available "fossil" essergy and the buildup of a specialized stock
of capital, K 2, whose only function is to permit the economic system to exploit
renewable (solar) energy. However, the optimal path for economic growth would
be unchanged if K 2 were interpreted, instead, as a stock of "infrastructure" capi-
tal required to enable the use of a different (less readily available) stock of
exhaustible essergy. For analytic convenience, it was assumed that the building
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of this capital stock requires "ordinary" capital (and labor), but that, once built,
each unit of such infrastructure generates a continuous but decreasing flow of
essergy throughout its useful life without additional labor. This is a very reason-
able description of a solar satellite (as noted earlier) or a hydroelectric plant. It
is also a fairly realistic characterization of an oil or gas field, after the drilling is
completed and the pipelines are in place.
Given this generalized interpretation, Phase IV of the one-period model
would effectively become Phase I of a subsequent cycle. At some time, perhaps
after ta, but certainly before z, the "planner" would have to assess the magni-
tude of the second kind of resource stock (call it 82), which need not be accu-
rately known at the time of the initial plan, and identify the next specialized type
of infrastructure capital K a, and its annual essergy yield Ca' A new optimal
plan would then be generated for the next period. Figures 5.9 and 5.-4 suggest,
in schematic terms, how a multiperiod version of the model can be expected to
behave.
I~P;~~~tiVityroductsPK1· PT
PK2
o
Figure 5.9. Generalized economic cycle.
PK3
I .... oc
It is undeniable that Figure 5.-4 bears some resemblance to the so-called
Kondratieff long wave. Some economists still doubt that the cycle is "real."
However, if the model described in this paper is at all realistic, a wavelike
behavior should exist, though the periodicity need not be constant.
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Figure 5.,4. Generalized pattern of growth.
It is also undeniable that over the past 200 years of rapid industrialization
there have been a series of fairly dramatic shifts in dominant energy (essergy)
technology, from wood (charcoal) to coal, then to petroleum and electricity
(derived primarily from fossil fuels), and currently to natural gas and/or nuclear
power (Nakicenovic and Marchetti, 1979; Nakicenovic, 1986). The sequence of
substitutions is shown schematically in Figure 5.5
According to the logic of the model, a period of slow growth in ordinary
productivity should have occurred during the transition from wood to coal
(17808 in the UK, 1880s in the US); again during the transition from coal domi-
nance to oil dominance (the 1930s?); and finally during the transition from oil to
gas (the 1980s?). This is a fascinating speculation, to be sure, but too heavy a
burden to lay on such a simple model at this stage. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to note that the behavior predicted by the model is, at least, qualitatively, con-
sistent with some aspects of historical experience.
5.8. Conclusion
The picture is still too crude to reflect adequately what happens in the real
world, of course. One obvious oversimplification is the implicit assumption that
each essergy source is homogeneous in grade, with constant capital/output ratio
(or yield factor C2, Ca, ...) over its lifetime. This is unrealistic, of course, and
72
F/(l-F)
10 2
Life eve/e. and Lo"'J Wow.
Fraction (F)
0.99
..... wood ~ coal~ '-~
"--~ ~ / -.....
~
"- -'~/ ...........~ y ~ ~ /"
~~ ~ ;><..,
J ..,.....
"g- ,../ ........... ./ ........
/ /I' ~/ ~/
ollA p nat-gas nuclea~ . solfus
10 1
10 0
10- 1
10-2
1850 1900 1950 2000
0.90
0.70
0.50
0.30
0.10
0.01
2050
Figure 5.5. World primary energy substitution.
real resources are quite inhomogeneous. Moreover, it has been shown by
Herfindahl (1967), among others, that it is optimal to utilize the highest grades
of ore first. As a consequence, the quality or grade of the remaining stock of any
fossil resource tends to decline over time, which implies that more and more
economic effort must be devoted to extraction and refining activities over time.
This means that the surplus for consumption or reinvestment lags increasingly
over time, in comparison with what it would be in the idealized case illustrated
by Figure 5.-1.
Heterogeneity of actual resource stocks, together with heterogeneity of uses,
explains why it can be optimal to exploit more than one different type of
resource at the same time, as occurs in the real world.[12] Inhomogeneity and
heterogeneity in the system undoubtedly help to smooth out, to some extent, the
sharp discontinuities in economic growth rate shown in Figure 5.-1. However, it
is not likely that smoothing due to heterogeneity could totally eliminate the
occurrence of changes in growth rate from time to time owing to periodic shifts
in investment from one major resource infrastrw:tnre to another.
A more penetrating criticism of the present model might be that it is based
on the assumption of a single utility function for society as a whole. It is certain
that humans and organizations do not in general attempt to specify a utility
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function for decision making. In fact, most do not utilize any optimizing meth-
odology in decision making. Even if firms or individuals can be assumed to
behave like rational "utility maximizers," in the sense of von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944), it is unclear that the combined behavior of many independent
individual decision makers would result in overall economic behavior equivalent
to that of a single utility-maximizing entity. Thus, the validity of any such
model as this is open to question on several points. Nevertheless, the model
seems to capture two important but hitherto elusive aspects of macroeconomic
behavior. This would appear to justify further investigations, at both the
theoretical and empirical levels.
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Notes
[I]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Some features of the present framework were first suggested in Resources,
Environment && Economics (Ayres, 1978).
There is an obvious analogy between crude information and crude oil. Refined
petroleum products have less energy content but much greater utility than crude
oil.
However, see Buringh et a1., 1975, for example. Obviously, if humans were able to
colonize other planets or grow food in orbiting space colonies, terrestrial limita-
tions would not apply.
Calculating the optimal consumption of such a stock has been called the "cake-
eating problem" for obvious reasons.
The subscripts 1 and 2 are used to facilitate a later generalization regarding
several kinds of alternative essergy stocks, 8 1, 82, 83, and types of infrastructure
K 2, K 3,····
See, for instance, Hudson and Jorgenson (1974); Allen et a1. (1976); Manne
(1977); Hogan and Manne (1977).
See Berndt and Jorgenson (1973); Berndt and Wood (1977); Griffin and Gregory
(1976).
Reasonable people may disagree on whether nuclear fuel is, in any sense, a substi-
tute for fossil essergy or merely another kind of fossil fuel. It does not matter in
the context of our model.
I am indebted to T. Vasko for pointing out that the Russian scientist Academician
V.A. Trapeznikov made essentially the same argument in 1966.
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It must be pointed out that the phase transition is not discontinuous in the sense
that the consumable resource runs out suddenly. Nor is there any discontinuity in
resource price at the point where the initial substitution of the alternative of
essergy resource (renewable or not) for the depletable resource. This transition
begins at a point where the shadow prices are equal. An extended discussion of
this issue can be found in Tietenberg (1984, Chapter 6). I am indebted to a
reviewer for calling my attention to this point.
Probably the planner would use an optimal control model in a simulation mode.
The "grade" of a resource can only be defined in relation to a specific use. Thus
coal is a very low-grade resource in terms of providing liquid fuels for automotive
vehicles or aircraft, and it is scarcely better in terms of providing gas for house-
hold heating. On the other hand, coking coal is a very high-grade resource for
purposes of smelting iron ore.
Appendix A: Information and Knowledge
In fact, one can clearly identify and distinguish at least three distinct forms of informa-
tion. There is an obvious analogy with the distinct forms of matter (solid, liquid, and
gas), although I do not pursue it further here.
(1) Disembodied information is associated with the temperature on spectral charac-
teristics of incoherent electromagnetic or thermal radiation (energy). It is quanti-
tatively proportional to the available useful work (or essergy) content of the
energy flux.
(2) Information is embodied in the (average) state and chemical composition of
unstructured matter, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, or in the physical micro-
structure of a crystal or glass.
(3) Information is embodied in the form or shape of a solid medium, (two or three
dimensions) or in the structure of a macromolecule (such as DNA).
The first two categories are essentially thermodynamic. Explicit rules for comput-
ing each type of information content in quantitative terms have been formulated. Note
that the third category includes information as we normally use the term, viz., a photo-
graph, symbols on a printed sheet of paper, a magnetized tape, a precision gear, or a
pattern of impurities in a silicon chip. Information of the third kind can be (and often
is) transmitted via telecommunications channels, converted from one form (e.g., analog
data) to another equivalent form (e.g., digital data) and "processed" by computers.
Note that the third kind of information can only be stored and processed (i.e., util-
ized) by living organisms and/or material devices that also embody information of the
second kind. Moreover, all such organisms and devices require a flux of available useful
work (essergy) for their maintenance. Thus, information of the third kind is, in some
sense, the essence or condensate of a much larger quantity of information of the first and
second kinds. It can be termed "morphological."
Knowledge can perhaps be thought of as a fourth kind of information or as the
"useful" component of information of the third kind. It has been suggested that
knowledge is the minimum information required to decode a message or to reproduce
forms or patterns. IT this is true, knowledge is a form of information embodied in a
decoder or copying machine, or possibly in a living reproductive cell or a brain.
Knowledge is therefore literally undefinable in the absence of a supporting material sys-
tem. The more knowledge is embodied in the decoder, the less information needs to be
transmitted to reproduce the original message, or object.
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There is no general means of computing the minimum information requirement to
reproduce an object except for objects themselves defined in terms of computer lan-
guages. In this context, it is noteworthy that there is a computer science literature on
algorithmic information theory, for example, Chaitin (1978). Although quantitative for-
mulas are lacking in general, it is safe to assume that the knowledge component of
stored or transmitted information of the third kind is normally quite small, compared
with the total amount of information of all kinds that must be mobilized to store or
transmit it. In other words, much form and structure information is actually redundant.
It follows, incidentally, that while the amount of thermodynamic information (of the
second kind) that can be extracted each year from all eources (fossil fuels plus solar flux)
is indeed limited, this in itself imposes no practical limitation on the rate of accumula-
tion of human knowledge relevant to the production of goods or services.
Appendix B: Solution to the Optimization Problem
To solve the optimization problem stated above (following Takayama, 1974) we define a
Hamiltonian system with three "controls" 11, 12, and J:
H = ~O[U(Il1 - 11- 12-1) + a1K1 + a2K2 + aa t + a,,51]
+ Px (11 - d1K1) + Px (12 - d2K2) + PTJ1 ~
A III
- rS(""E - C2K2)+ QX/1 + Qx 12+ QTJ + QS51·
(5.18)
It can be shown without difficulty that ~o can be set equal to unity without loss of gen-
erality. Moreover, the three terminal conditions are automatically satisfied by defining
Px = Px +all Px = Px +a2' PT = PT+aa, and Ps = Ps-a". This yields the simpler1 1 ~ ~
equivalent Hamiltonian:
H = U(Il1 - 11 - 12 -1) + PX1(h-d1K1)
III
+ PX~(12-d2K2) + PTJ - Ps(E - C2K2)
+ QX/1 + QX/2 + QTJ + QS5 1·
(5.19)
The c~state variables PX
1
' Px~, PT, and Ps are canonical conjugates of K1, K2, T,
and 5 11 respectively. They are usually interpreted as shadow prices of the corresponding
stocks KlI K2, 5 11 and T. The Lagrange multipliers Qx, QT, and Qs are zero or positive,
but the products Qx • 11• Qx • 12• QTJ, and QS5 1 are all identically zero. Thus, introduc-1 ~
ing the nonnegativity constraints:
QX1 = 0 whenever 11 > OJ otherwise Qx~ ~ 0
Qx~ = 0 whenever 12 > OJ otherwise Qx~ ~ 0
QT = 0 whenever J > 0; otherwise QT ~ 0
Qs = 0 whenever 51> OJ otherwise Qs ~ O.
Two other nonnegativity constraints could be included, t!iz.,- $ > 0 (resources are never
put back into the ground) and h + 12 + J < III (investment never exceeds current
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production). However, the constrained and unconstrained solutions are essentially iden-
tical.
The first three Euler-Lagrange equations for an optimal path are obtained by par-
tially differentiating the Hamiltonian (5.19) with respect to 11' 12, and J, respectively:
8H =0 = -U'(y) + PK1+ QK1811
8H =0 =-U'(y) + PK~ + QK~812
8H = 0 = - U'( y) + PT + QT'8J
It follows from equations (5.20), (5.21), and (5.22) that
PK1+ QK1= PK~ + QK~ = PT + QT = U'(y),
(5.20)
(5.21)
(5.22)
(5.23)
where U'( Y) is the maginal utility of aggregate consumption. It follows from (5.23) and
the nonnegativity conditions that the optimal investment rule is to invest in that type of
capital with the largest shadow price. This can be demonstrated by assuming the con-
trary. For instance, let PK1 < PK~ but assume simultaneous investment in both; i.e.,
11 > 0 and 12 > 0 at the same time. Then from the nonnegativity conditions
QK = QK = o. From (5.23) it would follow that PK = U'(y) and that PK = U'(y).I ~ I ~
But this is not possible, by assumption that PK1 < PK~'
Taking this line of reasoning further, one can now derive the following expressions
for the Qs:
o
QK =IPK - PKI I ~ I
PT - PK1
o
QK =lpK - PK~ I ~
PT - PK~
o
QT= IPK, - PT
PK~ - PT
if PK1 > PK~' PT
if PK~ > PK1, PT
if PT> PK1, PK~
if PK~ > PK1 ' PT
if PK1 > PK~' PT
if PT > PK1 ' PK~
if PT > PK1 ' PK~
if PK1 > PK~' PT
if PK~ > PK1 ' PT'
(5.24)
(5.25)
(5.26)
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The co-state variables PK1 , PK2, PT, and PS' together with the corresponding
state variables K 1, K 2, T, and S, satisfy the following canonical system of differential
equations, which are conditions for a solution:
aH =1(1
aPK1
aH =1(2
aPK2
aH = t
aPT
aH =5
aps
aH .
aK
l
= - (PK1 - 6PK1 )
aH .
aK
2
= - (PK2 - 6PK2 )
aH = - (l'T - 6PT)aT
aH = - (I's - 6Ps).as
(5.27)
(5.28)
(5.29)
(5.30)
(5.31)
(5.32)
(5.33)
(5.34)
To solve the set of eight differential equations (5.27)-(5.34) we need eight con-
stants of integration. These are determined by so-called transversality conditions. For
the four state variables K l' K 2, T, and S, it is reasonable and sufficient to fix initial
values at time t = O. The initial values can be zero or finite. Except for PS' the
corresponding co-state variables must be fixed at the terminal point t = z. Here it is
reasonable (though not necessary) to assume
PK1(Z) = PK2(z) = PT(z) = o. (5.35)
However, if we specify S(z) = 0, then PS(z) > 0 and conversely. The case of a declin-
ing, but still nonzero, resource stock would imply PS(z) > 0, with the useful
simplification that Qs = 0 for all t ~ t,. The following derivation is based on the
simplification that z = t" whence Qs = 0 at all times t ~ z. In the more general case
where t, < z, it can be shown that PSis discontinuous at t, and declines for
~ < t < z. In this period Q, is nonzero and must be determined by using the condition
::; = 0, which implies [from (5.14)] that C2K 2 = III/E.
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It is interesting to note, by the way, that the condition of vanishing shadow prices
(5.35) implies that the marginal utility of consumption U'( Y) also declines to zero [by
(5.23)1, which means that a consumption plateau is finally reached at 1= s. When the
indicated differentials of the Hamiltonian are carried out, the results are a set of four
first-order differential equations for the shadow prices PK1 , PK2 , PT, and Ps as follows:
OIlI 1 OIlI
0= PK1 - (6 + dl)PK l + U'(Y) (oKI ) - Ps( E OKI )
0= PK2 - (6 + d2)PK2 + C2Ps
OIlI 0 III
0= PT - 6PT + U'(Y) ( oT) - Ps oT(E)
0= Ps - 6Ps + Qs'
(5.36)
(5.37)
(5.38)
(5.39)
It should be pointed out that (5.38) assumes that output III is explicitely dependent on
T, but that there is no implicit dependence through K I or K2• In other words,
oKI/oT = oK2/oT = O. (5.40)
This reflects the fact that K I and K2 are pure measures of the quantity of capital.
Improvements in the quality of capital and labor are reflected by increases in T alone.
The most general solution of (5.39) is
t
Ps(l) = e6t IPs(0) - f QsW)dt'l = Ps (0)e6t ,
tI
(5.41)
since Qs = 0 holds for all I < I" The next step is to substitute equation (5.41) for (5.37)
and solve. The result is
PK =exp(6 + d2) PK(O) - c2i PSW)exp(d21')dt'I'
2 1 0 (5.42)
which rises to a maximum value (when PK2 =0) and then falls, becoming negative when
the term in square brackets becomes negative. The initial value of PK(O) must be chosen
large enough such that PK2 vanishes at I = s, as required by (5.35).
To solve (5.36) and (5.38) we can again substitute (5.41) and also use (5.23).
Equation (5.36) becomes
.... oIlI OIlI Ps
0= rK - (6 + d l - -) PK - (-)(- - QK )1 oKI loKI E 1 (5.43)
~" U.AJI"U
with the general solution
, oil IPK1 =expl!(6 + II. - oK~ )dt'
! ' I" 1Ps oil. oil.x PK1(O) + ! (/F - QK1) oK. exp -! (6 + II. - oK.) dt· dt',
where QK
1
is given by (5.24). Similarly (5.38) becomes
[ oil.loll. oil.o = PT - 6 - - PT - -(-) Ps + (-) QToT oT E oT
and has the solution
, oil
PT =exp If (6 - _.)dt'o oT
[ ,[ [1 I" rIo Il. oil. oil. • ,x PT(O) +! Ps oT /F - QT oT exp ! (6 - oT) dt
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(5.44)
(5.45)
(5.46)
and QT is given by (5.26). When (5.24) is inserted to (5.44) to eliminate QK1, the result
is an integral equation. The same is true when (5.26) is substituted into (5.46). It can
be verified without much difficulty that (5.44) and (5.46) are well behaved for reason-
able values of parameters. In particular, the shadow price of productive capital, PK1 , is
a (generally) decreasing function of time - as it should be - as long as the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital oIl./oK. is greater than the sum of pure utility discount rate (if
any) plus the depreciation rate; i.e.,
oil.
--> 6oK. + II•.
Similarly, the shadow price of technological knowledge PT is a generally decreasing func-
tion of time, provided the marginal productivity of knowledge exceeds the discount rate
oil.
oT > 6.
Note that QK1 and QT are, respectively, nonzero when, and only when, the corresponding
investment terms (1. and J) vanish. The effect of nonzero values of QK and QT is to
1
decrease (or even reverse) the decline PK and PT , again as one would expect. In fact,1
QK and QT, appearing in equations (5.44) and (5.46), act as negative feedback
1
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stabilizers, in effect. They vanish at points where the shadow price trajectories intersect
and increase as they diverge.
Actual solutions of equations (5.44) and (5.46) require forward integration with
assumed starting values of PX1,PT to t = s, followed by a set of successive corrections
until the terminal conditions are satisfied.
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CHAPTER 6
From Life Cycles to Long Waves
to Catastrophes
s. Menshikov and L. Klimenko
6.1. Introduction
In recent years substantial evidence has been accumulated to show that growth
in many products and technologies passes through a life cycle, experiencing, in
consecutive order, takeoff, acceleration, deceleration, and stagnation. In statisti-
cal and econometric terms such processes can be approximated by the logistic
curve.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the life-cycle approach has a
more general application in economic analysis, helping to explain not only
individual instances of growth in products or technologies, but also overall
macroeconomic trends, fluctuations, and sudden drastic changes in performance.
6.2. The Life Cycle as a General Rule
In economic life any product or factor that is not immediately consumed, but
utilized gradually, due to either its material substance or its economic necessity,
undergoes some sort of life cycle. Among these factors are natural resources,
labor, technical know-how, and those parts of national product that are saved,
accumulated, and subsequently used in production or consumption. In this
Modified version of this pa.per was published in Collection 0/ Worb 0/ All Union SlJ'km Re,earch
Inmt~t No. 20, 1988, pp. 54--69, Moscow.
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paper we shall leave aside natural resources, labor, and demographic variables,
and deal exclusively with renewable material resources, which play an important
role in determining life cycles of products, technologies, plant, equipment, and
inventories.
All these factors operate as capital stock participating in various produc-
tion processes, and are themselves created by accumulating the results of such
processes. This applies also to stocks of materialized technical know-how, con-
sisting of plant and equipment specifically designed to produce new products and
new technologies. The nature and role of the economic life cycle is explained by
the interaction between stocks and processes.
The economic duration of a particular life cycle is determined largely by
the time that is necessary to return the full value of the stock plus an increment
intended to maintain a given rate of growth. The maximum duration is, of
course, set by the physical durability of the particular kind of stock. However,
the resource usually becomes economically obsolete long before it ceases to func-
tion in physical terms.
The return of the stock per unit of time varies at different stages of its
operation. The overall rule is that it gradually reaches a maximum somewhere
near the middle of its lifetime ("maturity"), and then tends to fall, so that the
overall picture is reminiscent of the normal probability distribution. Smaller
returns at the start are caused by natural limitations of any new resource, which
need time and expense to be overcome, while at the finish smaller returns are
due to aging and to competition of newer products and technologies.
This process can be described in terms of function
E(t) = are-rt
(1+e- rt)2 I (6.1)
where E(t) is return per unit of time and r is speed of adjustment to optimal
conditions. Starting at 0, E(t) gradually accelerates and then levels off reaching
a maximum (ME = ar /2) and then declines back to zero (Figure 6.1).
A higher speed of adjustment can in some cases be achieved by using newly
produced equipment of a well-established type so as to avoid high costs of initial
introduction. It is possible in this way to gain higher initial returns, but eventu-
ally the user may find himself lagging behind in technical progress.
Given the described behavior of return per unit of time, total accumulated
return will have a maximum limit a. At any given moment it will be approxi-
mated by the logistic curve
a
F(t) = l+e-"" (6.2)
where F(t) is total accumulated return of the stock and a is total demand over
time for product of the stock or as the maximum limit of total return.
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Figure 6.1. Wave of return of stock function.
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The duration of a life cycle in terms of this formula is directly correlated
with total demand, and inversely correlated with the speed of adjustment (both
return and demand are measured in the same units). Total demand depends on
a number of factors, including aggregate purchasing power and relative competi-
tiveness of the product or process.
Let us assume that from the macroeconomic perspective r represents the
average speed of the utilization of stocks in the economy, or the speed of
diffusion of new products and new technologies. It follows that the ratio r / a is
extremely important in determining whether an economy is keeping abreast of
technical progress, or is lagging behind other economies.
Any renewable material stock is created by capital investment seeking ade-
quate return. Assume that expected accumulated return equals
EF(t) = K(O) (l+q)t, (6.3)
where EF(t) is expected accumulated return at moment t, K( 0) is initial value
of the capital stock, and q is expected average annual growth rate of K equal to
average rate of return.
Compare expected and actual total return (Figure 6.2). There are a few
possibilities. Assuming that EF(t) = F(t), both curves intercept at t a point
that is close to total demand a. The economically determined lifetime of the
stock will terminate at this point, since its further use would fall below the
expected rate of return. By this time the total actual return would be adequate
to replace the old stock by a new one which could be larger and, presumably,
more efficient.
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Figure 6.£. Comparison of expected and actual total return.
H the speed of utilization (diffusion), r, is sufficiently high, actual total
return may intercept EF at an earlier point in time (t1). The replacement of old
stock would then be possible earlier than expected, or old stock could be kept
until any moment before t2 , since this would bring additional total return. How-
ever, if the rate of profit, rather than total return were being maximized, the life-
time of the stock would terminate at t3• The outcome would depend on the
actual criterion, which would be chosen by entrepreneurs or planners at this
time.
This duality of outcome is important. It indicates that higher speeds of
utilization (diffusion) may change the duration of the life cycle in both directions.
Whether it becomes shorter or longer, depends on the economic rationale that
prevails at this point. As shown below, this may be tantamount to the existence
of more than one equilibrium position, and thus to the possibility of sudden leaps
from one to another (bifurcation).
It is also possible that r turns out to be rather slow, so that total actual
return fails to intercept the expected return curve. This again may lead to
several eventualities. One would be to take a loss at expected time t, and replace
the old stock with a more efficient one. Another would be to wait until max-
imum average return (or actual profit rate) was achieved at t 4• In both cases the
effective rate of return would be lower than expected, but the duration of the life
cycle would not change appreciably. However, if profit maximization was
replaced by output maximization, then the life cycle could be lengthened appreci-
ably from t to t s' Again, this opens the door to bifurcation.
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The concept, as described above, applies directly to life cycles in products
and technologies, though it is true that the notion of "stock," as related to par-
ticular products or technologies, is not easy to define in precise terms. Output of
a family of products or technologies needs so many different kinds of capital
stock with so many different durabilities that special research would be needed
to single out the particularly long-lasting components of plant, equipment, and
technology, which are associated with the particular family of products or tech-
nologies constituting one common life cycle.
When the life-cycle concept is applied to equipment that is later replaced
by modernized versions of the same kind, one may argue that a represents not
total demand, but rather potential accumulated total return. The latter is
reached when incremental return becomes zero or negative. This is possible if
equipment is used beyond its normal retirement age owing to expensive capital
repairs, patching up, and other costly methods. This may be practical in
extreme deficit conditions, but normally could result in technical regress,
inefficiency, and physical breakdowns.
At the beginning of this section inventories were mentioned as an example
of stocks with a life cycle. This too needs explanation. Capital invested in
inventories is similar to any other in that it expects a certain rate of return. But
does actual return follow a logistic curve? It is obvious that maximum momen-
tary return from inventories is reached only at a certain optimal ratio between
inventories and output. Investment into inventories is made in order to achieve
savings in transportation and other costs. It follows that the maximum momen-
tary return is reached only somewhere in the middle of its lifetime, since inven-
tories are either higher (at the beginning) or lower (at the end) than their
optimal level.
The length of the life cycle in inventories depends in part on the physical
durability of the product that is being saved. But apart from this consideration
it is determined by the ratio between intermediate costs and value added.
Klimenko (1972) has shown that the average duration of the inventory cycle is
practically equal to the ratio of inventories to value added in various industries.
The larger the share of intermediate costs in total value, the higher, on average,
is the optimal ratio of inventories to product. And the lower the share of value
added in total value, the smaller the average relative return obtained from the
use of inventories and the longer the life cycle in inventories.
6.3. The Life Cycle and the Long Wave
The particular combination of life cycles in an economy serves as a material
basis for the existence of a spectrum of fluctuations with different frequencies.
The simplest explanation of how one translates into another is that the intermit-
tency in stock creation leads to an echo effect.
However, if one assumes an ideally planned economic system, the time
when stocks are created can be distributed so evenly that the echo effect would
practically disappear. But even such an ideal system is not free from external
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shocks, which may impose an echo, depending on its speed of adjustment and
correction. As experience of the 19708 and 19808 has shown, the adjustment of
centrally planned economies to drastic increases and falls in the price of oil and
other phenomena of the structural crisis in market economies has been relatively
slow, which served to increase foreign indebtedness and internal economic imbal-
ances.
In a predominantly market economy the echo effect may be either damp-
ened or sustained owing to the existence of other sources that generate economic
cycles of different duration. Intuitively, it seems logical to explain such cycles by
predominant average duration of life cycles of different kinds of stocks.
The mechanism that translates life cycles into macroeconomic fluctuations
has yet to be fully explored. Two approaches are feasible. One approach is to
study the speeds of reaction and adjustment in an economic system that
transforms echo effects and life cycles into close to periodic fluctuations. This
approach is reviewed in more detail later in this paper. Another approach could
be based on analyzing the connection between the cost structure of the various
industries comprising the economy and the various life cycles.
As mentioned, the duration of the inventory cycle is directly related to the
share of intermediate costs in total value of the product of various industries.
On the same basis it would be logical to assume that the frequency of cycles con-
nected with fixed capital is related to the share of depreciation and the cost of
capital in total value. However, these issues should be explored in conjunction
with the mechanism of investment determination.
An attempt to combine these approaches was made in Menshikov (1972),
which discusses dynamic properties of input-output models supplemented by
econometric difference equations that determine components of final demand
(equipment investment by industry, construction investment by type, personal
consumption by group) by variables derived from the cost structure of industries
(intermediate inputs, depreciation, labor income, other income). The general
structure of such models is (in matrix form)
x = (E-A)-1 Y (6.4)
Y=S+f+G (6.5)
sS = 11 [W(t-k), P(t-k)] (6.6)
sf = 12 [P(t-k), K(t-k)] (6.7)
W = 13 [V(t-k)] (6.8)
s. Merllhikov and L. Klimenko
p= v- w
v = (E-a) X
K = (E-d) K (t-k) + f
3
S = E sS (i, jj)
;;=1
n
f = E s/(i, j)
;=1
sS (i, jj) = c(i, jj) sS (jj) i=l, ... , n; jj=l, 2, 3
s/ (i, j) = b(i,j) sf(j) i=l, ... , n; j=l, ... , n
nE c(i,jj)=1
i=1
nE b(i, j) = 1,
i=1
where:
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(6.9)
(6.10)
(6.11)
(6.12)
(6.13)
(6.14)
(6.15)
(6.16)
(6.17)
X is the vector or total value of industry output.
Y is the vector of total final demand.
S is the vector of personal consumption.
sS is the vector of personal consumption by three types.
sS is the matrix of personal consumption by type and producing
industry.
G is the vector of exogenous final demand.
f is the vector of total investment demand by producing industry.
sf is the vector of industry investment.
s/ is the matrix of investment by investing and producing industries.
W is the vector of labor income.
P is the vector of nonlabor income.
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is time lag.
is the vector of value added.
is the vector of capital stock.
is the coefficient of investment structure.
is the unity matrix.
is the coefficient of consumption structure.
is the matrix of input-output coefficients.
is the diagonal matrix with industry shares of value added in total
value.
is the matrix of depreciation rates.
Estimated on the basis of US time series and using actual US input-output
coefficients, the model generated a spectrum of periodic oscillations, including
3.5-, 8-, 20-, and 40-year cycles. However, the analysis was not completed and
the precise mechanism, which chooses a specific group of dominant
macroeconomic cycles among a long list of individual frequencies that depend on
the various cost structures, has yet to be explored.
Another approach, as indicated above, is to study the interaction of
different speeds of adjustment in systems of differential equations that describe
the operation of an economic system. These equations represent the modes of
adjustment of stocks to processes and vice versa, as well as between various
stocks, processes, and their relation to macroeconomic ratios (i.e., profit rate,
capital-output ratio). Each differential equation contains an exponential lag of
one variable relative to another:
thjdt = -a(x - by), (6.18)
where a is the speed of adjustment of x to y and b is the coefficient of average
proportionality between x and y. Coefficient b, besides assuring compatibility of
variables measured in different units, also shows the direction in which x changes
relative to bY, i.e., to its equilibrium position.
In market economies a is usually >0 and <1. When a=O, which is typical
of a command economy, the initial deviation of x from its equilibrium remains
constant, meaning that x ceases to react to changes in y, as it should. In com-
mand economies a is often <0. Then the initial deviation tends to grow
exponentially. Not only is the equilibrium never reached, but the normal aver-
age relation between x and y is distorted, which may lead to the destruction of
the whole mechanism, or to the creation of another one with substantially
different characteristics (i.e., a shadow economy interlocked with a bureaucratic
command system).
When a is close to or larger than unity, any deviation from equilibrium is
eliminated practically immediately. This does not provide much flexibility, and
may lead to sudden sharp reactions to large external shocks. Economic stability
is better served by somewhat slower, but smoother, adjustment.
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Though individual relationships between variables do not generate cycles
per Be, coefficient a plays a leading role in determining the frequency of the
cycles, when generated by a system of equations of type (6.18). On the other
hand, a is inversely dependent on the duration of the life cycle that underlies the
relation between the variables.
Indeed, total return of a momentary investment is obtained only gradually.
Equilibrium is reached only when total actual return equals expected return. It
follows that speeds of adjustment should gravitate toward relative incremental
speeds in actual life cycles. In other words, a in equation (6.18) is directly corre-
lated with r in equation (6.1).
As mentioned, the sign of coefficient b shows the direction in which one
variable changes relative to another. In economic systems variables are corre-
lated both positively and negatively. The negative correlation is likewise a result
of the life cycle. Though flows of investment finance are continuous, actual
investment expenditure and the placement of capital stock are concentrated in
relatively short periods of time. The speed of increasing capital stock is inversely
correlated with accumulated capital stock. After adequate capital stock has been
created, the necessity to replace or increase it emerges only after some time has
passed.
Thus, life cycles generate both gradualness in the use of stocks (positive
correlation) and discontinuity in their creation (negative correlation). A combi-
nation of both is a necessary condition for the emergence of periodic fluctuations.
This is possible in both market and nonmarket economies, but their probability
in market economies is much larger.
In a market economy negative correlations are also caused by the general
use of certain criteria that control its dynamics. For instance, in the short run
acceleration of fixed capital stock is positively correlated with the rate of profit,
but negatively with accumulated capital stock.
Systems of differential equations with positive and negative relationships
are analogous to simple mechanical systems, i.e., pendula, springs, flexible con-
structions with dampers. However, there is an important difference. In mechan-
ics flexibility and dampening are usually determined independently, while in
economic systems they are products of different combinations of mutually depen-
dent forces. To take a simple example, in the well-known Samuelson model of
the business cycle both flexibility and dampening are determined by different for-
mulas, in each case containing different combinations of the accelerator and pro-
pensity to consume. In more complex models such combinations include many
common structural coefficients.
Consider a simplified version of our Siena model of the long wave,
presented in Menshikov and Klimenko (1985):
d" / dt = - a (" - bk)
dk/dt = -c (k - gp)
(6.19)
(6.20)
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where y is the growth rate of labor productivity, k is the growth rate of capital
intensity (capital stock per man-hour), p is the growth rate of the profit rate,
and a, b, c, and 9 are the structural coefficients. Note that in this model left-
hand variables are actually second derivatives with respect to time and that y, k,
and p are growth rates rather than absolute values. Labor productivity adjusts
to capital intensity, and the latter to the profit rate. To simplify matters it is
assumed that the share of profit in national product is constant, so that p is
approximately equal to y-k.
The dynamic properties of this model are determined by characteristic
equation
x2 + [a+c(l+g)Jx + ac(l+g-bg) = 0,
or, if b=1 (which is approximately true in the long run),
x2 + [a+c(l+g)Jx + ac = O.
(6.22)
(6.23)
Regular cycles in growth rates are generated when g=-2 and a=c. Given
these conditions, long waves of 50 to 60 years appear if speeds of adjustment
equal 0.11-0.12; 20-year cycles, when a=c=.34; a 7-year cycle when they are
both = Ii and a 3.5-year cycle, when a=c=2.
The unabridged model (6.19)-(6.21) with coefficients estimated from US
time series for 1889 to 1982 generated cycles of 53.7 years. In this estimation a
and c were far from equal (a=.048; c=.25). This is in agreement with expecta-
tions, since investment, represented by dk/ dt tend to adjust to profit rates (the
negative correlation) much faster than output adjusts to capital stock (the posi-
tive correlation).
However, the difference in coefficients a and c is important in determining
the dampening force. The larger the ratio c/ a, the smaller the critical absolute
value of 9 necessary to produce explosive cycles. This follows from
and
a + c + cg < 0
9 < - (l+a/c) .
(6.24)
(6.25)
With a=.048 and c=.25, 9 has only to be smaller than -1.192 to generate explo-
sive cycles. The estimated value for the whole period was -.61, or twice as large,
meaning that there was a dampening factor of .273.
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An enlarged version of the Siena model was presented in Menshikov and
Klimenko (1986). Here fixed capital investment was disaggregated (using the
latent variable technique) into three structural components:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Extensive investment, representing increase in stock of existing technolo-
gies.
Productivity investment, introducing new technologies that increase factor
productivity.
New products investment, used to create new products or spheres of pro-
duction.
The speeds of adjustment SA (i) of the ith type of investment were
estimated to be SA(1) = .094, SA(2) = .059, and SA(3) = .022. The fastest
adjustment was made by extensive investment, which follows changes in output.
Nearly twice as slow was the adjustment of investment into new technologies,
which followed past rises in productivity. The slowest was new products invest-
ment, which adjusted to changes in the profit rate.
Computer simulations of this model produced a superposition of fluctua-
tions of approximately 20, 30 to 40, and 60 years. Particularly important was
the dominance of the longer-term wave in total capital stock. Total net invest-
ment tended to gravitate toward 2o-year fluctuations, apparently tied to exten-
sive investment, while both new technology and new products investment deter-
mined the 3O-to-4o-year pattern.
6.4. Dynamic and Static Bifurcation
Linear differential models with constant coefficients, such as presented above,
may turn out to be dynamically unstable when they generate explosive cycles.
Instability of a different kind appears in them when the system has "negative
flexibility," associated either with negative speeds of adjustment or with the
absence of negative feedback relationships between variables. This is typical of
command economies. In this case even smaller shocks to the system leading to
deviations from the equilibrium path will tend to increase exponentially, making
special and, perhaps, continuous exogenous efforts necessary to restore stability.
However, if a differential system is nonlinear, then the "galloping" effect
may occur for both exogenous and endogenous reasons. Consider
Y· + bly' + elY + almVy' = 0, (6.26)
where an external force, having velocity V, influences the system, whose recep-
tivity equals al' Particularly important is coefficient m, which transforms the
external influence in such a way that it may be either positive or negative.
IT m<O, then the overall dampening effect (b l + almV) may become nega-
tive, if V is larger than critical speed
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This generates explosive oscillations. In linear systems the explosion is infinite,
leading to total destruction. In nonlinear systems, such as
1/" + b1/' + C1/ - a V[ ml1/' + m2(1/,)2] = 0, (6.28)
the explosion continues only until it reaches a cycle of certain finite amplitude,
which may, however, be sufficiently large so as to make impossible the normal
operation of the system.
What is the economic meaning of these formulas? In real economic systems
the gradual accumulation of a positive external effect may reach a certain critical
point when the net effect suddenly becomes negative. For instance, when the
Keynesian multiplier was first introduced, its accompanying negative effects were
so small as to be largely ignored. However, over later decades these negative
effects, caused by inflation and monopoly, weakened the supply response of the
market to such an extent that the value of long-term, and in some cases of
short-term, multipliers became negative.
Figure 6.9 shows the dependence of m = dGNP/ dG on G/ PGNP, where G
represents government purchases and PGNP is the potential output of the econ-
omy. H the share of government expenditure in total potential output is rela-
tively low, the effect of an increment in G has an increasingly positive effect on
actual output. However, as the share of government expenditure and GNP
approaches capacity, the inflationary and bottleneck effects tend to lower the
value of the multiplier. When both G/PGNP and GNP/ PGNP pass critical lev-
els, the multiplier becomes increasingly negative. This is particularly true of mil-
itary expenditures, as shown in a number of recent studies.
Assume that the aggregated Siena model is modified by introducing re-
straints that add to equation (6.23) component (+ al m V 1/') and (c2 1/') where
cl=c+c2. In this modified form (m 1/') represents the change in the growth rate
of labor productivity (GNP/employment), produced by a change in the share of
government purchases in GNP, whereas coefficient al = G/GNP measures the
receptivity or susceptibility of the system. Then, using actual coefficients of the
model and arbitrary assumptions of m, we obtain the following values of critical
velocity Vc = .1455/[al abs(m)]:
al m
.1 +.2
.2 +.1
.3 -.1
.4 -.2
Vc
4.85
1.82
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Figure 6.9. Dependence of multiplier on the share of government purchases in GNP.
Similar effects may be associated with other forces that may be totally or
partially external. For instance, large government deficits have had adverse
influence on the economy not only through the inflationary mechanism, but also
through the "crowding out" effect in the money markets. The rise of transna-
tionals and the globalization of capital markets have distorted the traditional
mutual responses between money exchange rates and trade flows, leading to
unprecedented imbalances in international payments and, presumably, to major
stock market crashes.
To sum up, in cases when a previously positive influence suddenly becomes
negative, there is danger of dynamic and, for that matter, static instability.
External, or partially external, factors may act to change structural
coefficients of a system, which may themselves oscillate as a function of time.
For instance, in Menshikov and Klimenko (1984) the Siena model was fitted not
only for the full 90-year period, but also for various shorter periods of 20 to 24
years. In some cases the coefficients showed relative stability over time, while in
others there were significant changes.
Thus, coefficient a, Le., the speed of adjustment of labor productivity,
changed relatively little from .25 to .5, but was much higher than the long-term
value of .048. Coefficient h, Le., proportionality of labor productivity to capital
intensity, changed from a high of 1.4 in 1904-1924 to a low of .3 in 1924-1928,
but remained stable in both 1894-1914 and 1946-1977 at .99 and .98. Coefficient
c, i.e., speed of adjustment of capital intensity, was extremely volatile, reaching
a high of .8 in 1900-1924 and 1953-1977 (long-term average was .25).
Coefficient g, i.e., proportionality between capital intensity and the profit rate,
was relatively stable at (-.3; -.4) from 1894 to 1948, but very volatile thereafter.
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When fitted with these coefficients, the model generated cycles of 15 to 19
years duration (in one case - 9 years) that were mostly explosive. In real
economic life structural coefficients tend to oscillate in a nonlinear manner even
within cycles of medium (7 to 10 years) or short (3 to 4 years) duration. This
may also, at times, produce explosive cycles. When an economy finds itself in
dynamic instability, it cannot maintain an equilibrium on its own merits, and
has to undergo substantial structural change to avoid complete destruction.
In differential systems, like those described above, most economic variables
are assumed to be interdependent. Such a system has only one equilibrium for
one set of coefficients. Any deviation from this equilibrium tends either to be
eliminated with time (autocorrection) or to increase infinitely or to a certain
point which is far from equilibrium.
But in real life, economies may at any given moment have two or more
equilibrium positions, with the possibility of sudden change from one to another.
In mathematical terms such changes are called static bifurcations and are
explored in the Catastrophe theory.
In dynamic bifurcations the catastrophe (or "galloping") is associated with
the possible destruction of the system. A new system with new structural
coefficients and another regulatory mechanism may emerge instead.
In static bifurcations changes from one equilibrium to another may occur
within the same system of structural coefficients, and may not necessarily lead to
its destruction. Such a catastrophe may be followed by an anti-catastrophe,
which restores the former equilibrium.
Static bifurcation in an economy usually occurs when there is a significant
and lasting deviation of two or more variables from their optimal mutual rela-
tionships as reflected by the structural coefficients. For instance, as shown in
part one, this happens when the actual return curve either intercepts the
expected return curve earlier than expected, or not at all. In both cases the
impossibility of completing the life cycle and passing to a new one, as originally
planned, creates additional pressure or friction in the system. This is particu-
larly true in the latter case, when the necessity of foregoing previous profit max-
imization targets is forced upon the economy. In the former case the situation is
more favorable, but the possibility of a sudden drastic change is still possible.
Both situations may happen within market and planned economies.
The existence of a second (third, etc.) equilibrium may serve as a certain
guarantee that the underlying system may survive. The seeming absence of
alternative equilibria, on the other hand, does not prove the durability of the sys-
tem that may well break down under pressure. Of course, potential equilibria
may exist that are tantamount to nonexistence of the current system. This is so
in physics (consider the change of cold starlike mass from small dwarves to neu-
tron stars) and in economics (like the sudden transformation of a poorly planned
economy into a mixed command/shadow market system).
Even in an economy with damped cycles external shocks may generate such
large amplitudes that transcend critical pressures or, in the nonlinear case, lead
to chaotic movement (cr. Rasmussen et aI., 1985). The critical pressures are
defined as frontiers beyond which a bifurcation becomes possible, and in some
cases inevitable.
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The mathematical Catastrophe theory is intended to establish such critical
frontiers, or zones. It is possible to single out from any n dimensional system
one or more variables, as control parameters, whose small and gradual changes
in the vicinity of certain points bring about bifurcations, or catastrophes
inherent to the system. The concrete form of catastrophe depends on the
number of control parameters.
Assume that in market systems output is determined by factors of produc-
tion, however, not directly but through the profit rate. Simple example: if we
choose the capital-output ratio as the only control parameter then there is only
one type of catastrophe possible, namely, "the fold." The production function in
this case is described as a third-order surface:
x = p3 + (K,JP, (6.29)
where X is output, P is profit rate, and K% is capital-output ratio. Their rela-
tion is shown in Figure 6.4. For relatively small K% there is only one stable
equilibrium for X relative to P (as demonstrated by the minimum points of
curves Xl and X 2• As K% increases, so does the pressure on the system. After it
reaches a certain critical value (represented by curve X 3) surface X(P, K%) sags
in such a manner as to produce three alternative optimal points (illustrated by
X4 and Xs). The area between them defines the critical zone of the profit-rate
values that make bifurcation possible and inevitable. The higher K% the wider
the critical zone bordered by curve PCR'
The source of bifurcation in this example can also be traced to the life
cycle. A high capital-output ratio may mean that actual return, as represented
by output, is lower than expected return, as represented by capital. This creates
alternative equilibria: the local minima are points where the profit rate is max-
imized relative to output, whereas the local maximum indicates maximization of
output.
A mechanical analog to this system is pressure brought upon an arch where
ends are connected by a spring. When pressure brought upon the arch reaches a
critical level, the arch will suddenly jump from its upper to lower equilibrium
position.
In Klimenko and Menshikov (1987) labor productivity (Y) and capital
intensity (K) were chosen as the two control parameters, assumed to serve as
substitutes for, respectively, intensive and extensive technical progress. Note
that the ratio of K to Y is identical to the capital-output ratio, which in this
case is expressed by two, rather than one control parameter. Output is assumed
to be a nonlinear function of the profit rate and of the two parameters. Employ-
ment (L) influences output in a linear manner, thus not directly affecting bifur-
cational characteristics of the system.
With two control parameters any process X(q), where q is the vector of
independent variables, is described by surface
X = q4 + >'lq2 + >'2q (6.30)
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Figure 6.-/. Static bifurcation depending on capital-output ratio.
and the possibility of catastrophes by set
dX/dg=O.
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X(Kxs , P)
X(Kx4 • P)
X(Kx3, P)
X(Kx2 , P)
X(Kxll P)
P
(6.31)
Thus it is logical to express production functions described above as
x = al p 4 + a2 pS + as p2 Y + a4 PK + a5L
or
x = al p4 + a2 pS + as p2K + a4 PY + a5 L ,
(6.32a)
(6.32b)
where P is profit rate, Y is labor productivity, K is capital intensity, and L is
employment.
When al and a2 are small, equations (6.32a) and (6.32b) are similar to
usual production functions weighted by the profit rate. The two variants reflect
conditions prevailing under, respectively, intensive and extensive growth. On
those parts of the surface that are far from the critical zones both surfaces are
well approximated by linear production functions.
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We then test the hypothesis that actual output moves along paths that are
close to optimal points of X relative to P, Le., close to trajectory:
dX / dP = 4al p3 + 3a2p2 + 2a3P Y + a4 K + 0 . (6.33)
One would assume a positive correlation of output relative to productivity
and, in most cases, to capital intensity (and thus a3>0; a4>0). This proved to
be true in most empirical estimations. However, the sign and significance of al
and a2' representing the highly volatile influence of the profit rate are subject to
more speculation. As shown below the signs of these coefficients are dependent
on the prevailing direction of technical progress and thus on the movement of
the capital-output ratio within the period under estimation.
For any combination of Y and K, there may be three different values of P
corresponding to this criterion. Then there are three equilibrium positions of X
relative to P, which - depending on the sign of 01 - are either two maxima and
one minimum (al>O), or one maximum and two minima (01<0). If there are
complex roots, only one equilibrium exists. Negative equilibrium values of X do
not exist in real economies and are excluded from the analysis.
Equations of the type (6.32a) and (6.32b) were fitted to US time series for
1889-1982. It was found that actual values of GNP, indeed, were close to one of
the equilibria, Le., for each pair of actual Y and K the rate of profit calculated
from equation (6.33) was close to actual P. As in the case of the Siena model the
whole period was subdivided into sub-periods of 24 to 27 years corresponding to
upturns or downswings in the long wave. In two periods (namely, from 1889 to
1939) there were two positive real roots, and in two other periods (from 1933 to
1982) one positive real root. In periods of economic crises there were leaps from
one equilibrium to another, typically from Xmin in non-crisis years to Xmax in
crisis years.
This was explained by the coexistence within the market economy of forces
of monopoly and competition. Catastrophes occurred when the predominance of
monopoly (and thus of profit maximization) gave way to prevailing competitive
conditions (and thus to output maximization). It was also noted that bifurcation
took place in periods when the ratio K / Y reached its local maxima, Le., when
the dominance of extensive technical progress was at a peak, opening the door
for a new technical revolution. At such points forces of competition became par-
ticularly active helping to storm and destroy some of the traditional monopoly
bastions. In the 1930s such changes were particularly noticeable due to the
overall fall of commodity prices and exchange rates. In the 1970s and 1980s
there was also evidence of drastic leaps, particularly in the prices of fuels and
raw materials, as well as in exchange rates. Extraordinarily large imbalances in
international payments and government budgets and enormous accumulated
unrepaid external debts are symptoms of large inconsistencies and superpres-
sures that may provoke a maxi-catastrophe. These peculiarities did not show up
in the corresponding equation owing perhaps to the fact that the large imbal-
ances appeared after 1980 and did not show in our time series.
100 lAfe C"ele. and Long WOllt..
Nonlinear output surfaces described above were further explored to estab-
lish the extent of their relative stability. For every nine years centered around
every consecutive year in US time series from 1893 to 1977, coefficients aI' a2'
a3' and a4 in equation (6.32) were estimated by a two-stage procedure. Assum-
ing that they are functions of time and that output moved along paths close to
equilibrium points of X relative to P, Le., dXj dP = 0, we obtained
dXjdt = (dXjdY) (dYjdt) + (dXjdK) (dKjdt) .
Note that with dXjdY=a3 p 2 and dXjdK = a4 P we get
dXjdt = a3 p 2 (dYjdt) + a4 P (dKjdt) + e(t)
or
dXjdt = a4 P (dYjdt) + a3 p 2 (dKjdt) + et.
(6.34)
(6.35a)
(6.35b)
Having estimated a3 and a4 from equation (6.35) we then estimate al and a2 by
substituting a3 and a4 into equation (6.32). In this way equilibrium points of X
relative to P were calculated for every combination of K and Y in every year
from 1893 to 1977. The use of the nine-year centered estimation makes it possi-
ble to eliminate most shorter-term influences.
The results of this exercise have yet to be fully analyzed. Let us point to a
few preliminary conclusions:
(1) The X-surfaces changed from year to year. In most instances the sign of
aI' which largely determines the quantity and sequence of maximum and
minimum equilibria, remained unchanged from year to year. In 15 cases,
however, it did change, indicating a more substantial transformation of the
surface. This last case is important for the following reason. If two posi-
tive equilibrium points exist, then, if al>O the left-hand one is Xmax and
the right-hand one is Xmin. When al<0 the left positive equilibrium is
Xmin and the right one is Xmax.
(2) In mechanical systems the Xmax equilibrium point is usually unstable, and
Xmin is stable. The leaps, when they occur, are either from Xmax to
Xmin, or from one Xmin to another. In economic systems the leaps, as evi-
denced by this exercise, are always between an Xmax and an Xmin, or vice
versa. The reason is that the economy is driven to one of the equilibria by
either profit or output maximization. When a l <0 both forces work in the
same direction: the larger the output, the higher the profit rate, and vice
versa. If in these conditions the economy finds itself at a minimum, it is
under the overwhelming influence of inadequate aggregate demand. If
al>O then the profit and output maximization work in opposite directions,
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and a leap to Xmin may be caused by profit maximization being stronger
than demand-pull and output maximization.
(3) It was found that in most cases the G1>O situation occurred when K was
increasing faster than Y, i.e., when the capital-output ratio was rising, and
vice versa. Thus a change in the sign of G1 was generally correlated with
the change in the direction of movement of K / Y over time. This is shown
in Figure 6.5. An increase in K / Y usually corresponds to the downward
movement in the long wave, and it is at this point that the forces of output
and profit maximization act in the most mutually contradictory manner.
x
d(Kfy) > 0
dt
at > 0
at < 0
d(~{Y) < 0
o p
Figure 6.5. Static bifurcation depending on the relation of two control parameters
K/Y.
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(4) Contrary to this general rule a change to 01<0 also occurred in 1930-1931
and in 1973-1975, in both cases at a time when K/ Y was rising. In the
first case there was a severe fall from Xmax to Xmin. These were condi-
tions of acute crisis of overproduction, when demand inadequacy forced the
economy down. In the second case output remained closer to Xmax.
Apparently other forces, i.e., stagflation and the oil shock, were stronger
than the more traditional demand inadequacy.
(5) In this exercise every estimated X-surface largely reflected the nine-year
medium-term cyclical characteristics. Therefore its results could not be
identical to the earlier exercise that concentrated on the longer-term cycli-
cal features. From a longer-term perspective the economy chooses either
Xmax or Xmin as its predominant and, therefore, stable equilibrium point,
changing to the unstable equilibrium only in the time of crises. From a
shorter-term perspective, the X-surface itself changes during critical times,
making Xmin as stable during crises as Xmax is during times of cyclical
upturns.
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CHAPTER 7
Economic Structural Changes and Waves
in Technological Progress
Iouri Tchijov and Irene Sytchova
7.1. Introduction
One of the explanations of long-term waves in economic development is based on
technological progress or the interpretation of technological waves as a main
source of long-term oscillations in economic systems. On the other hand, techno-
logical progress can be measured at a macroeconomic level as a process of rela-
tive input saving. This is why it might be interesting to analyze long-term
dynamics of total labor requirements as well as their components.
IT the cost decrease is a target of technological progress, one of the progress
assessments is a change in the cost structure. It is due to the uneven impact of
new technologies (NT) on different elements of product costs. Hence it is possi-
ble to determine three types of technological progress: labor saving, fixed capital
saving, and material saving. In reality, any new technology or technological pro-
gress as a whole changes all the three elements of cost, but historically it is possi-
ble to determine the periods when one of them dominated. The reasons for such
an uneven influence are the dynamics of relative prices of each resource (on the
demand side) and the objective dynamic possibilities of scientific and technologi-
cal development.
7.2. Methodological Approaches
In our investigations we use seven input-output tables of Japan for 1951, 1955,
1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980.[1-31 All the tables were aggregated to 18
104 Life Cvc1e. and Long Wave.
industries and re-estimated into the 1970 prices.[4] Thus we have the time series
of completely comparable input-output tables:
bi = E aii bi + 'i'i (7.1)
where bi and bi are the total labor requirement coefficients, 'i is the direct labor
requirement coefficient, and ali is the input-output coefficients. If we divide aii
into two parts,
aii = Qii + Pii ' (7.2)
where Qii reflects the use of materials produced by a ith industry and Pii reflects
ith capital consumption for unit production in a jth industry.
To estimate Pii it is necessary to disaggregate capital consumption
allowances for each industry into its elements - fixed capital goods produced by
certain industries. We have chosen five such industries (construction, c; general
machinery, gm; electrical machinery, em; transportation equipment, te; and agri-
culture, a) as well as a technological structure of fixed assets (houses, 1; con-
structions, 2; equipment and machines, 3; ships, 4; other transportation equip-
ment, 5; instruments and fixtures, 6; land improvement, 7; plants and animals, 8;
and incomplete construction, 9). The algorithm of industrial classification
transformation is shown in Table 7.1.
Then we got the experts' estimates of lifetime for different types of fixed
capital assets as 33 years for houses and constructions, 11 years for industrial
equipment, 5.7 years for transportation equipment, and 8 years for plants and
animals in agriculture.[5] As a result we estimated the distribution structure for
capital consumption allowances in each industry (~i) (see Table 7.e) based on
the use of the real structure for 1965 and assumptiOns about average lifetime
mentioned above.[6]
The data in Table 7.e mean that for industry 8, for instance, capital
allowances (~8) will be distributed as flows of capital goods (x") in the following
way:
x" 3.8 = 0.30 ~8
x" 10.8 = 0.43 ~8
x" 11.8 = 0.07 ~8
x" 12.8 = 0.20 ~8 .
This method permits us to develop the matrix of fixed capital allowances as
Pii = x"iii Xi
estimated by the above-mentioned methods,
(7.3)
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Table 7.1. Industrial classification transformation.
Industries
c
gm
em
te
a
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Technological structure of assets
1,2,9
3
6
4,5
7,8
Table 7.e. Distribution structure for capital consumption allowances (%).
Material Transportation and Nonmaterial
production Agriculture communication production
(No. e-19, 17;a (No.1) (No. 16) (No. 1~, 15, 18)
3,c 30 27 27 50
10,gm 43 40 40
ll,em 7 7 6 12
12,te 20 20 27 37
l,a - 6
Total 100 100 100 100
8Numbers of industries correspond to the list in Table 7.3.
x·· = x'·· + x W ••I' I' I"
O:ij = x'ijl Xj
from 1-0 tables, and
aij = O:ij + Pij
(7.4)
(7.5)
new 1-0 coefficients. Thus we have transformed the capital consumption row of
the third quadrant of the 1-0 table into additional elements of input-output
coefficients.
In the postwar economy of Japan, import traditionally covered a certain
part of input. To exclude the influence of imports we need the same purification
of 1-0 tables. The most reasonable approach is based on import subtraction
from the 1-0 matrix, element by element. But there are only two import
matrices in the Japanese statistics (for 1970 and 1980), and we had to develop an
approximate algorithm of such an elimination.
If Mi t is a volume of imports of products of the ith industry, xtt is a
volume of this industry's domestic production (all in year t), the share of domes-
tic production in the total ith product consumed in the economy will be
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(7.6)
Of course, we used a rather strong assumption that for a given year t the
import share is the same for different ways of product use. But it will change in
dynamics, from one year to another.
The modified flows, purified from the import part, will be for each 1-0
table:
x~· = x· .. d·
'" '" ,
(7.7)
where xi; is taken from equation (7.4).
To prove the applicability of this method we compared two matrices of
domestic flows - the first one was estimated from the official import statistics for
1970 and the second one was estimated for the same year by using the proposed
method.
The correlation coefficients for these two vectors estimated for each indus-
try (from 1 to 18) were more than 0.99 except for one case - transportation and
communication in which the coefficient was 0.92. These results can be treated as
evidence of the method acceptability.
Thus we reconstructed the input-output tables where the flows of products
were purified from import and divided into material and fixed capital consump-
tion. It is possible to disaggregate the coefficients of total labor requirements (b)
into three coefficients: direct labor requirements (I), material requirements (b m ),
and final capital requirements (b C). If A is a matrix of direct material and capi-
tal requirements and A m is a matrix of direct material requirements, b and its
components will be defined as follows:
b = I(E - A)-1,
bC = I(E - A)-1 -/(E - A m)-\
bm = I(E - A m)-l -I,
b = I + bm + bC.
(7.8)
(7.9)
(7.10)
(7.11)
The shares of labor, material, and capital consumption in the total cost of
product will be defined, respectively:
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5, = 4 ,; x;I"4 b; x;,
, ,
5m = "4 bi x;14 b; x;,, ,
5c = 4 bi x;14 b; x;.
, ,
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(7.12)
(7.13)
(7.14)
Consequently, to define the type of technological progress for a certain period, it
is necessary to estimate the impacts of these three components on the total labor
requirement reduction and to find the main one.
7.3. Technological Progress, Economic Growth,
and Structural Changes
The data obtained for the output growth as well as for the direct and total labor
requirements reduction are shown in Table 7.9. It is obvious from both
viewpoints that uneven growth took place in the Japanese economy - in dynam-
ics and in the industrial structure. The accelerated output growth of the 19505
and 19608 was substituted for the economic growth deceleration in the 19705. A
similar tendency was observed in labor requirements (direct and total).
Let us analyze two hypotheses. The first one is that the postwar technolog-
ical progress promoted a decrease of big industrial differences (in total labor
requirements), which took place at the beginning of the 1950s. The second
hypothesis claims that industries with higher labor requirements at the begin-
ning tended to decrease their requirements to an average level, or industries with
a higher starting point experienced a more rapid decrease later.
To test the first hypothesis we estimated the dynamics of the relation
between a standard deviation and a sample average (51 Y) for the total labor
requirements. The results (see Figure 7.1) show that technological progress in
the Japanese economy led to a reduction of the total labor requirement in all
industries, and the industrial differences moved down during 1951-1965 and then
up again.
We tested the second hypothesis for the total labor requirements (TLR),
estimating the correlation between decrease rates (TLR 80/TLR 51) and the
starting levels of the variables in 1951 (kTLR 51). These estimates were made
for 17 industries (No. 2-18 in Table 7.9). The results, displayed in Figure 7.2,
show that this hypothesis is acceptable for the total labor requirement case.
IT we compare the growth rates for industrial outputs with the decrease
rates for the total industrial labor requirement coefficients we can find a certain
relationship between them. Higher reductions in the cost of production usually
correspond to higher production growth rates. The total rank correlation
coefficient of these two variables for 17 industries was (0.65) from this point of
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Figure 1.1. The dynamics of industrial differences (measured as relation of standard de-
viation to sample average) in total labor requirements.
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Figure 1.e. The dependencies of labor requirement coefficients changes on their starting
values.
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view it is possible to define "progressive" industries (like electrical and
nonelectrical machineries, transportation equipment, and chemicals) and less
technologically intensive industries (like agriculture, services, construction, and
food).
For example, output in electrical machinery increased by a factor of 150 in
1951-1980, in transportation equipment by 47, and in nonelectrical machinery by
30. During the same period total labor requirements in these industries dereased
by a factor of 24, 15, and 11, respectively. On the other hand, output in agricul-
ture, services, and the food industry increased only by a factor of 2, 6, and 7,
respectively, and total labor requirements declined by 4-5 times. One can find
that there is a certain interdependence between the rate of output growth and
the rate of cost (total labor requirements) reduction (see Figure 7.9).
-20
•
GO,%
-30
-40L
I TLR, %
•
•
Figure 7.9. Five-year changes in total labor requirement (TLR) versus five-year changes
in gross output, constant prices (GO).
But during the postwar period we found big differences in this relationship.
Let us compare the interpolated regression between the rate of total labor
requirement reduction (TLR) and changes in industrial outputs (10) (see Figure
7.-1). The dynamics of the slope coefficient reflects a tendency to decrease from
0.37 for the first period up to 0.22 for 1965-1970 and a lack of such a relationship
in 1970-1975. Then the coefficient increased again in 1975-1980. T values
shown in parentheses reflect the decrease of the coefficient estimates probability.
Thus we can observe certain tendencies in long-term dynamics of variables
reflecting waves in technological progress. The dynamics of total and direct
labor requirements, the changes in industrial differentiation (see Figure 7.1), and
the changes in the relationships between economic growth and cost reduction
(see Figure 7.-1) show that the first part of the 19708 was a turning point in
long-term waves, connected with technological progress.
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7.4:. Three Types of Technological Progress and
Their Dynamics
111
IT the total labor requirements are disaggregated into three components - labor,
material, and fixed capital inputs, see equations (7.12)-(7.14) - the technological
progress materialized in total cost reduction can be divided into three types:
labor, material, and capital savings. By using the method described earlier and
the seven input-output tables for the postwar economy of Japan we derived the
data reflecting these three types of technological progress in dynamics (see Table
7.-1).
It is obvious that at any time during the investigated postwar period the
technological progress combined all three types. But in each period one type
usually dominated. The material-saving type took place in all periods playing a
main role in 1955-1965. The labor-saving type of technological progress played a
growing role and reached the biggest share in the total cost reduction in
1965-1970. The important impact of capital saving on total cost (or labor
requirements) reduction took place in 1975-1980.
The first period (1951-1955) of technological progress belonged to the
labor- and material-saving types. In 1955-1965 material saving dominated, but
the role of labor saving was growing and in 1965-1970 labor saving was the lead-
ing type of cost reduction. In 1970-1975, when the first postwar energy crisis
occurred, material saving became more important again. Finally, 1975-1980 was
the only period when fixed capital saving dominated.
As a result (see Table 7.5), the labor share in total cost grew in the 1950s,
was stable in the 1960s up to 1975, and then grew again. The material share
decreased during the whole period but with different rates, and the capital share
in total cost increased up to 1975 and decreased afterward.
There were certain correlations between the three types of technological
progress in the industries. The comparison of the change rates (1951-1980) in
labor (LR), material (MR), and capital (CR) savings is shown in Table 7.6. For
instance, the value of a direct labor requirement coefficient in agriculture in 1980
equals 21% of its value in 1951, the value of a material input coefficient in con-
struction in 1980 equals 32% of its initial value, etc.
From the viewpoint of labor saving, the three best industries were electrical
machinery, mining, and chemical, but the three worst were food, services, and
construction. From the material-saving viewpoint the best ones were primary
metals, electrical machinery, and chemicals, and the worst ones were finance
(plus real estate), construction, and agriculture. And finally, from the capital-
saving viewpoint the best industries were electrical machinery, primary metals,
and chemicals. Finance, agriculture, and construction can be regarded as the
worst three. On the whole the most progressive industries (minimum rank sum)
in the Japanese economy were electrical machinery and chemicals; construction
and agriculture can be regarded as smokestack industries.
The theoretical discussion about the relationships between
labor-material4:apital savings (either they compete or coincide in dynamics)
might be added with our estimates based on the rank data shown in Table 7.6.
The coefficients of the rank correlation are the following: 0.83, between material
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Table 7.5. Structure of total cost of production (%).
Cost 1980-
element 1951 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1951
Labor 44.7 44.5 46.5 47.3 46.2 47.4 53.3 119
Material 51.7 50.9 47.8 44.6 44.1 41.4 37.8 73
Fixed capital 3.6 4.6 5.7 8.1 9.7 11.2 8.9 245
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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In 1960-1980 labor prices doubled in Japan, prices of materials increased
2.5 times, and prices for capital goods increased 1.6 times. This led to higher
savings of material input and lower savings of capital input (see Table 7.5). The
first real capital-saving period took place in the second half of the 19708. One
reason was that prices of capital goods began to grow practically only in the
1970s and had been very stable before.
The supply of resources influenced these processes too. For example,
material saving dominated during the periods of the postwar reconstruction of
the Japanese economy when it lost the traditional sources of raw materials
abroad and in 1970-1975 - the period of a first severe energy crisis. The
1965-1970 period was of a labor-saving type. At that time the rural labor
resources were exhausted, the wage rate growth accelerated by 2 times, and the
labor-saving type of technological progress became mostly preferable.
Coming back to the subject of our discussion, long waves, it is possible to
draw the following conclusions from the analysis of different types of technologi-
cal progress. Besides long-term oscillations of the technological progress as a
whole, discussed above, the elements of cost reduction - labor/material/capital
savings - have their own long-term harmonics dependent on both the common
reasons and the specific ones.
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CHAPTER 8
Technology Diffusion in a
Long-Wave Context:
The Case of the Steel and Coal Industries
A rnul! Griibler
..La societe, c'est I'imitation, et I'imitation
c'est une espece de somnambulisme. "
G. Tarde, Les lois de l'imitation, 1895
8.1. Introduction
This paper is intended to illustrate, with the aid of selected examples from the
steel and coal industries, the intimate relationship (or rather the causality)
between technological change and Wechsellagen in long-term economic develop-
ment. For this purpose periods of relatively stable homogeneous growth (charac-
terized by regular diffusion patterns of new technologies, industries, and prod-
ucts into the market) and periods of turbulence and stagnation in economic
activity (during which a number of leading technologies and industries, which
were the main driving force of the previous upswing period, reach saturation in
their market niches) will be differentiated. During these saturation phases new
important technological innovations are often (although not always) introduced
into the market.
It is my contention that during periods of depression leading technologies
and products (in terms of their contribution to previous economic growth) are
saturating. This saturation can be observed in either one or a combination of
the following indicators: total output, market share, further cost reduction
potential along the learning curve of a technology, and productivity indicators.
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It is necessary at this point to emphasize that the argument presented here
does not rely on a perfect synchronization of the saturation of existing and/or the
emergence of new technologies as causal phenomena to explain long-term
economic fluctuations, although empirical evidence suggests a certain degree of
clustering in the appearance of innovations (see Chapter 4 by A. Kleinknecht).
Rather, the argument is based on the high degree of overlap in the main growth
periods (i.e., the period needed to increase from 10 percent to 90 percent of the
ultimate market potential) of a number of key sectors and technologies, which
would be sufficient to result in Wechsellagen of economic development.
In upswing periods one can observe regular growth in output, productivity,
etc., as well as regular technological diffusion patterns, all of which convert to
oscillatory behavior when reaching the saturation phase of market growth and
technology diffusion. However, to describe these periods of saturation and tur-
bulence (depression) not only in dimensions of changes in output and technologi-
cal diffusion, economic and social indicators (such as prices and strike rates) will
also be considered to characterize periods of stable growth and turbulence in
long-term economic development.
In Chapter 9 N. Nakicenovic deals with the term technology in a wider con-
text, in that primarily the evolution of transport infrastructures and of the
energy system is analyzed. Infrastructures and energy constitute to some extent
higher-level aggregates of a large number of underlying technologies. In this
paper this view will be complemented (arriving at similar conclusions) by zoom-
ing from the macro level down to two specific sectors and discussing in detail
changes in specific technologies, in factor inputs (energy and labor), and in major
market outlets in individual countries. It will be shown that periods of tur-
bulence and depression constitute important turning points in the structural
change of the system with regard to all indicators mentioned above. Thus, the
concept of the long wave constitutes a powerful paradigm through which long-
term technological change can be systematized and better understood.
8.2. Multidimensional Indicators of Technological Change
Technological change is described along two dimensions: time and a number of
indicators of technological change per se. With regard to the time dimension, a
number of different indicators will be used to identify secular periods of stable
economic growth and time periods of turbulence and stagnation. The
identification of these time periods is especially important as there is evidence
that all indicators of technological change per se show that the market saturation
of major technologies and products, as well as significant turning points in the
structure of the technological system (appearance of new technologies, changes in
factor inputs, changes in market outlets), tend to cluster during these periods of
turbulence and stagnation in economic growth.
ArnuJl Griibler
8.2.1. Indicators to identify secular periods of growth
and periods of stagnation
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A large number of possible methods to describe long-term fluctuation in
economic development have been advanced in analyzing empirical evidence in
arguing pro or con the long-wave hypothesis.[II For the purpose of this paper a
number of different indicators will be used to increase the confidence about the
exact timing of the various phases of the long wave. This approach is taken,
because it is considered here that the complex phenomenon of economic fluctua-
tions can be described only by a number of different (to an extent independent)
indicators. Thus, the following indicators will be considered to describe secular
movements of economic activity:
Deviations from long-term trends in output, prices, social indicators, etc. Typi-
cally, long time series are analyzed with various filters. In this paper deviations
from a 5~year moving average are analyzed, these deviations are then smoothed
by applying a 9-year moving average to them.
Discontinuities in long-term trends. Economic upswing periods are characterized
by continuous growth in output, while downswing and depression periods are
characterized by stagnation and oscillatory behavior of output figures. In this
context it is interesting to note that an analysis of long-term production trends
often reveals an overlap of consecutive growth pulses, with production figures
oscillating between the boundaries defined by the two consecutive growth pulses.
Introduction and/or saturation of technologies.
Evolution of economic and social indicators. Under this hypothesis the periods of
depression and structural change are characterized by flares in economic (e.g.,
prices) and social (e.g., strike rates) indicators. One theoretical explanation of
these flares would consider the saturation of existing technologies, implying that
further (real-term) cost reductions along the learning curve become infeasible
(law of diminishing returns of technology improvement) and thus marginal pro-
duction costs of resources, commodities, and products increase substantially.
This increase in costs (and prices), along with the phenomenon of market satura-
tion, could in turn have repercussions on social relations, making the settlement
of working disputes a more difficult task and flares in working disputes more
common.
8.2.2. Indicators of technological change
A number of different indicators are proposed in this paper to describe techno-
logical change:
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Output. Introduction of new technologies allows an intensification of production
and results in significant growth in total output. A typical example of this
intensification is provided in the case of the introduction of the Bessemer pro-
cess, allowing mass production of steel.
(Real) production costs. A drastic reduction in (real-term) production costs is a
typical indicator for the introduction and growing importance of a new technol-
ogy. The introduction of the puddling process and later of the Bessemer process,
for instance, resulted in a significant decrease of the nominal and real-term steel
production costs and prices.
Technological substitution. Here the share of various competing technologies in
the production of total output is analyzed, using a logistic substitution model
(Fi'llher and Pry, 1971, and Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979).[21 This model
describes the emergence of new and the replacement of old technologies in terms
of their fractional market share by a set of logistic substitution functions, where
the emergence date is defined as the date a new technology captures one percent
market share and the saturation phase of a technology is defined by a (non-
logistic) transition function linking the logistic functions describing the introduc-
tion of a technology and its replacement by a more recent one.
Changes in factor inputs of production (in particular energy and labor). This
analysis considers the long-term evolution of the intensity of factor inputs (or its
inverse, in the form of energy efficiency or labor productivity) and the changes in
the composition of factor inputs.
Changes in market outlets and products.
The above-listed indicators of technological change represent a considerable
expansion of the descriptive framework for understanding technological change,
which in the past has concentrated on indicators of output growth and factor
inputs. The various indicators are, of course, closely interrelated; however, if one
is able to discern their synchronous development (as we attempt to show in this
paper), additional evidence supporting the hypothesis that technological change
is a main driving force of long swings in economic activity can be gained.
8.3. Technological Change in the Steel Industry
The importance of steel in the industrial development in the second half of the
nineteenth century as well as in the post-World War II period is widely recog-
nized. In analyzing total world crude steel output in the period 1860 to 1985
(Figure 8.1) one can easily discern periods of regular growth from periods of
stagnation and fluctuations in world crude steel output.
The regular growth in total output can be described by two consecutive
growth pulses in the form of logistic functions with regular growth periods from
1880 to 1910 and 1950 to 1970. Figure 8.t! shows the same two consecutive
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pulses in the transformation F/(I-F), where F represents the ratio of the world
steel production in a particular year divided by the calculated saturation level of
the logistic growth pulse (around 100 and 900 million tons, respectively) on a
logarithmic scale. As a result, the deviations from the logistic growth trends
(appearing as straight lines in Figure B.e) can be more easily discerned. The two
growth pulses overlap in the period 1920 to 1945, which is characterized by an
oscillatory phase of turbulence, before a regular growth pattern is resumed after
World War II. Since 1970, a similar deviation of total world steel production
from the logistic growth pulse appears, indicating that the world steel industry is
possibly facing a similar period of transition, as in the period 1920 to 1950. In
Figure B.9 world per capita steel production is analyzed, and one can conclude
that the picture is consistent with the situation illustrated in Figures B.l and B.e.
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Figure 8.9. World: growth pulses in per capita raw steel production.
The reason for the rapid increase in total world steel production after 1870
can be explained by the introduction of the Bessemer steel production process in
all steel-producing countries following its introduction in England in 1854.
Through the Bessemer process a dramatic increase in mass production of steel
became possible, compared with the production possibilities of the medieval
bloomery process or the crucible and puddling processes introduced in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The share of Bessemer steel in total
steel production increased very rapidly in the period from 1860 to 1875, account-
ing for nearly 90 percent of total world steel production, before it was gradually
replaced by the open hearth (Siemens-Martin) process.
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There are two reasons for the rapid expansion of the steel production after
World War II. First, in traditional steel-producing countries and regions (the
UK, Europe, and the USA) new market outlets for steel products evolved, espe-
cially in the rapidly expanding automobile industry. Second, new principal pro-
ducers, in particular Japan and "Newly Industrialized Countries" (NICs),
appeared on the market. During this phase of expansion, we observed the rapid
adoption of the basic oxygen blown furnace (BOF or LD) process and the
replacement of the Bessemer and open hearth processes at the global level (see
Roesch, 1979, and Chapter 9 by N. Nakicenovic).
During the same time period, one can observe a regular pattern of alternat-
ing periods of stable growth with periods of stagnation and fluctuations in out-
put, as well as in the diffusion of new and the replacement of old steel production
processes; one also observes the emergence of several new steel-producing coun-
tries and a change in the leadership of world steel production. Figure 8.-4 shows
the share of principal steel-producing countries and regions (the UK, Europe
including Eastern European countries, the USA and Canada, the USSR, Japan,
and NICs) in total world steel production. Figure 8.5 presents the same data
transformed. The transform F j(I-F) represents the share in total steel produc-
tion of one country or region divided by the share of all remaining countries and
is plotted on a logarithmic scale. This was done to make the data transforma-
tion underlying the logistic substitution model clearly visible.
Despite the turbulences induced by World War I, the 19305, and World
War II, one can nevertheless observe periods of significant structural change in
the geographic location of steel production. These structural change periods are
characterized by the emergence of new producing countries and the saturation
and consequent loss of leadership (in terms of market share) of traditional pro-
ducers. To better illustrate the dynamic shifts in the location of steel produc-
tion, Figure 8.5 is reconsidered by applying the multiple logistic substitution
model to it (Figure 8.6). The transformation of the data from Figure 8.5 com-
pared with Figure 8.-4 makes the earlier (turbulent) phases of a particular
country's market share more visible. Straight lines in Figure 8.6 indicate logistic
substitution paths of an increase and a decline in the market share. These model
calculations are not intended as a method of forecast, but rather provide an
instrument for data structuring that could better illustrate the dynamic geo-
graphic shifts in world steel production.
Again, periods of structural change can be distinguished from periods of
regular growth and smooth transition. In periods of structural change (around
1870, 1920, and 1970 onward) new producing countries appear on the market
and the long-term market share of the dominant producer(s) is reaching its
saturation level in order to decline thereafter.
The period 1860-1880 is characterized by the loss of leadership in world
steel production by the UK to Europe, which in turn saturated its share in total
world steel production around 1870. During this time period two new producers
emerged: North America (expanding very rapidly and overtaking the UK and
Europe by 1890 in terms of market share) and the USSR.
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In the period 1910 to 1930 a pattern similar to that of 50 years ago can be
observed. The market share of the leading region in steel production (North
America) reaches its saturation phase and new producers are entering the
market (Japan and NICs). Currently the steel industry again appears to be in a
phase of transition: the market share of the USSR in total world steel produc-
tion is saturating (around 1975) and, based on the model estimates, one would
expect a similar saturation for Japan by 1990. The rapid expansion of NICs is
particularly at the expense of the North American market share, with Europe,
the USSR, and ultimately Japan gradually loosing market share to these coun-
tries.
Despite the turbulences induced by wars and the crudeness of representa-
tion related to such a simple model, it is interesting to note that the logistic sub-
stitution model captures quite accurately the dynamic behavior, especially of the
oldest and latest competitors. The UK has been loosing its market share since
1870 along the logistic path, which appears as a straight line in Figure 8.6. In a
similar way the emergence of newly industrialized countries can quite accurately
be captured by a logistic market share growth function, suggesting that the his-
torically observed trend will continue into the future and will leave NICs as the
only winners in the game.
After having established a framework of periods of change, turbulence, and
saturation (around 1870, 1930, and since 1970) and of periods of smooth growth
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and transition at the macro level, the analysis will now zoom down to the
national level to consider economic indicators and to analyze whether technologi-
cal change coincides with the periods of turbulence and saturation identified
above. The examples of a number of different countries point out, that the
periods of fluctuation and depression coincide with the saturation of major tech-
nologies, in terms of both their market share and their performance (energy and
labor efficiency). This indicates a close causal relationship between technological
change and Wechsellagen of economic development.
Figure 8.7 shows the evolution of the per capita steel production in Ger-
many (Federal Republic of Germany after 1945) and of the steel intensity per
unit of GNP. One can observe a regular growth pattern of the two indicators up
to 1910, with a stagnation period between 1870 and 1875. After 1910 a drastic
slump in the steel intensity per capita and per unit of GNP can be observed as a
result of the two world wars. Particularly visible is the effect of the depression of
the 1930s. After 1945 the two indicators increase in line with the economic
reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany and reach their saturation
(for steel intensity around 1960 and for per capita steel production around 1970)
and consequently started to decline, pointing to the fact that the material inten-
sity of the German economy is decreasing.
Figure 8.8 presents the evolution of nominal and real-term (in 1913
Deutsche marks) steel prices since 1850. Although the data series available to
date are still incomplete in order to analyze with regard to cyclic fluctuations (in
particular, the time period of the 1880s, the period after World War I, and the
time period of hyperinflation in the 1920s are lacking), they nevertheless provide
a first-order picture on the evolution of real-term prices. Of particular interest is
the dramatic decline of nominal and real steel prices between 1860 and 1875 as a
result of the rapid diffusion of the Bessemer process. It is also interesting to note
that the real-term steel prices have remained rather stable during the periods of
stable economic growth (1890-1910 and 1950-1975).
On the basis of Figures 8.7 and 8.8 one can conclude that the time periods
with important changes and fluctuations to be analyzed in a technological change
context are the periods from 1860 to 1875 (rapid fall of nominal and real steel
prices), 1910 to 1935 (decrease of per capita steel production and steel intensity),
and the period since 1970, where the shift away from a material (steel) intensive
economy for the Federal Republic of Germany is particularly apparent. Let us
now consider how technological change in terms of the principal steel production
processes integrates into this picture.
Figure 8.9 shows the evolution of the share of different steel production
processes in Germany. The evolution of the technological system can be
described by a regular succession of growth, saturation, and replacement of
different technologies in the production of steel. This regular pattern is quite
remarkable in view of the territorial changes of Germany throughout this period
and in particular between the German Reich before World War II and the
Federal Republic of Germany thereafter.
The most important technological shifts in German steel production tech-
nologies start with the substitution of the medieval bloomery process by the pud-
dling process, which saturates its market share in the period from 1855 to 1865
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(period of introduction of the Bessemer process) and then is consequently
replaced by the Bessemer and later by the open hearth processes. [3] The
diffusion of the last two technologies follows a regular logistic path in the period
from 1875 to around 1910, when the two technologies enter their phase of satura-
tion. After 1910 the electric arc process emerges, which after some turbulence
(the share of recycled scrap in total steel production increased dramatically dur-
ing the wars) resumes a regular diffusion pattern in the second half of the twen-
tieth century.
At the beginning of the 1960s one observes the appearance and fast adop-
tion of another technology, i.e., the basic oxygen blown furnace (BOF or LD pro-
cess). The emergence of a major technological innovation during a period of
steady growth is in contrast to what we have observed in the past, when new
technologies appeared during the phase of saturation of the predominant tech-
nology (coinciding to some extent with periods of economic fluctuation and
depression). Still, it is interesting to note that, despite the appearance of the
BOF technology falls outside the observed historical pattern, the diffusion of the
BOF process enters its phase of saturation around 1973 and appears in the long
term to be replaced by the electric arc process.
The case of steel production technologies in Germany supports thus the
earlier statements in this paper that new technologies follow a regular diffusion
pattern during phases of stable economic growth and approach their saturation
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stage during those periods defined as downswing and depression phases in the
long-wave literature.
Figure 8.10 presents a time series for nominal and real prices of coal and
pig iron (raw steel since 1965) for the United Kingdom. This example serves pri-
marily to point at distinct price flares in the long-term evolution of coal and iron
prices, whereas the cyclic nature of price fluctuations will not be further dis-
cussed on the basis of this particular example. Figure 8.10 draws our attention
in particular to the three distinct flares in nominal and real prices that occurred
in 1835 (pig iron), after 1870 (coal and pig iron), and around 1920 (coal and pig
iron). After 1940 nominal prices increase dramatically in line with inflation, and
two flarings of real prices can be observed around 1950 (coal and pig iron) and
around 1975 (raw steel) and 1980 (coal).
Under the assumption that price flares are indicators of periods of struc-
tural change in the system, we will now analyze the technology changes in crude
steel production in the UK (Figure 8.11). Contrary to the example presented of
Germany, the available data (Mitchell and Deane, 1971) for steel production
according to processes go back only to 1871 and refer only to ingots and castings
production. Thus, detailed statistics on a very important market segment of the
UK steel industry in the nineteenth century - namely, the production of high-
quality tool steel (Sheffield steel) by the crucible process - are missing, but it is
clear that most of the steel production prior to the invention of the Bessemer
process in the United Kingdom was in the form of crucible steel (Tweedale,
1986). Following the diffusion pattern in the USA, it took approximately 15
years for the Bessemer process to displace much of the market share of the cruci-
ble process, until the Bessemer process in turn was displaced by the open hearth
process in the UK. Thus, it would be fair to assume the year 1870 (15 years
after the introduction of the Bessemer process) as the approximate saturation
period in the market share of the Bessemer technology. Since this question of
the saturation date of the market share of the Bessemer process cannot in the
absence of available statistics be resolved at present, the discussion will concen-
trate on the later period.
One can identify in the available data segment a regular diffusion pattern
of open hearth technology versus the Bessemer process during the time period
1871 to 1920 when the open hearth process enters its phase of saturation
(1920-1960). During World War I electric arc steel appears, and the market
share of the various technologies shows no particularly regular pattern during
the saturation phase of the open hearth and the emergence of electric arc steel.
It is only with the appearance of the BOF technology around 1960 that a regular
technological substitution pattern is resumed with the BOF replacing the open
hearth process until it reaches its market saturation in the early 19708. Along
with this, one observes a steady decline in real steel prices which is only reversed
the moment BOF technology reaches its saturation (and eventually its limit in
cost reduction potential).
As a result, there exists evidence that the major turning points in the struc-
tural change of the system (especially with regard to the beginning of the satura-
tion phase of the dominant technology and the emergence of new technologies)
coincide with price flares, which are at least for 1870, 1920, and the present to
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some extent consistent with phases of downswing or depression in a long-wave
context.
Figure 8.11! shows the substitution of different steel production technologies
in the USA. As already discussed in the examples of Germany and the UK, a
strong correlation between major structural changes and turning points in tech-
nological change with the periods of downswing and depression in a long-wave
context can be observed. This is illustrated by the saturation of the Bessemer
process in the late 1870s, of the open hearth process at the end of the 19308, and
of the BOF process starting around 1975. During periods of stable economic
growth (1890 to 1930 and 1955 to 1970), a regular pattern of technological
diffusion and substitution in steel production technologies emerges from Figure
8.11!.
Let us now consider whether these important dates of the technological
change in the US steel industry can also be identified in another indicator of
technological change, namely, in factor input (energy consumption).
Figure 8.19 presents the specific energy input per ton of raw steel produc-
tion in the USA. Despite the fact that there is a considerable gap in the avail-
able statistics, one can still discern the historical tendencies both in energy input
(specific energy consumption) and in the composition of energy input. The evo-
lution of specific energy consumption [Figure 8.19 (a)l clearly exhibits a typical
learning curve, where energy efficiency of steel making dramatically increases in
the period between 1850 and 1920. After this time, energy efficiency still
increases, however, not in the previously exponential manner but only in a linear
trend, which is illustrated well in the available statistics from 1947 onward. This
trend in the learning curve of energy requirements of steel production in the USA
is confirmed also by European data (see Decker, 1976).
The year 1920 represents also an important date in the structural change of
the composition of the energy inputs Figure 8.19 (6). By that time the substitu-
tion process of bituminous coal for the traditional fuels charcoal and anthracite
coal is completed and the system is almost entirely based on coal as fuel. It is
interesting to note that prior to 1850 a similar substitution pattern of anthracite
coal for charcoal can be observed, with the market share of anthracite reaching
its saturation level between 1860 and 1870 with more than 50 percent of all
energy requirements in steel production. This illustrates that it takes about 50
years between the shift in the market dominance of a particular fuel.
The situation characteristic for the beginning of this century, where practi-
cally all energy requirements were provided by a single source of primary energy,
is in contrast to the situation after 1950. Here the energy is provided by four
different energy sources: coal, oil (with a declining market share), natural gas,
and electricity (with an increasing market share). Although the available statis-
tics do not allow linkage between the two data series directly, one can by extra-
polating structural change tendencies into the past observe that the important
turning point in the introduction of new fuels into the steel sector and, thus the
important structural change from a system relying on a single source of energy
into a system with a diversified supply, occurred in the period from 1920 to 1930.
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This structural change period coincides with another important date in the tech-
nological change of the system: the saturation of the open hearth process and
the introduction of the electric arc process.
8.4. Technology Change in the Coal Industry
(Mining and Use)
Figure 8.1-1 shows the evolution of world coal production from 1860 to the
present. As in the case of world steel production regular periods of growth and
fluctuation in world coal production can be identified. Long-term evolution can
be described by a succession of two growth pulses that overlap during the period
1920 to 1945, where production oscillated between the boundaries defined by the
two consecutive growth pulses.
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Figure 8.14. World: growth pulses in coal production.
A similar picture can be seen in the evolution of coal production and con-
sumption figures for the UK, the country with the longest recorded history of
coal production. Figure 8.15 presents the history of coal production and con-
sumption for the UK since 1700 and piecewise secular trends of homogeneous
growth rates in the periods 1720 to 1760, 1760 to 1820, 1820 to 1870, 1870 to
1910, and then a less pronounced secular downward trend starting around 1960
becomes apparent. Figure 8.16 illustrates these secular movements in terms of
the deviation of coal consumption in the UK from a 50-year moving average.
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These deviations are smoothed by applying a 9-year moving average, with the
smoothed secular deviations also being presented in Figure 8.16.
With regard to long-term price movements, which were already presented
(in nominal and real terms) in Figure 8.10 and which are further analyzed in
Figure 8.17 with regard to their deviations from a 50-year moving average
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(deviations are smoothed by a 9-year moving average), one observes an overlap
of the secular movements in production and consumption and prices. With
regard to peaks, the two secular movements harmonize for the period 1870, lag
for 10 years in 1910 (consumption) and 1920 (price), and harmonize again during
the 19508; With regard to the troughs the two movements show a similar
pattern only in the 19308 and a ten-year time lag between 1965 (price) and 1975
(consumption). Apparently, the frequency of the observed fluctuations has
somewhat increased in the post-World War II period.
Before turning to a brief discussion on the long-term evolution of factor
inputs (labor productivity) in coal production and its relation to technological
change in the mining sector, another (social) indicator to determine periods of
fluctuations and structural changes will be discussed. Figure 8.18 presents the
strike rates in the mining sector of the UK in the last 100 years. The original
statistics refer to the number of workdays lost owing to working disputes; using
this absolute measure the number of strike days in the 1980s amounts to 20 mil-
lion lost workdays. This figure is not very high in comparison with the strikes in
1921 and 1926 with more than 70 million and nearly 150 million lost workdays,
respectively. One has, however, to consider that the employed workforce in the
coal-mining sector has drastically decreased between the 1920s and the present.
Thus a relative measure, i.e., the number of strike days lost in relation to the
total number of available workdays, was analyzed in Figure 8.18. As can be
seen, the period 1912 to 1926 and the period since 1970 are particularly
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and quarrying.
noticeable periods for intensive work disputes whereas during the period 1930 to
1970, the strike activities remained at a relatively low level. Incidentally the
flares in strike activity occur at the same time as other indicators used so far to
point out important turning points in the structure of the system.
Figure 8.19 shows the evolution of labor requirements (labor productivity)
in UK coal mining. The productivity showed a downward trend over the period
1860 to 1925, with troughs in the productivity figures corresponding to the years
of intense working disputes. This productivity decrease is primarily a conse-
quence of resource depletion, as deeper deposits are mined, whereas the mining
operation continues to be essentially a manual one.
Since 1925 labor productivity shows a reversal of the secular trend, in that
1925 productivity increased steadily (except for the wartime period 1939 to 1945)
and reached a first level of saturation in 1970. This productivity increase is
caused by the diffusion of mechanization technology (which will be analyzed later
in more detail for the case of Germany), in terms of mechanization of winning
operations (introduction of pneumatic picks and later shearers) and coal loading
operations, as shown in Figure 8.19. Thus the massive introduction of pneu-
matic picks in the mid-1920s, followed by the increasing use of mechanized face
operation schemes, is translated as an increase in the labor productivity, despite
a continuation of the worsening in geologic conditions. Whereas the appearance
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of pneumatic picks and first shearers in the 19208 is consistent with earlier obser-
vations that important innovations tend to be introduced in periods of structural
change and turbulence, one cannot follow a similar logic when analyzing the
introduction of mechanical loading into the UK mining industry after 1945.
However, it is interesting that the ultimate saturation of the two technology
diffusion processes appears to be synchronized (1980). Also visible in Figure 8.19
is the effect of the beginning saturation phase of mechanization (in passing more
than 90 percent of total production) on productivity. This example would thus
support the hypothesis of the importance of the simultaneous saturation of tech-
nology diffusion as a causal factor for economic depression periods.
Figure 8.eo analyzes the development of the underground labor produc-
tivity in coal mining of Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) similar to the
previous analysis for the UK. Again two distinct phases in the development of
labor productivity become apparent. The productivity, which remained practi-
cally constant up to the mid-1920s, is drastically increased as a consequence of
the rapid diffusion of pneumatic picks as the first technology of mechanization in
coal mining. This particular diffusion process saturates in the early 1930s when
practically 100 percent of the total production is won with pneumatic picks. As
the diffusion of the first mechanization in coal mining is saturating, the labor
productivity (which doubled compared with the period when mining was essen-
tially a manual process) is stagnating.
After World War II a regular pattern of diffusion of semi-mechanized min-
ing technologies (mechanization of coal winning by shearers and of transport
operations by conveyors) and later of completely mechanized mining schemes
(mechanization of winning, transport, and development operations by means of
self-advancing hydraulic roof supports) emerges, resulting in a doubling of the
prewar productivity level. With the saturation of the diffusion of complete
mechanization in the mid-1980s no further significant improvements in the labor
productivity are to be expected (especially in view of ever worsening geologic
conditions), unless a new technology (e.g., automation) is introduced.
The saturation of the diffusion of new technologies and its impact on factor
input (labor productivity) and ultimately the costs of production can conse-
quently be considered an important contribution to the stagnation of a particular
sector. The simultaneous saturation in the technology diffusion of a number of
key sectors in turn could provide an explicative model of long-term economic
fluctuations.
At the end of this discussion of the technological changes in the coal sector,
let us briefly consider the structural changes in the market outlets. The most
important utilization of coal in the nineteenth century related to supplying the
energy requirements of industry and households, the conversion of coal into
secondary energy forms (in particular, coke and town gas), and fueling the trans-
port sector (steam engines). Since 1900 one observes a shift in the market
outlets especially for conversion into secondary energy carriers and in the trans-
port sector.
Whereas the conversion to coke still constitutes an important market for
coal, we observe a dramatic shift in the use of coal for the production of other
secondary energy carriers. The production of town gas from coal has
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disappeared in all industrialized countries as a result of the substitution of gas
for lighting purposes by electricity and by natural gas for other uses. Instead,
the electricity-generating sector has in the period 1920 to present become the
most important market for coal, both in absolute and in market share terms.
Currently electricity production represents around 70 percent of total coal con-
sumption in the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany, and around 80 per-
cent in the USA.[4] The use of coal in the transport sector, which reached its
peak around 1920 with more than 23 percent of total coal consumption in the
USA and around 15 percent of total coal consumption in the UK, has entirely
disappeared as a consequence of the substitution of the steam engine for the
internal-combustion engine. This substitution occurs both in water transport
(ships) and in ground transport (railways).
Figure 8.t!1 illustrates this substitution process of the coal-fired steam
engine for the internal-combustion engine based on petroleum products in the
case of the UK. In the figure the substitution process in terms of the total ton-
nage of ships registered in the UK fleet is presented, and a regular technological
diffusion pattern emerges. Sail ships are replaced by steamships, which are
introduced into the market in the mid-1820s and saturate their market share by
1920. Since that time period steamships are replaced by motor ships, resulting
in the loss of the market outlet for coal for this application. For the USA a simi-
lar pattern can be observed.
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In a similar way, coal-fired steam locomotives are replaced by diesel
locomotives (illustrated in Figure 8.!!!! for the USA). Since the end of the 1930s
steam locomotives are replaced by diesel locomotives along a logistic substitution
path. This substitution process was completed by the beginning of the 1960s
and currently the entire locomotive fleet of the USA consists of diesel locomo-
tives (contrary to Europe, electric locomotives have no practical importance in
the USA). The result from these technological substitution processes in the
transport sector initiated in the 19208 and 19308 was a complete disappearance
of coal utilization in the transport sector and the loss of this important market
outlet.
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Figure 8.££. USA: substitution of steam for diesel locomotives. {Source: Nakicenovic,
1987b.}
8.5. Conclusion
The illustrative examples from the steel and coal sector presented in this paper
provide evidence to support the hypothesis that technological change is closely
related to Wechsellagen in long-term economic development.
A variety of different indicators has been used to illustrate that historically
one can discern periods of turbulence from periods of stable economic develop-
ment, where stable growth in output, regular technological diffusion patterns,
and stable (real-term) prices are observed.
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The regularity of growth and technological diffusion patterns during up-
swing phases seconds the contention that long-term economic fluctuations are to
a large extent driven by the growth and the resulting saturation of technolo-
gies.[sl The regularity of technological diffusion processes (as captured quite
accurately by the logistic substitution model), i.e., the somnambulisme in the
structural change of a technological system during the phase of regular economic
growth, is seen as a result of the eomparative advantage (with regard to quality
of output, economics of production, and response to societal needs) of new tech-
nologies over old ones.
Stable growth periods are followed by periods of stagnation and turbulence
(depressions), during which time a high degree of dustering of saturations
(saturation of market growth and subsequent oscillation of output levels and the
saturation in market penetration and in efficiency improvements of technologies)
can be observed. The dustering of saturations in the diffusion of different tech-
nologies is not necessarily related to the introduction date, i.e., technologies that
are introduced at a later date tend to diffuse faster and reach saturation at a
similar time period to technologies introduced much earlier into the system.
During this dustering of saturations of leading technologies and
markets/products, new technological innovations very often emerge and flares in
nominal/real-term prices and social indicators can be observed.
Thus it is my contention that long-term fluctuations in economic activity
are caused by the overlap of the main growth phases in output and technology
diffusion and the subsequent dustering of saturations in markets, in output, and
in the diffusion of technology, in particular, in those key sectors responsible for
much of the previous economic growth.
The examples analyzed in this paper from the steel and coal industries are
seconded by similar types of development patterns in the field of primary energy
and transport infrastructures, which can be considered as (aggregate) "metatech-
nologies," and are analyzed by Nakicenovic in Chapter 9.
The dustering of saturations hypothesis thus draws on examples of the
saturation of primary energy carriers (coal), infrastructures (railways) [61, steel
technologies (open hearth processes), and mining technologies (first mechaniza-
tion of coal mining with the introduction of pneumatic picks), among others, to
explain, for instance, the depression of the 19308. In that respect it is noticeable
that the diffusion rates of these examples are widely different. In the case of the
primary energy share of coal and the expansion of the railway network, the time
constant is around 100 years; in the case of the diffusion of the open hearth pro-
cess it is around 50 years; and in the case of coal mechanization the diffusion rate
amounts to only 20 years. Still the dates of saturation of all these technologies
fall within a relatively short time period, between 1920 to 1935.
It would be illusionary to expect from such a working hypothesis as the
dustering of saturations a perfect synchronization with the historically observed
depression dates. Consequently, similar saturation phenomena or price flares
outside the 50-year pattern of Kondratieff cycles can be found. Examples for
this saturation of technology diffusion and price flares during periods of economic
growth include the saturation of the puddling process in Germany around 1860,
the price flares and long-wave upswing in coal and steel prices in the UK around
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1950, and the date of the trend shift in one steel intensity indicator for the
Federal Republic of Germany (per capita steel production) around 1960. This,
however, is not necessarily a contradiction to our working hypothesis, as the
saturation dates should be considered in terms of a frequency distribution
around the depression date of a Kondratieff cycle, rather than in terms of a rigid
synchronization.
The regularity of growth rates, the regular technological diffusion patterns,
and their overlap in time, as well as the coincidence of the (- in a larger sense -
simultaneous) saturation in output and technology diffusion and the often-
observed emergence of new technologies during these saturation phases would
point to a Schumpeterian view of long-term economic development.
More phenomenological evidence has still to be assembled before the con-
clusions of this paper can decisively be confirmed and a causal model of economic
Wechsellagen can be developed. The preliminary phenomenological cluster
presented in this paper is intended to provide the basis for such a model, in
which technology diffusion and growth, clustering of technology and market
saturation, and a certain degree of clustering in the introduction of key techno-
logical innovations are considered as driving forces of economic development.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
For example, van Duijn, 1983; Freeman, 1983; Hartman and Wheeler, 1979;
Kleinknecht, 1984; Kondratieff, 1926; Kuznets, 1930; Rostow, 1975; Schumpeter,
1939; Stewart, 1982.
This particular model draws an analogy to the behavior of biological systems in
using models of S-sha~ growth patterns, like the logistic curve (Verhulst, 1838),
used in biology to describe the growth and the dynamics of interaction of biologi-
cal populations (Goell, Maitra, and Montroll, 1971; Lotka, 1910; Pearl, 1925).
The theoretical basis for an application of such models in the technology and
market area can be found in the concept of product life cycles as well as in the
theories of the adoption and diffusion of new innovations, in both time (Rogers,
1962; Bass, 1969 and 1980) and space (Higerstrand, 1967).
Contrary to other countries (e.g., the UK and the USA) one cannot observe a dis-
placement of the Bessemer process by the open hearth process in the case of Ger-
many. The reason for the continuing importance of the Bessemer process can be
found in the available iron ore resource base of continental Europe (e.g., the high
phosphorous ores of the Lorraine) for which a variant of the Bessemer process, the
basic Bessemer, or Thomas process was particularly suited.
For a detailed overview of the historical changes of the market outlets of coal pro-
duced in the Rhur basin of the Federal Republic of Germany see Wiel, (1970).
At this point it is necessary to stress the synergistic effects of the growth of a
number of key sectors in explaining major upswings in economic development.
Thus, a number of sectors would have to be studied under the "leading sector"
hypothesis (Rostow, 1962; Hirschmann, 1967) in order to explain the extent of
economic growth during certain time periods of intense economic development.
See, for instance, Holtfrerich, 1973, and Fremdling, 1975, for an analysis of coal
and railways in the economic development of Germany in the second half of the
nineteenth century.
For additional evidence see also Mothes, 1950.
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CHAPTER 9
Dynamics of Change and Long Waves
Nebojsa Nakicenovic
"Evolution is the result 0/ a sequence 0/
replacements." Elliott W. Montroll, 1978
9.1. Introduction
Much of the long-wave debate centers around the existence of empirical evidence
and possible explanations of the phenomenon, but even those who claim that
such long-term fluctuations in economic life are real argue whether the waves
and their timing are regular and to what extent various events are synchronized.
We will argue that the long-wave phenomenon is one particular way of describ-
ing technological, economic, and social change and development. We show that
this evolutionary development process is the result of a sequence of replacements
of one technique (technology, artifact, product, practice, organization, tradition,
or idea) by another.
Long waves emerge because a number of important replacements take place
simultaneously, leading to a prolonged phase of economic growth. Likewise,
these replacements and growth processes tend to saturate during relatively short
periods resulting in prolonged recession, economic restructuring, and technologi-
cal and social change. It is during these periods that innovations cluster and
eventually lead to a new "wave" of replacements and growth. This hypothesis
does not require a high degree of synchronization or "focusing" for either the
innovation clusters or the saturation clusters. Instead, it is sufficient that a
number of important replacements take place simultaneously resulting in the
periods of prolonged growth.
Denoting the time interval that it takes to replace from 10% to 90% of old
practice or technique by AT, all that is required is that the ATs overlap for a
number of important substitutions. This requirement implies a certain degree of
clustering of saturations and innovations, but the clusters need not be sharply
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focused during the troughs of the long wave. In fact, they are initiated during
the end of the growth phase, which is followed by a period of turbulence when
the first important replacements start saturating, and last well into the begin-
ning of the upswing phase marked by a new pulse of replacements. This view of
the long wave is also consistent with Kleinknecht's observation that innovation
clusters can be observed around the troughs. However, they do not appear to be
as strongly focused as originally maintained by Mensch (see Mensch, 1979;
Kleinknecht, 1987; Chapter 4). We will show that important technologies
saturate around the troughs and, more importantly, that the time intervals
covered by their I:i..Ts encompass prolonged periods of growth and expansion.
Long-wave pulsations (flares) in prices will be used as an indicator of the various
phases, especially the sequence of growth and recession phases.
On the basis of our assumptions, the dynamics of change and economic
growth can be decomposed into a sequence of replacements that generate periods
of growth followed by recession. These are marked by turbulence caused by the
lagged saturation of the replacement processes. Innovations eventually lead to a
new phase of replacements and thus growth. The innovations should not be
viewed in the narrow technical sense, because they also include new social and
organizational forms and ideas and creation of new practices. At the aggregate
level, e.g., physical output or gross national product (GNP), the indicators por-
tray long-term increases interrupted by phases of turbulence. In other words,
the aggregate indicators look like step functions where each step is a plateau
with large fluctuations, and the periods of growth between the plateaux are S-
shaped curves. Due to the inaccuracy of the data and the inherent difficulty of
identifying exact resolutions of different phases in the long waves, we will use a
number of different indicators simultaneously to describe technological and
economic changes.
We will use both physical indicators, such as energy consumption or length
of transport infrastructures, and monetary indicators, such as prices or output at
given prices. A large number of indicators give a higher precision in identifying
growth pulses, replacements of old by new, and various phases in the long wave.
This higher precision is reached in the statistical sense and same way as a large
number of synchronized clocks will give a better time measurement than a single
one does (official time is in fact measured by an average). Thus, the multi-
dimensional approach increases the accuracy of the results in spite of often
insufficient data quality, especially for the records from last century or before.
Another reason for analyzing a number of different indicators for the same
time periods and same processes of change (e.g., energy, transport, prices) is that
not all can be described by the same secular patterns. For example, prices often
portray fluctuations, some of them with relatively long periods, but rarely
increasing or decreasing secular trends of more than a few decades. Growth and
senescence of technologies or consumption levels, on the other hand, often have
consistent secular trends with very long duration (compared with the long wave).
Usually, the secular trend of growth and senescence processes can be described
by S-shaped (often logistic) curves. However, not all can be described by simple
(or single) S-shaped functions. Sometimes more complex patterns are observed,
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which are often described by envelopes that can be decomposed into a number of
S-shaped growth or senescence phases.
Two typical cases are successive growth pulses with intervening saturation
and a period of change, and simultaneous substitution of competing technologies.
We argue that (1) the population, production, or performance of inanimate
(man-made) objects or systems can be described by successive growth pulses
that often have an S-shape, the same shape encountered in the growth of popula-
tions, "organisms," etc., as originally described by Verhulst (1844) and Pearl
(1924); and (2) these growth pulses can be decomposed into a sequence of
replacements, originally exploited by Fisher and Pry (1971), as the appropriate
model for the dynamics of industrial replacements, and later extended to simul-
taneous replacement of more than two competing technologies (Marchetti and
Nakicenovic, 1979). In the first case, successive S-shaped pulses usually
represent, for example, the growth of energy consumption or successive improve-
ments in performance, such as aircraft speed records. Here the first pulse is
associated with an old technology, the piston engine, and the second with the
new technology, the jet engine (see Nakicenovic, 1987a). In the second case,
simultaneous substitution of competing technologies is usually described by
increasing market shares of new technologies and decreasing market shares of old
technologies, such as the replacement of sails by steam and later by motors.
Thus, we will describe the dynamics of change and the long waves with a
number of different indicators (that is, by vector rather than by scalar measure-
ments). Usually an asymmetrical view is offered, using either price or physical
(technological) indicators as explanatory variables. Our description is not frozen
into one or the other view, but rather we offer a symmetrical description by con-
sidering many dimensions of these dynamic processes.
First, we will illustrate the waves (flares) in prices. Second, we will show
that the expansion of the most important means of transportation, starting with
canals and ending with aircraft, can be seen as a replacement process where the
substitution of older for newer technologies overlaps the growth phases in the
long wave. This analysis starts, somewhat unconventionally, with the youngest
technologies (aircraft and airways) and ends with the oldest (canals and water-
ways). Finally, we will show that the evolution of the energy systems and steel
production also follows a similar pattern where important replacement processes
take place during the growth phases of the long wave. In addition, we will show
that total global production of energy and steel evolved through two growth
pulses that are related to the last two long waves. Throughout the text we will
use the price flares as a clock for the long waves.
9.2. Price Waves
The regularity of fluctuations in price data was the phenomenon that first stimu-
lated Kondratieff and his predecessors to postulate the existence of long waves in
economic life. These waves are most pronounced in the wholesale price indices
for all commodities in the United States, but they can be observed in the price
indices of other industrialized countries including the United Kingdom. Figure
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9.1 shows the wholesale price index in the United Kingdom from 1560 to 1982
and Figure 9.!! in the United States from 1800 to 1982. In both countries prices
appear to be stationary with long fluctuations almost over the whole period.
Only after the 1940s can a pronounced inflationary trend be observed that had a
magnitude greater than any other previous fluctuation. In the United States
prices reached pronounced peaks around the years 1780, 1815, 1865, and 1920,
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and there were also sharp increases during the last decade. In the United King-
dom, the fluctuations were subdued until the end of the eighteenth century. The
first pronounced peak occurred around the year 1810, a weaker but prolonged
peak around the year 1872, another pronounced peak in 1920, and a prolonged
inflationary period during the last decade. Because all pronounced inflationary
periods in both countries are associated with major wars, Hartman and Wheeler
(1979) observed that the absence of strong inflation during the mid-nineteenth
century in the United Kingdom could be partly due to the absence of such mili-
tary conflict.
Clearly, price fluctuations in the United Kingdom and the United States
display a broadly similar pattern, although the behavior in the United States
prior to the mid-eighteenth century is not well documented and is uncertain.
Prices in the United Kingdom portray a long decline from 1660 to about 1740
with two pronounced peaks in 1699 and 1710, and a long rise from about 1740 to
about 1810, followed by another decline. The turning point between these two
periods of rising and falling prices corresponds to the first pronounced peak.
Especially large price rises occurred between 1785 and 1792 as the Industrial
Revolution gained momentum. In the United States, a pronounced price peak
occurred during the Revolution and the recovery period between 1775 and 1785.
Although the two countries differed substantially in many respects, such as the
level of industrialization, institutional development, energy use, and internal
conflicts, the parallel in the pattern of price fluctuations through the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries is striking. In the face of quickened industrialization, the
Napoleonic Wars (UK), and the War of 1812 (USA), prices rose until the 1820s.
A period of declining trend continued through 1850 (UK) and 1843 (USA), fol-
lowed by a rising trend that was more pronounced in the United States,
undoubtedly associated with the Civil War. The period from 1873 to 1896 is
characterized by a declining trend in both countries, and the succession of rising
and falling periods has remained almost exactly parallel until the present. Since
World War II, prices in the United Kingdom and the United States have risen
almost uninterruptedly and to unprecedented levels.
The price fluctuations in both countries indicate a regular and parallel pat-
tern as will be elaborated shortly. Price peaks of the 1780s, 1820s, 1870s, and
1920s are spaced at intervals of four to five decades. These recurring long swings
in prices are in our opinion not the primary causes of the long-wave phenomenon
but rather a good indicator of the succession of alternating phases of the long
wave. We consider the long swings in price movements to indicate the phases of
rapid growth and saturation with the increasing level of prices and phases of
recession, and regenerative destruction with decreasing price level (see Schum-
peter, 1939).
To obtain a clearer picture of the timing of the long waves that are observ-
able in the price indices of the two countries, we have decomposed the time
series into fluctuations and a secular trend. Since the secular trend does not
indicate a simple functional form, we have used a 51-year moving average
method for its elimination from the time series. We have smoothed the resulting
residuals (Le., the relative difference between the actual price level and its secu-
lar trend expressed as a percentage) with a IS-year moving average. The
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resulting stationary series (smoothed and unsmoothed residuals) are shown on
the lower plots in Figure 9.9 for the United Kingdom and in Figure 9.~ for the
United States. The upper plots in Figures 9.9 and 9.~ show stylized indicators of
the long swings in prices. The curves have been derived by smoothing the resid-
uals by a 25- (instead of a 15) year moving average. We have chosen such a long
moving average to eliminate some of the more pronounced fluctuations from the
residuals that overlap the five-decade long swings. The stars approximately indi-
cate the turning points of the long waves. We are aware that this kind of simple
smoothing can introduce spurious fluctuations into the time series.
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This empirical determination indicates not only a parallel development of
the price movements in the two countries, but also a high degree of synchroniza-
tion. For the period before 1800 in the United Kingdom, we dated turning
points in the years 1623, 1651, 1681, 1712, 1739, 1753, and 1773. The intervals
between the four succeeding troughs are 58, 58, and 44 years and between the
three peaks 61 and 41 years. As the Industrial Revolution gained momentum,
first in the United Kingdom and later in the United States, the long swings
became more regular and the magnitude of the fluctuations increased. The aver-
age amplitude of the fluctuations rose from less than 10% in preindustrial United
Kingdom to about 20% in both countries. Table 9.1 shows the dates of the turn-
ing points and the duration of the long swings in prices for the two countries.
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The average duration of the fluctuations is about 50 years and the occurrence of
peaks and troughs varies by not more than one or two years. We consider Table
9.1 a rough, empirical indicator of the timing of long waves in the two leading
countries. This timing is similar to the stylized schemes derived by van Duijn
(1983) and Bieshaar and Kleinknecht (1984). In subsequent examples we will
use this empirical indicator of the long-wave turning points to determine the
correspondence between the fluctuations that we will establish in other monetary
and quantitative indicators of economic development.
Table 9.1. Chronology of the long wave, UK and USA.
Price swings
Phase
Downswing
Upswing
Downswing
Upswing
Downswing
Upswing
Downswing
Upswing
Downswing
Upswing
Downswing
Upswing
Downswing
Upswing
United Kingdom
Period Duration
1585-1623 48
1623-1651 28
1651-1681 30
1681-1712 31
1712-1739 27
1739-1753 24
1753-1773 20
1773-1810 37
1810-1840 30
1840-1869 29
1869-1895 26
1895-1920 25
1920-1945 25
1945-
United States
Period
1809-1841
1841-1869
1869-1895
1895-1920
1920-1945
1945-
Duration
32
28
26
25
25
9.3. Transport Systems
9.3.1. Aircraft
We will now show that the evolution of transport systems and infrastructures
can be analyzed as a sequence of replacements of old modes of transportation by
new ones. Furthermore, the substitutions of old for new technologies overlap the
growth phases in the long-wave fluctuations as indicated by price flares. The
analysis starts, somewhat unconventionally, with the youngest transport system
(air travel) and ends with the oldest (canals and waterways).
The rapid expansion of air travel during the recent decades has its roots in
developments achieved in aerodynamics and other sciences many decades ago,
and especially in the engineering achievements made between the two wars. The
DC-3 airliner is often given as the example of the first "modern" passenger trans-
port because in many ways it denotes the beginning of the "aircraft age." The
use of aircraft for transportation has increased ever since and its performance
has improved by about two orders of magnitude. Figure 9.5 shows the increase in
air transport worldwide measured in billions of passenger kilometers per year
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Figure 9.5. Air transport worldwide.
(passenger-kmjyr). It gives all carrier operations including those of planned
economies. The logistic function has been fitted to the actual data, and it indi-
cates that the inflection point in the growth of air travel occurred about 10 years
ago (1977).[11 Thus, after a period of rapid exponential growth, less than one
doubling is left until the estimated saturation level is achieved after the year
2000. The figure shows that the most rapid expansion of air travel in the world
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lasted from the 1930s until the 1970s and that the growth rate has been declining
for about the past 10 years. Therefore, air travel expanded in much the same
way growth processes do in biology, as S-shaped growth patterns. The most
rapid expansion of air travel took place during the growth phase of the long
wave.
Figure 9.6 shows the same data and fitted logistic curve transformed as
z/(It-z), where Z denotes the actual volume of all operations in a given year and
It is the estimated saturation level. The data and the estimated logistic trend
line are plotted in Figure 9.6 as fractional shares of the saturation level,
F = Z / It, which simplifies the transformation to F/ (1-F). Transformed in this
way, the data appear to be on a straight line, which is the estimated logistic
function.
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Figure 9.6. Air transport worldwide, logistic plot.
Perhaps the more interesting results are that it took about 30 years for
world air transport to reach the inflection point (half the estimated saturation
level) and that after two decades the saturation level will be reached. This raises
a crucial question. What will happen after saturation? Can we expect another
growth pulse, a decline, or the instability of changing periods of growth and
decline? Most likely a new period of growth associated with new technologies
will follow the projected saturation (see also Lee and Nakicenovic, Chapter 1).
During the same period, while air travel worldwide increased by two orders
of magnitude, the productivity of the individual aircraft also increased by two
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orders of magnitude from the DC-3 to the Boeing 747 (see Nakicenovic, 1987a).
Another growth phase of air travel, or some other new transport system, in the
next century would require an analogous increase in the productivity of the vehi-
cles. In the case of aircraft this would imply supersonic or hypersonic (extremely
large subsonic transports) or both.
How probable is the development of a large cruise supersonic or hypersonic
transport? S-pulses do not usually occur alone but in pairs. Usually structural
change occurs at the saturation level, leading to a new growth pulse and in turn
to new productivity and performance requirements for succeeding technologies.
This logic would suggest the need for a more productive means of long-distance
transportation for the next century than the current wide-bodied families of sub-
sonic aircraft. It is questionable whether history repeats itself, but we will show
that in the past each growth phase of the long wave is associated with the evolu-
tion of a number of important technologies that tend to saturate during the end
of the prosperity phase and during the recession phase of the long cycle. Below
we illustrate that the growth of the older technology, road transport systems, in
the United States can be described by a pair of successive growth pulses with an
intervening saturation during the 1930s marked by a period of change. Using the
data available, we illustrate the evolution of road vehicles and other transport
systems in the United States, but will return to analyzing long waves and tech-
nological change at the global level thereafter.
9.3.2. Automobiles
At the beginning of this century, few proponents of the automobile envisaged
that its use would spread so rapidly throughout the world. As a commercial and
recreational vehicle, the motor car offered many advantages over other modes of
transportation, especially animal-drawn vehicles. Perhaps the most important
advantage was the possibility of increasing the radius of business and leisure
transport.
The most rapid expansion of the automobile was witnessed in the United
States. It had a relatively late start in relation to European countries, such as
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. According to the records, four
motor vehicles were used in the United States in 1894. This was followed, how-
ever, with an impressive expansion of the automobile fleet: 90 in 1897; 8,000 in
1900; almost half a million 10 years later; and more than one million after
another two years. Thus the United States quickly surpassed European coun-
tries both in production and in the number of vehicles in use.
Figure 9.7 shows the rapid increase in the number of cars used in the
United States. It also shows that the expansion of the automobile fleet is charac-
terized by two distinct secular trends, with an inflection in the 1930s followed by
less rapid growth rates. Since the two secular trends on the curve appear to be
roughly linear on the logarithmic scale, the automobile fleet evolved through two
exponential pulses. Thus, in this example, the growth of the automobile fleet did
not follow a simple, single S-shaped growth pulse.
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Figure 9.7. Number of automobiles and road horses (and mules), USA.
The working hypothesis here is that the two trends indicate two different
phases of the dissemination of motor vehicles in the United States. The first
characterizes the substitution of motor vehicles for horse-drawn vehicles and the
second the actual growth of road transport after animal-drawn vehicles essen-
tially disappeared from American roads. Thus the first expansion phase was
more rapid since it represents "market takeover" or substitution for older means
of transport, whereas the second represents the actual growth of road vehicle
fleets and their associated infrastructure, such as highway systems. The
inflection point that connects the two growth pulses coincides with the prolonged
recession in the long-wave cycle. Thus our hypothesis implies that the motor
vehicle fleets evolved differently in the two adjacent Kondratieff cycles.
The lack of historical records of the exact number of horse-drawn vehicles
in the United States soon after the introduction of the automobile in 1895 makes
it difficult to describe accurately the assumed substitution of the motor car for
the horse during the first, more rapid expansion phase of the motor vehicle fleets.
The number of draft animals (road horses and mules) and the automobiles given
in Figure 9.7 are therefore a rough approximation of this substitution process.
Figure 9.8 gives fractional market shares of horses and cars in all road vehicles
(sum of horses and cars). Market shares, F, are plotted on a semilogarithmic
plot transformed as F /1 - F, as a ratio of the market shares of one technology
over the other since fractional market shares always sum to one.[2]
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Figure 9.8. Substitution of horses for automobiles, USA.
Figure 9.8 indicates that the automobile replaced animal-drawn road vehi-
cles during a relatively short process and proceeded along a logistic path. Motor
vehicles achieved a 1% share of road vehicles shortly after 1900 and a 50% share
in 1916. A complete takeover occurred in 1930 when there were 0.3 million road
horses and mules and 23 million cars, an increase from less than 2 million cars 10
years earlier. Thus the inflection point in the growth of the automobile fleet
from Figure 9.7 actually coincides with the end of the replacement of animal-
drawn road vehicles by motor cars and explains the apparent saturation in the
growth of motor vehicles observed by many analysts during the late 1920s and
early 1930s. This perceived saturation marks the beginning of a new phase in
the motorization of America, with growth rates comparable with those of the
expansion of horse-drawn vehicles before the automobile age. Seen from this
perspective, the number of all road vehicles increased from 1870 to 1930 but
from 1900 to 1930 the automobiles replaced the horses, whereas after the total
replacement, only the number of cars was expanding during the last long wave.
In most European countries, the rapid expansion of the automobile also started
during the last Kondratieff wave. In this example we see two aspects in the
dynamics of technological change: the growth of technological populations, in
this case road vehicles, and the replacement of older by newer technological
species. Figure 9.9 shows the growth in the number of all road vehicles as a con-
tinuous growth process with an apparent saturation level of about 350 million
vehicles after the year 2000 and a I:::. T equal to about 100 years.[3] Because the
growth of road transport in general and the substitution of automobiles for
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horse-drawn carriages and wagons overlap in time, together they produce two
growth trends in the growth of the automobile fleet with an inflection point in
the 1930s making the structural change in the composition of the road vehicle
fleets. Therefore, this example illustrates that during the last two growth phases
of a long wave, road vehicle fleets developed differently. One tentative conclu-
sion from this example could be that the further development of road vehicles
could take another new path after the 1990s.
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Figure 9.9. All road vehicles in use, USA.
The expansion of the road vehicle fleets in the United States and the
growth of the global air travel illustrate two important aspects of technological
and economic change. The expansion of air travel was shown as as-shaped
growth pulse. This example parallels growth processes in biology, for example,
growth of a leaf or bacteria population. The replacement of horses by cars shows
substitution of an old for a new technology as an S-shaped increase in market
shares of the new competitor.
We have ar,ued that during each expansion phase of the long wave a
number of important technologies are developing simultaneously, growing,
replacing old ones, and usually enhancing each other. Road transport systems
require, in fact, elaborate and sophisticated infrastructure. The development of
road transport vehicles (and infrastructure) illustrates the succession of replace-
ments of old by new as one of the basic features of the development process.
Furthermore, it shows that the different replacement processes are associated
with the two long waves. Thus we have seen that the expansion of automobiles
in the United States and global air travel took place during the growth phase of
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the last long wave, whereas the replacement of horses by cars was a feature of
the previous long wave when railroads were the dominant form of transport in
most of the developed world. Railroads are now in the post-saturation phase;
their position as a means of passenger travel is being eroded in most industrial-
ized countries and has become insignificant in the United States. A symbol of
this decay is the discontinuance of the transcontinental railway service in the
United States.
9.3.3. Transport infrastructures
Both air and railroad transport systems require elaborate infrastructures. In
fact, airports and railroads were obviously constructed for the sole purpose of
providing infrastructure for aircraft and trains. However, this distinction is not
clear for roads, although we have shown that the construction of surfaced roads
preceded the expansion of the automobile fleet. This similarity in the evolution
of the transport systems is perhaps indicative of an invariance in the develop-
ment process of transport systems and their underlying infrastructure. A serious
problem arises, however, when comparing railroads and roads with other tran-
sport systems that do not depend exclusively on the rigid, man-made links
between them. Airways and waterways, for example, rely less on man-made
links between the nodes because they use the natural environment (air, rivers,
coastal waters). Nevertheless, they require an elaborate infrastructure, such as
airports, harbors, and canals. Thus it is difficult to compare the total length of
the implicit airway and waterway routes with the total length of the main rail-
road tracks and surfaced roads. As an approximation in the analysis of the evo-
lution of transport infrastructures, we will use the sparse accounts and probably
inaccurate estimates about the construction of canals as an indicator for the total
network of the waterway transport systems.
Figure 9.10 shows the length of the three successive transport infrastruc-
tures: canals, railroads, and surfaced roads. In the United States the first canals
were built during the 1780s but in fact, canal construction really accelerated dur-
ing the first decades of the nineteenth century, making that period the "canal
era." It expanded very rapidly to about 2,000 miles until 1831, when 13 miles of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad went into operation. Thus the canal era lasted
until the railways became the main mode of long-distance transport a decade
later. From this point of view, the 1830s were turbulent years: many turnpikes
were abandoned; canal construction was reaching its peak; and important early
railway projects were already completed. Figure 9.10 shows that the railroads
remained the longest transport network until 1920, when they were surpassed by
the rapidly expanding road system and the automobile. The construction of rail-
roads saturated during the following decade and has been decreasing ever since.
This is analogous to the saturation of canals during the 1840s and their decline
thereafter. Figure 9.10 shows that the evolution of the transport infrastructure
can be seen as a succession and replacement of older with newer transport sys-
tems, although at any given time more than two systems were actually in opera-
tion.
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Figure 9.10. Length of transport infrastructures, USA.
This succession of the three transport infrastructures can be described in
terms of three S-shaped growth pulses that are given together with the estimated
logistic curves in Figure 9.11. Seen as successive growth pulses, the expansion of
canals saturated during the 1860s at a level of about 4,000 miles and the expan-
sion of railroads saturated during the 1930s at a level of about 300,000 miles,
whereas roads will saturate during the coming years. Thus, the three transport
systems saturated successively at intervals of about six decades. Figure 9.1f!
shows the same growth pulses transformed so that the data and the S-curve
appear as a straight line. This indicates that the development of canals was
much quicker (with a 6T of about 30 years) than the expansion of railroads and
roads (with a 6T of 54 and 56 years, respectively). Thus, canals have a time
constant comparable with that of airways.
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Figure 9.11. Growth of infrastructures as fraction of saturation, USA.
The difference in the time constant between air and inland water transport
systems, on the one hand, and rail and road transport, on the other, indicates
that at least at this level of comparison transport systems having more extensive
infrastructures may take longer to expand, and possibly to complete the whole
life cycle from growth to saturation and later senescence. Thus, it is remarkable
that in spite of these differences, the saturation in the growth of these three
infrastructures coincides with the beginning of the prolonged recessions in the
last three long waves.
To assess whether the time constants are really different, Figure 9.19 shows
the successive substitutions of the three transport infrastructures and the federal
airway route miles. The substitution process is shown as relative market shares
(F) of a given transport infrastructure to the total length of all of the infrastruc-
tures together.[4J From this perspective the replacement of the four systems
over time appears as a regular process.
This result may appear to contradict the earlier observation that the total
length of railway tracks and surfaced roads took longer to construct than water
and airway routes. In fact, the timetable associated with the substitution
dynamics of infrastructural length is surprisingly consistent in relation to the
duration of growth pulses of the four transport modes during the past 180 years.
The apparent inconsistency results from the different ways of measuring the
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Figure 9.lf. Growth of infrastructures as fraction of saturation, transformed.
growth rates and life cycles of the respective infrastructures. In the case of
market shares the increase in a particular transport infrastructure is analyzed in
terms of the length of all networks. Thus, even the rapid growth rate of airway
route mileage is translated into a comparatively long time constant because at
the same time the total length of all transport networks is also growing rapidly.
As a result of these rapid growth rates, the share of surfaced roads has been de-
clining since the 1970s, whereas the total length of surfaced roads is still growing
toward the ultimate saturation level.
Thus, the total length of a transport infrastructure (in this case, canals,
railroads, and surfaced roads) can still be growing even decades after ultimate
saturation and final senescence, while the share of its length in all transport
infrastructures is declining. The saturation and decline of market shares there-
fore precede saturation in absolute growth in a growing market, meaning that in
those cases the eventual saturation of any competing technology can be antici-
pated in the substitution dynamics.
This description of the evolution of transport systems and infrastructures
shows that during each growth phase of the last three long waves one of the
important transport systems developed in the United States. Thus,
Schumpeter's association of the last three long waves with canals, railroads, and
automobiles can be confirmed from the empirical point of view.
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9.4. Steel and Energy
9.4.1. Steel production
A widely accepted view is that the iron and steel industry constitutes a more
mature sector of developed economies and an important sector in developing
countries. In other words, iron and steel production is approaching or already
has reached saturation and is declining in the industrialized countries, but it is
still growing in most of the developing world. Subsequently, the iron and steel
industry worldwide is in different phases of development, ranging from the early
development and expansion phase to that of maturity and decline. We will
attempt to give empirical evidence for this broad and long-term development of
global steel production. In Chapter 8 Griibler analyzes specific changes of indi-
vidual countries and technologies in greater detail.
Metallurgy dates back to the dawn of human civilization, but, because
metals were precious, wood, stone, and sometimes bones were the dominant
materials to help accomplish a difficult task. In spite of a wider and more
sophisticated use of metals (initially mostly copper and bronze, and later also
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iron and some steel), the use of traditional materials prevailed through antiquity
and the Middle Ages. The voracious use of iron and steel evolved parallel with
the so-called Industrial Revolution. Figure 9.1.1 illustrates the enormous increase
in steel production worldwide since 1860. Production and growth has been espe-
cially rapid since the end of World War II, increasing from about 160 million
tons to more than 850 million tons in less than four decades. Figure 9.1-1 also
shows wide fluctuations in steel production during the 1920s and 1930s and again
during the last decade.
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Figure 9.1-1. Global steel production. (Source: Griibler, 1987.)
This enormous increase in steel production is due to the crucial role that
materials have in the development of industrial societies. The precise details of
this strong coupling between economic development in general and materials in
particular is truly complex, but the basic reason is actually obvious and trans-
parent - the effectiveness and design of machines, equipment, and infrastructure
depend to a substantial degree on the materials of which they are made. The
discussion about the development of transport infrastructures illustrated this
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point very vividly: successive replacements of turnpikes, canals, railways, roads,
and airways paralleled major improvements in construction materials from wood
and stone to iron, steel, and concrete, and during recent decades to more
advanced alloys and materials.
The introduction of better materials was instrumental for the development
of new manufacturing techniques, energy sources, and transport systems. Metal-
lurgy, manufacturing, energy, and transport all developed owing to numerous
cross-links as one improvement or breakthrough made another possible and
sometimes necessary. It so happens that during the last two centuries iron and
steel were perhaps the most critical of all widely used materials. While stone
and wood continued to be important materials, the advent of steam, railroads,
and the coal "age" would not have been possible with wood and stone. In fact, a
more efficient technology for producing high-quality steel was required, and, after
a series of major innovations ranging from the substitution of charcoal for coke
to new casting methods, it culminated in the invention of the Bessemer steel pro-
cess in 1857. Figure 9.15 shows the simplified representation of the technological
changes in steel production since 1860, starting with puddle steel as the oldest
production method and ending with electric arc steel. Figure 9.15 shows the
fractional market shares (F) of the five competing steel technologies transformed
as F/ (1-F) on a semilogarithmic plot.[5]
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In spite of the very different nature of the five steel production technolo-
gies, their chemistry, energy sources, share of scrap iron, etc., they all appear to
be in competition with each other, the newer technology eventually displacing
the older. The linear trends indicate where the replacement of old with new
technologies followed logistic curves. Grilbler (Chapter 8) shows that the same
historical trend can be observed in most industrialized countries. The replace-
ment of crucible and puddle steel was a very fast process, whereas the open
hearth method developed into the dominant steel technology over many decades.
Bessemer became the dominant steel technology during the 1870s and thereafter
its importance declined, while the open hearth process expanded. From 1870 to
1950 most of the increase in global steel production was achieved by the
improvements and expansion of the open hearth method. The electric arc steel
process was introduced during the 1920s, and its market share is still expanding
with increasing amounts of recycled steel in the total production. After 1950
basic oxygen steel expanded vigorously, but now its relative contribution to steel
production is saturating.
Thus, we have identified three distinct phases in the evolution of steel tech-
nologies. The first ended with the swift introduction of Bessemer steel, the first
industrial process that could achieve high-quality and large-scale production of
steel. The second is congruent with the development of the open hearth steel
process, and the third marks the expansion of electric and basic oxygen methods.
Another way of describing this succession of replacements in the evolution of the
steel industry is to decompose the aggregate steel production (from Figure 9.14)
into appropriate development phases. Figure 9.16 shows total steel production
(from all five technologies) in per capita terms as two distinct S-shaped growth
pulses. The first starts with the dominance of the Bessemer method and mirrors
the expansion of the open hearth process, while the second starts with the intro-
duction of the electric arc process and accelerates with the expansion of basic
oxygen steel.
Figure 9.17 shows the same growth pulses transformed so that the two S-
shaped curves appear as straight lines. [6] Transformed in this way, the two
pulses appear as parallel lines indicating equal duration of the two pulses with a
a T of about 45 years. The two pulses overlap during the period of highest tur-
bulence indicating that another period with large Huctuations in per capita (and
therefore total) steel production may have started. These two pulses coincide
with the growth phases of the last two long waves (see the rough timing for the
long waves in the United Kingdom and the United States given in Table 9.1).
Figure 9.18 shows that in addition to broad Huctuations in the wholesale prices,
the prices of iron and steel also show pronounced Hares during the depression
years in these countries. Thus, the iron and steel prices reHect important struc-
tural changes in the global steel industry.
This example confirms our original hypothesis that each growth phase of
the long-wave cycle is associated with the expansion of a number of important
new technologies through successive replacements of the old ones. Furthermore,
the evolution of transport infrastructures and steel technologies is a very regular
replacement process, but the saturation of dominant technologies does not
correspond exactly to the timing of the depression phases in the long wave.
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Figure 9.16. Global per capita steel production. (Source: Griibler, 1987.)
Instead, the saturation periods are more dispersed in time so that some occur
before the depression years (e.g., canals in the United States) and some at the
beginning of the upswing (e.g., saturation of open hearth steel in North America
and West Europe).
9.4.2. Energy consumption
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, fuelwood, agricultural wastes, and
mechanical wind and water power supplied most of the inanimate energy in
addition to animal and human muscle power. We have seen that a considerable
infrastructure of roads (turnpikes) and canals was in place for timber and later
coal transport, although the widespread use of coal became possible with the
emergence of railroads. Thus, like today, the use of energy in the early industrial
development phase also depended on the transport system, and energy was an
important component of goods transported on turnpikes, canals, waterways, and
railroads. The development of energy and materials, and in particular steel tech-
nologies, is related in the same way as energy and transport systems. Better
fuels made better steel processes possible, while higher-quality metals were cru-
cial in further improving the whole energy system.
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Figure 9.11. Global per capita steel production, transformed. (Source: Griibler, 1987.)
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Fuelwood represented most of the commercial primary energy inputs dur-
ing the last century. Figure 9.19 shows the annual consumption of fuelwood, fos-
sil, and nuclear energy sources in the world since 1860. Data are plotted on a
semilogarithmic scale and show the exponential growth phases in consumption
by piecewise linear trends.
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Figure 9.19. Global primary energy consumption.
Since the beginning of the century the consumption of fuelwood at the glo-
bal level has declined as a commercial energy source, although it is still used
widely, especially in the developing world. With the expansion of railroads and
the steel industry, as well as the application of steam in general, the use of coal
increased exponentially until the 1910s when a new, less rapid growth phase
started. Since their introduction in the 1970s, oil and natural gas have been con-
sumed at even more rapid rates. In fact, oil and natural gas curves have the
same slope and thus almost identical growth rates; they are shifted in time by
about 15 years. The increased use of oil and natural gas paralleled the growth of
the petrochemical and electrical industries, and the expanded use of internal
combustion and electric prime movers. Because nuclear energy is still in its early
phase of development, the steep growth of the last two decades may not indicate
the possibility of rapid expansion in the future. During the last few years, the
growth of nuclear energy has declined worldwide to more moderate rates.
Primary energy consumption (including fuelwood) increased exponentially
at an average growth rate of about 2% per year. The decline of older energy
sources was more than compensated for by the rapid growth of the new ones.
Thus, energy systems, like transport infrastructures and steel processes, evolved
through a sequence of replacements of old by new technologies, practices, and
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Figure 9.20. Globa.l prima.ry energy substitution.
methods. Figure 9.eo shows the primary energy substitution process in terms of
the fractionar shares (F) held by each of the five energy sources in total con-
sumption and plotted as F/(l-F) on a semilogarithmic scale.
Compared to the substitution of transport infrastructures and steel techno-
logies, the replacement of energy sources is a remarkably regular process. The
slopes of the linear segments in the substitution process (logistic curves) are
nearly the same, indicating that all four older energy sources have almost the
same ~T of about 100 years. Furthermore, the market shares do not reflect
important historical events such as the world wars - the long-term trends are
remarkably stable.
Based on these historical trends, we have used a scenario to project nuclear
energy shares into the future. We have assumed the same slope as the expansion
of oil and natural gas, implying a 5% market share by the year 2000. This indi-
cates the possibility of a larger growth of nuclear energy in the next century, but
also means very few additions to the current generating capacity during the next
decades.
Coal saturated during the 1920s and oil during the 1980s. This again
corresponds well to the timing of the last Kondratieff cycle. The growth phase
until the 1920s is characterized by the expansion of the coal, railroad, and iron
and steel industries, while the next growth pulse corresponds to the expansion of
the oil, petrochemical, electricity, and road transport industries. These two
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growth pulses can be seen more explicitly at the aggregate level in total energy
consumption. Figure g.Hl shows the per capita global primary energy consump-
tion divided into two growth pulses that reflect the substitution of primary
energy sources. The first one was initiated with the rapid expansion in coal con-
sumption after the 1860s and ends during World War II, by which time coal's
share curved into a phase of decline. The second pulse is initiated with the onset
of coal saturation and the beginning of the oil expansion phase (oil surpassed
fuelwood in 1925) and accelerated after both fuelwood and coal were in decline.
This second growth pulse is apparently nearing completion as the oil market
shares in primary energy saturate.
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Figure 9.Hl. Global per capita energy consumption. (Source: Griibler, 1987.)
Figure g.HH shows the same growth pulses transformed so that the two S-
shaped curves appear as straight lines.[7] In this way the differences between the
two growth pulses are more clear. The!i.T of the first pulse is longer than 60
years whereas it is shorter than 40 years for the second one. In contrast to this
asymmetry the two growth pulses in per capita steel production had almost
identical slopes and a !i.T of about 45 years (see Figure g.l7). In spite of these
obvious differences between the energy and steel pulses, the analogy of the two
processes is very strong and their timing almost identical. In fact, the deviations
of the actual growth pulses from the estimated logistic curves show almost
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identical patterns. Fluctuations are strong at the beginning of the pulses until
more than 10% of the saturation level is reached and they increase again above
the 50% level. This result indicates that in addition to the regular pattern in the
substitution of old for new technologies during the last two long waves, energy
and steel use evolved through equivalent growth pulses that are concurrent with
the upswing phases of the two last waves.
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Figure 9.!!!!. Global per capita energy consumption, transformed. (Source: Griibler,
1987.)
9.5. Energy and Prices
The above description of the complex process of technological and economic
change is obviously incomplete. Certainly, there are many other, perhaps better,
ways of describing the dynamics of transport infrastructures, steel production,
and energy consumption. The intriguing aspect of the replacement dynamics
and price fluctuations is that they appear to be interwoven with regular features
and related to both the invariant pattern of substitution dynamics and the long
waves in economic life. To show that this is not a feature unique to the last two
long waves, we will show similar congruence in replacement dynamics of primary
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energy in the United States and price fluctuations over a period of about two
centuries.
9.5.1. Primary energy
Energy use is one of the rare quantitative indicators that can, at least in princi-
ple, be compared over long periods of time in spite of many technological
changes and substitutions of old for new sources of energy. This is possible
because different energy sources can be expressed in common energy units. For-
tunately, it is possible to reconstruct the history of the more important sources
of energy for the United States since 1800, because a more complete record of
energy consumption exists for this country than for the world. Figure 9.f!S shows
the annual consumption of fuelwood, fossil energy, mechanical water power, and
hydroelectric power in the United States since 1800. As in Figure 9.19, data are
plotted on a semilogarithmic scale and show the exponential growth phases in
consumption by piecewise linear trends. The growth of total energy consump-
tion was on average about 3% per year in the United States. The general pat-
tern in the evolution of the energy in the United States, however, is not different
from that in the world as a whole. In a way this is not surprising since the
United States is the largest energy consumer during this century.
Figure 9.f!~ shows primary energy substitution in the United States.
Mechanical water power (mostly water and some windmills) and hydroelectric
power are not plotted in the figure because of their small contribution to total
energy supply: they barely exceeded the 1% level during short periods and were
otherwise under that critical level. This shows that the omission of these energy
sources due to the lack of data in the example of energy substitution at the glo-
bal level is probably not too crucial, although the share of these noncommercial
energy sources must be higher worldwide than in the United States.
Before the 1820s fuelwood fulfilled virtually all energy needs in the United
States. Coal entered the competition in 1817 at the 1% level and until the 18805
it was essentially a two technology market - whatever gains coal made were
translated into losses for fuelwood. Crude oil and natural gas were first used in
the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and both held a 1%
market share during the 1880s. From then on the use of crude oil expanded, and
by 1950 the consumption of crude oil surpassed that of coal. (Even as late as the
1920s, however, the consumption of crude oil was not much larger than that of
fuelwood.) The use of natural gas surpassed the use of coal nine years later. In
comparing this period with earlier periods, it is remarkable that the structure of
energy consumption changed more during the period of oil dominance than ever
before.
Natural gas exploration, production, and transport significantly indicate
different trends from oil technologies, although natural gas was associated with
the oil industry ever since its first commercial use. Nevertheless, most energy
accounts bind natural gas to oil because of the large production of associated
natural gas from oil wells. Except at the point of production, associated natural
gas, or oil-technology gas, is indistinguishable from gas produced from natural
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Figure 9.es. Primary energy consumption, USA.
gas wells. The fact that this distinction is difficult to make, and is consequently
ignored in historical data, is to an extent misleading since oil and gas technology
have portrayed distinctly different trends during the last century. This is how-
ever not reflected in oil and natural gas consumption data given in Figure 9.~9.
The distinction between associated gas and crude oil, in terms of primary energy
accounting, is desirable and is consistent with the tradition of adding city gas
produced from oil or coal to these primary energy sources rather than to natural
gas.
To illustrate that natural gas is becoming increasingly uncoupled from oil
technologies, we have attempted to reconstruct the primary energy balances by
adding associated gas to crude oil and subtracting the same amount from natural
gas consumption (but leaving net imports with natural gas balances). The
revised market shares are given in Figure g.~.4. The resulting replacements can
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be characterized by very regular time constants because the historical data are
apparently accurate enough to provide the information required for this further
analytical resolution. This is possible in the case of primary energy consumption
in the United States because associated (oil technology) and nonassociated (gas
technology) natural gas production is accounted for in the historical records.
This result shows that although associated gas has long been available as a
by-product of oil, its use does not represent the actual evolution of gas technolo-
gies. Figure 9.!,4 shows that the resulting substitution process improves the
regularity to the extent that the time constants (~Ts) now cluster at about 70
years for all energy sources and that the saturation intervals between coal, oil,
and gas technologies are all separated by about 50 years. During the saturation
periods of the dominant energy sources, new ones are introduced. Gas technolo-
gies are introduced during the saturation of coal, and nuclear energy during the
saturation of oil. Thus, the evolution of the energy system reflects with perfect
symmetry the long waves in prices and the associated periods of growth and
structural change.
The slope of the nuclear energy penetration is determined by a scenario to
have a ~T of about 70 years by specifying a 10% market share by the year 2000.
After the 19908 gas technologies clearly emerge as the most important energy
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source in the projection given in Figure 9.e4. However, the natural gas (gas
technology) shares have been below the trend line during the last few years while
the coal shares have exceeded the projected market shares. It remains to be seen
whether this disparity between our projections and actual development will be
reabsorbed in the coming years like the "under- and overconsumption" of coal
and oil, compared with trend lines during the 19208 and 19308, which were even-
tually absorbed. It is conceivable that the uncoupling of oil and gas industries
may provide a vehicle for wider use of natural gas in the future.
Although the saturation periods of coal and oil technologies are separated
by about 50 years and during these periods of saturation new energy sources are
introduced (gas technologies and nuclear energy, respectively), we still have yet
to probe further into the past to test whether an even older energy source
saturated during the previous long wave, i.e., during the 18708.
Figure 9.es shows that it is possible to include a partial reconstruction
since 1850 of an even older energy source in the United States - animal feed. It
represents an energy source equivalent to the amount of food consumed by the
working animals (mostly horses and mules used in transportation and agricul-
ture).
Animal feed reached its highest market share in the 18808 indicating that
draft animals provided the major form of local transport and motive power in
agriculture in spite of the dominance of railroads and steamships as long-
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distance transport modes (see the discussion on evolution of transport systems
above). It is curious that the feed and oil technologies cross in the 19208 as if to
suggest the simultaneous substitution of the horse carriage and wagon by the
motor vehicles (see Figure 9.8 and Nakicenovic, 1987b).
Figure 9.es indicates that the replacement dynamics can result in a perfect
symmetry of the successive substitutions of older for newer energy forms, provid-
ing a rather complete reconstruction of past patterns in energy use. Three
emerging saturation periods are separated by about 50 years starting with
animal feed in the 18808, coal in the 19208, and oil technologies during the 19808.
Each economic growth phase that connects the periods of energy saturation and
prolonged recession throughout the economy is characterized by the expansion of
two energy sources, one with large market shares "attacking" the saturating
energy source and the other just emerging during the periods of saturation and
structural change in the energy system. Next we will investigate another feature
of the evolution of energy use in the United States that reflects the long waves in
terms of the energy intensity of the whole economy.
9.5.2. Efficiency of energy use
There are many ways of determining the efficiency of energy use. The most
obvious indicators are the efficiencies of primary energy conversion to secondary
and final energy forms. Another possibility is to estimate the efficiency of energy
end use. Examples include the amount of fuel needed for travel or for space con-
ditioning. All of these efficiences have improved radically since the beginning of
the Industrial Revolution along with the introduction of more efficient technolo-
gies. In some cases the improvements span almost an order of magnitude. For
example, in 1920 the average efficiency of natural gas power plants in the United
States was 9%, whereas today the best gas turbine power plants can operate
with efficiences of almost 50%. Over longer periods the improvements are even
more impressive. For example, the second law efficiency of prime movers
increased by two orders of magnitude since 1700, that of lamps by almost three
orders of magnitude during the last century, and so on (see Marchetti, 1979).
All of these efficiency improvements of individual technologies are translated into
more effective uses of energy and other materials at the level of the overall
economic activity. Some efficiency increases result from improved technologies
and others from substitution of the old for new technologies. In general,
replacement follows when the saturation in additional improvements of an estab-
lished technology is reached.
The extent of these changes and improvements can be expressed at an
aggregate level by the amount of primary energy consumed per unit of gross
national product in a given year. Figu.re 9.e6 shows the total primary energy
consumption (from Figu.re 9.eS), per capita consumption, and the ratio of energy
consumption over gross national product (energy intensity) for the United
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Figurt. 9.R6. Primary energy, gross national product, and energy intensity, USA.
States. The average reduction in energy consumed to generate one dollar of
gross national product was about 0.9% per year during the last 180 years. The
ratio decreased from 10 kilowatt years per (constant 1958) dollar in 1800 to
slightly more than two kilowatt years per dollar in 1982. Thus, a regular decline
in energy intensity of the whole economy prevailed over a long historical period
indicating that energy conservation is a historical replacement process that was
discovered as a concept only during the last decade.
Figure 9.er shows the fluctuations in energy intensity in the United States
after the elimination of the secular trend by a 51-year geometric moving average.
The fluctuations show pronounced long-wave movements and a high degree of
synchronization with the price swings (see Table 9.1). Figure 9.e8 shows the
evolution of energy prices in comparison with the wholesale price index from Fig-
ure 9.-1 and the heat and lighting price index (the last two indices are almost
indistinguishable from each other), and in Figure 9.e9 the oil prices are also
shown as an index to indicate the concurrent changes in energy and wholesale
prices.
During the downswings in prices the energy intensity of the economy
decreased more rapidly and during the upswings less rapidly. This illustrates
relatively high energy price elasticity since energy prices changed in unison with
general price movements as shown in Figure 9.e9. This means that during the
downswing in economic activity general rationalization measures of individual
enterprises cause larger energy savings compared with the average historical
reductions.
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As the competition intensifies during the recession and depression, energy
savings become an important factor in cost reduction, also because of generally
higher energy prices in addition to the overall price inflation. With recovery,
new demands and prospects of continued economic growth release many pres-
sures associated with saturating markets. Price levels are also much lower at the
beginning of the new growth phase. Most entrepreneurs in the new growth sec-
tors must intensify their activities to meet new demands, and low energy inten-
sity ceases to be an important competitive criterion. New technologies and
energy forms offer possibilities for continued expansion in new markets so that
relative energy use intensifies. Toward the end of the prosperity period the
growth process encounters limits once more. These are reflected in saturating
demand and general price inflation illustrated by the long wave of wholesale
price movements (see Figure 9.-1). Thus, during the downswing energy use
reductions become important.
These reductions are not only due to efforts to cut costs as a reaction to
saturating demand, but also due to a host of social constraints. Many energy
technologies, along with other economic activities, become socially and environ-
mentally unacceptable toward the end of prosperity. This means that some
diseconomies that were socially acceptable during the growth phase become
internalized as additional economic costs or as explicit limits to further expan-
sion. These causes of additional costs appear to offset the benefits of the
economies of scale achieved during the expansion phase. In fact, with the
demand reductions during the downswing the large capacities that offered
economies of scale become sources of additional costs as excess capacity.
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The relationship between primary energy consumption patterns and the
long wave appears to extend beyond the parallel changes in the per capita level
of energy consumption and energy intensity with the fluctuations of other long-
wave indicators such as wholesale prices. Comparing Figure g.es with Figure
g.e7 indicates that the upper turning points of energy intensity fluctuations
correspond to the saturation points of primary energy sources. The upper turn-
ing point that occurred in the 1870s is related to the saturation in animal feed
substitution, the 1915 turning point with the saturation in coal substitution, and
the turning point of the 1970s with the saturation of crude oil. In addition, new
energy sources reached 1% market shares during the times of high energy inten-
sity (during the 1870s, 1910, and 1973). Thus, the succession of the long waves
indicates a similar timing as the dynamics of energy substitution and the changes
in steel production and transport infrastructures.
9.6. Dynamics of Change
At the risk of generalizing, we can state that there is strong evidence that sym-
metric or at least similar changes in the patterns of energy consumption, steel
production, transport infrastructures, and price niveau occur from one long wave
to another, although the historical content and individual manifestations change
profoundly so as to make the symmetry apparent only at the higher level of
abstraction. Thus, only patterns of change are similar while the symmetry breaks
with an attempt to relate individual events that are always unique to a particu-
lar historical situation and thus different from one long wave to another. This is
the essence of the analysis presented here - recurring patterns emerge as we con-
sider sequences of replacements of old by new technologies, growth pulses, and
deviations from smoothed secular trends. In all three cases the individual dis-
tinctions are removed from the data. It is the individual distinctions that "con-
dense" the time series to actual (original) indicators removing the symmetry in
patterns among periods of growth and periods of saturation and change.
To understand the actual mechanisms behind the long-wave phenomenon
and changes in technology, economy, and society, we must acquire better analyt-
ical and statistical descriptions of the causal relationships we generally call
experience. This would also imply that we need to understand the course of
specific events and their individual manifestations that led, for example, from a
period of rapid growth after World War II to the oil shocks of the 1970s, saturat-
ing world markets, changing industrial structure, increasing national debt in
many quarters of the world, and developing the economic slowdown of the last
decade. For the time being we can only observe that the particular cir-
cumstances change from one long wave to another, but that the sequence of
fluctuations and structural changes at a higher level of abstraction indicate a
striking regularity. Thus, the symmetry is destroyed in the transition from a
sequence of replacements and fluctuations to particular circumstances and indi-
vidual events. In other words, the individual event, such as an innovation, is
unique, but the pattern of change appears to be regular for the emergence of
innovations taken together as a dynamic process.
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The annals of business cycles (see, for example, Thorp and Mitchell, 1926;
Mitchell, 1927) show that the severe crises or so-called Great Depressions occur
regularly during the downswing of the long waves. It suffices here to mention
that the Great Depressions and financial panics of 1819, 1874, and 1929 in the
United States with small variance occurred throughout the rest of the world.
This immediately suggests an obvious historical manifestation of the prolonged
periods of stagnation, but this does not answer the question whether these Great
Depressions are a necessary characteristic of the downswing.
The analysis of technological substitution in steel production, energy con-
sumption, and transport infrastructures showed that the same basic approach
can be applied to describe the structural changes. In all three cases older tech-
nologies were replaced by new ones with regular recurring patterns. Besides the
now obvious similarity in the substitution patterns, it should be observed that
the timing of the saturation phases is to some degree synchronized in the three
examples.
In all three cases technologies that have saturated before 1850 (canals, cru-
cible and puddle steel, and fuelwood) are declining, although at different rates.
The next "wave" of technologies to reach saturation in terms of market shares
between 1870 and 1875 are railways, Bessemer steel, and animal feed as a source
of energy. During the 1920s coal saturated, in 1950 open hearth steel, in 1970
length of roads and oil technologies, and in 1980 oxygen steel. This indicates
that the saturation periods measured in terms of relative market shares are not
perfectly aligned, but that they are grouped around the upper turning points in
the long wave as indicated by price fluctuations (see Figure 9.-4). What is more
important however is that during period of saturation of some technologies and
prolonged economic recession, the next generation of growing technologies sur-
passes the declining ones, e.g., crucible and puddle steel by open hearth process,
canals by roads, fuelwood by oil and gas, railroads by airways, and Bessemer by
electric and oxygen steel. This illustrates that the periods of prolonged recession
are indeed periods of structural change when dominating technologies are either
close to saturation or already declining and when older declining technologies are
surpassed by the emerging ones. Another way of stating this symmetry is that
the dominating technology in each example bridges the period between the end
of growth in one wave and the beginning of growth in the next as its market
shares curve from increase through saturation to decline.
A possible explanation of this similarity in the substitution patterns is that
the specific changes that led to the replacement of old by new technologies and
energy sources were interrelated. For example, the new steel processes and
transport infrastructures were dependent on new energy technologies. On the
other hand, the new energy sources could only be developed with increased
intensity of energy use, such as in the new industrial and urban complexes that
emerged as the availability of transport possibilities and basic materials
increased (symbolized here by transport infrastructures and steel production).
This kind of interdependent lacing of technological development and growth of
demand indicates that a certain degree of synchronization in the substitution
processes could be expected. This of course still leaves the question of the pre-
cise nature of the 50-year time constant unanswered. Since we have already
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shown that the three substitution processes appear to portray similar features
and relatively close the timing of crucial market saturation and takeover events,
we will now consider the timing of long-wave fluctuations and energy substitu-
tion.
Figure 9.90 shows energy substitution (from Figure 9.eS) on the lower plot
and long wave in energy consumption, energy intensity, and wholesale prices
(from Figures 9.-4 and 9.e7) on the upper plot. Here we have implicitly assumed
that energy substitution is indicative of other replacement processes because the
timing of saturation periods, introduction of new energy sources, and li.Ts are
perfectly symmetrical in this example. Thus, Figure 9.90 summarizes the results
of the phenomenological analysis of the dynamics of technology and long waves.
A careful examination of the timing and patterns of changes shows that they are
all in tune. The saturation periods of energy technologies coincide with the
peaks in prices and energy intensity. The period of decline from saturation to
loss of dominance (Le., loss of the highest market shares) lasts on the order of 25
years, or about as long as the downswing phase of the long wave, which is
characterized in Figure 9.90 by the fluctuations of energy consumption, intensity,
and the price index. By symmetry, the upswing of the long wave is paralleled by
the growth of the new energy source from newly acquired dominance to satura-
tion.
9.7. Conclusions
A number of important technologies and growth sectors emerge within relatively
short periods of time: they expand because they are interrelated, and they
enhance each other because they are interlaced and interdependent. Long waves
emerge because the replacement of old technologies and methods and the growth
of new ones take place simultaneously, leading to a prolonged phase of economic
growth. Likewise, these replacements and growth processes tend to saturate
during relatively short periods of time resulting in prolonged recession and tur-
bulence, restructuring of the economy, and technological and social change.
The prolonged recession period reduces economic opportunities, and also
leads to excess production capacities, unemployment, and lower intensity of
other factor inputs. This change in the economic environment from relatively
continuous growth to stagnation, recession, and turbulence makes the applica-
tion of financial innovations attractive as other opportunities for return on capi-
tal decline. The prolonged stagnation and recession period is characterized by
volatility and expansion of speculative instruments and decline in productive
investments. As volatility increases so do the risks, and it is conceivable that
this diverts some capital and human resources into innovative activities.
Some evidence exists that innovations cluster around the recession periods
and eventually lead to a new "wave" of replacements and growth. This basic
pattern can recur and be repeated in completely different circumstances provided
that the growth of a number of important technologies is to an extent synchron-
ized. All that is necessary is a distinction between periods of growth and periods
186 Life CJlCle. and Long Wave.
Percenl
45.0 I I
Wholesale Prices
30.0 I J \ I
15.0 I I \ • / , Energy I
o.
-15.0 I " f \ I \ I \ / I
2000195019001850
- 30 •0 I I I I I I I I I I I , I I "--4 I I I I I I
1800
F/ll-F1 FAACllON (F)
HIll 1.99
'-.....
..........
wooi)'...... COFlL GAS TECH
~ ./ ,~ OIL TECH
J"'... ~ "'......... /' ~
FEED .-:. "' -- "" £/ ~~ .; .......~
./ /' ,~ /7 ,
..... / // ........ /""'" u" ~OA 1/ .....
/ J'V ~~ .kO'U)-n
/ ./-1 .// ............\ "'V I.. I _
Hl 1
10 e
Iii
li2
1881 IIl51 1911 1951
liJ.90
liJ.70
I.se
1.3e
I. 18
1.11
2811
Figure 9.90. Long waves and substitution dynamics, USA.
Neboj.a Nal:icenovfc 187
of change. This hypothesis does not require a high degree of synchronization or
"focusing" for either the innovation clusters or the saturation clusters. It is
sufficient that a number of important replacements take place and cause a period
of prolonged growth. Certainly this is a very simplistic and stylized scheme of
technological change and economic and social development, but it is supported
by the empirical evidence of technological substitution in energy, steel, and
transport and in the overall price movements. This evidence supports the
existence of weak clusters in the growth phases of different technologies, and
perhaps weaker evidence for saturation clusters. A larger "sample" of case stu-
dies would be required to confirm this result in the statistical sense. For the
time being it is not clear whether the phenomenological evidence is representa-
tive enough to allow generalization of the results or not. The example of pri-
mary energy substitution in the United States (see Figu.re g.eS) is remarkable in
that is portrays a perfect symmetry of introduction, growth, and saturation of
technologies and price movements over a period of almost two centuries.
The fact that some events that characterize profound changes in technology
and economic structure occur in tune is striking, but it leaves many questions
open. For instance, we have observed that technological replacements in steel
production and transport infrastructures do not portray perfectly symmetrical
patterns as primary energy substitution. This means that technologies saturate
in broad waves that start at the end of the prosperity phase and extend to the
beginning of the next Kondratieff wave. Perhaps this is an artifact of the choice
of technological substitution processes in that they are very closely related to
each other and represent the most important growth sectors. Yet, given the
sparse statistical records, it is difficult to find other examples that span
equivalent historical periods.
Nevertheless, the importance of the energy system and related infrastruc-
tural developments appears to be crucial with respect to the observed pulses in
economic activity. For example, the construction of great canals throughout
Europe and the United States during the eighteenth and beginning of the
nineteenth centuries was initiated by the ever increasing need to transport
timber and other goods in larger quantities over longer distances. Later, rail-
roads were associated with a similar boom period basically due to the same rea-
sons - the concentration of production in urban areas required a more efficient
transport system that also helped in the acquisition of new and larger markets.
Thus, canals and railroads expanded existing markets and "created" new ones
for new products. In terms of the energy system, large canals were associated
with the transport of fuelwood, which at that time was the primary source of
energy for many industrial activities such as iron smelting. The railroad era was
very closely related to the widespread diffusion of steel, steam, and coal-related
industries.
In terms of the long-wave fluctuations, we will name the upswing phase
from 1773 to 1810 the "age of canals" and the upswing from 1840 to 1869 the
"age of railroads." Accordingly, we name the upswing from 1895 to 1920 the
"age of electricity" because of its significant contribution to the rapid develop-
ment of new industries and communication technologies. The last upswing, from
1945 to the 1970s, we symbolically identify with motor vehicles, roads, aircrafts,
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and petrochemical industries. Unfortunately, it is not possible to time this last
turning point with any precision, but in view of the empirical evidence in the
synchronization of technological substitution processes, energy efficiency, and
other indicators, it probably occurred after the "oil crises" of the early 19708,
which marked the saturation of crude oil and its eventual replacement as the
dominant source of primary energy. Let us assume, for the sake of naming a
particular reference year, that it occurred in 1973. If this were actually the case,
and assuming the continuation of the long-wave fluctuations, the next turning
point could be expected sometime around the turn of the century. Going further
into the future on the basis of this scheme, the next upswing phase could be
expected to last until the 20308.
The overall picture that emerges suggests that each upswing phase is asso-
ciated with large infrastructural development. This development first opens
many new product and factor markets and toward the end of the prosperity
phase leads to eventual saturation of these markets and full adoption of the tech-
nologies that were introduced during the recovery period. This was the process
that occurred between the end of World War II and the initiation of a down-
swing five to ten years ago. We can already anticipate some developments of the
current downswing period. For example, the energy intensity curve in Figure
9.1!7 indicates that during this and the next decades we can anticipate further
relative improvements in the energy efficiency of the economy (Le., reductions in
the amount of primary energy consumed per monetary unit of gross national
product in real terms). Thus, we can expect further dissemination of energy
efficient technologies and institutional measures during the downswing phase
until the end of the century. As far as energy technologies are concerned, the
market penetration analysis suggests natural gas as the best candidate for even-
tual dominance as the major energy source during the upswing period after the
1990s. Natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel and from that perspective alone it is
attractive. It could also become a very efficient source of electricity and clean
fuels. Widespread use of natural gas would require new infrastructures for pro-
duction, long-distance transport (e.g., by pipelines or by superconductive cables
via electricity), conversion to fuels and electricity, and distribution to the final
consumer. Thus, construction of large grids and new industries based on natural
gas would be required.
Another growth sector discussed in terms of technological change are trans-
port systems and infrastructures. One possible development could be an
advanced aircraft with substantively higher productivity than the Boeing 747. It
could be a super large subsonic transport, a cruise supersonic, or a hypersonic
spacecraft. In any case, such advanced means of transport would require new
infrastructures, such as airports and "feeder" aircraft, and other transport modes
to and from airports. Cruise supersonic and hypersonic transports would also
require new sources of energy and new materials. Methane and hydrogen are
obvious candidates to replace kerosine, so that the coupling to natural gas is
obvious. It is analogous to the simultaneous development of the petrochemical
and automobile industries. New materials are related to a possible replacement
for the saturating steel industry, which in the long run will have to expand to
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other materials as recycled steel and the electric process exhaust their market
potentials.
These are just some possible candidates, but they are consistent with the
apparent requirements that emerge from the overall pattern of economic pulses
and technological substitution dynamics since the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution. Before these and other new technologies could expand during the
next upswing, the next decades would bring a period of renewal and "gales of
creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1935). A period of rapid (relative) deflation
can be expected together with prolonged unemployment and further economic
slowdown. These are the selection mechanisms that in the past distilled the suc-
cessful from a wide range of promising new technologies and entrepreneurial
innovations. The existing patterns will have to be destroyed before new ones can
emerge and their destruction will mark the beginning of renewal and a promise
of prosperity.
Most speculations about the nature and timing of future events are based
on the dynamics of equivalent changes in the past. The perfect symmetry
between changes in the primary energy and price fluctuations shows that cer-
tainly price mechanism alone cannot explain all of the dynamic changes. The
secular trends in prices are however consistent with the structural changes in
energy. There is an intertemporal price elasticity of energy use. As prices
increase energy is saved (intensity decreases) and new energy sources are intro-
duced. In some way prices appear to have short range as a "force" in a dynamic
economy. Savings are introduced in the face of a recession, but they only create
unemployment and excess capacities. It is the innovations that can "tunnel"
through the Kondratieff "barrier" aI1d create a new period of growth. From a
large number of innovative activities only a few are successful, most cannot
escape from the recession and decline. In the past the few successful innovations
were important enough to create a new period of growth. Thus, from the
dynamic perspective prices appear to have a shorter range while innovations
have little importance in the short run, but are of fundamental importance over
periods longer than the business and the inventory cycles.
This illustrates why the Kondratieff wave is a long cycle, but perhaps the
most important question is why the clock that times such events as the dynamic
changes in technology and long waves in economic activity operates on a SO-year
scale. Since we have shown that the events that mark structural changes are
synchronized and follow a logical order, the question of the time scale and invari-
ance is crucial. IT it were answered all the other events, since they occur in logi-
cal order apparently as required, would fit the grand pattern like pieces of a puz-
zle.
Notes
[11 One general finding of a large number ofstudies is that many growth processes fol-
low characteristic S-shaped curves. Logistic function is one of the most widely
applied S-shaped growth curves and is given by:
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2:/(IC-2:)=exp(at+p),
where t is the independent variable usually representing some unit of time, a,p,
and IC are constants, 2: is the actual level of growth achieved, while 1C-2: is the
amount of growth still to be achieved before the (usually unknown) saturation
level IC is reached. Taking logarithms of both sides gives the left side of the equa-
tion to be expressed as a linear function of time so that the secular trend of a
logistic growth process appears as a straight line when plotted in this way. Sub-
stituting F=2:/1C in the equation expresses the growth process in terms of fractional
share F of the asymptotic level IC reached, Le., the equation becomes:
F/(I-F)=exp(at+P).
[2J One general finding of a large number of studies is that substitution of an old tech-
nology for a new one, expressed in fractional terms, follows characteristic S-shaped
curves. Fisher and Pry (1971) formulated a simple but powerful model of techno-
logical substitution by postulating that the replacement of an old by a new tech-
nology proceeds along the logistic growth curve:
F/(I-F)=exp(at+P),
where t is the independent variable usually representing some unit of time, a and P
are constants, t is the fractional market share of the new competitor, while I-F is
that of the old one.
[3J We define ~T as the time elapsed between the achievement of one and 50% of the
saturation levellC, Le., in this example ~T = 95.5 years. Because of the symmetry
of the logistic function, the same time is required for the increase from 50 to 99%
of the saturation level. An alternative definition of ~T is the time elapsed
between the achievement of 10 and 90% level. In this case ~T would be slightly
different from the other definition, but for all practical applications both
definitions can be used interchangeably.
[4J The fractional shares (F) are not plotted directly but as the linear transportation
of the logistic curve, i.e., F/(I-F} - in this more general case, as the ratio of the
market share taken by a given transport infrastructure over the sum of the market
shares of all other competing infrastructures. This form of presentation reveals
the logistic substitution path as an almost linear secular trend with small annual
perturbations. Thus, the presence of some linear trends in Figure 9.19 indicates
where the fractional substitution of transport infrastructures follows a logistic
curve. In dealing with more than two competing technologies, we must generalize
the Fisher and Pry model, since in such cases logistic substitution cannot be
preserved in all phases of the substitution process. Every competitor undergoes
three distinct substitution phases: growth, saturation, and decline. This is illus-
trated by the substitution path of rail tracks, which curves through a maximum
from increasing to declining market shares (see Figure 9.19). In the model of the
substitution process, we assume that only one competitor is in the saturation
phase at any given time, that declining technologies fade away steadily at logistic
rates, and that new competitors enter the market and grow at logistic rates. As a
result, the saturating technology is left with the residual market shares (Le., the
difference between 1 and the sum of fractional market shares of all other competi-
tors) and is forced to follow a nonlogistic path that joins its period of growth to its
subsequent period of decline. Mter the current, saturating competitor has reached
a logistic rate of decline, the next oldest competitor enters its saturation phase
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and the process is repeated until all but the most recent competitor are in decline.
A more comprehensive description of the model and assumptions is given in Naki-
cenovic (1979).
[51 As in Figure 9.19, the fractional shares (F) are not plotted directly but as the
linear transformation of the logistic curve, Le., FI{I-F) - as the ratio of the
market share taken by a given steel technology over the sum of the market shares
of all other competing technologies. Also in this figure, this form of presentation
reveals the logistic substitution path as an almost linear secular trend with annual
perturbations. The presence of some linear trends in Figure 9.15 indicates where
the fractional substitution of steel technologies follows a logistic curve.
[6] Transformation FI{I-F) is used where F = site, te is the estimated saturation level
and s the steel production in a particular year, so that F represents the fraction of
the saturation.
[7] Transformation FI{I-F) is used where F = site, te is the estimated saturation level
and s the energy consumption in a particular year, so that F represents the frac-
tion of the saturation.
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CHAPTER 10
Techniques and Labor in Long-Term
Fluctuations: A Study of Underground
Transport in Mines
Louis Fontvieille and A nita Prigent
10.1. Introduction
After the 1973 crisis, the return to Kondratieff was generally effected with refer-
ence to Schumpeter under the stimulus of Mensch in West Germany and then of
Freeman in England. Mensch (1979) studied the lists of innovations produced
during the history of science and technology and showed that innovations appear
to be more numerous during the depression phase of the long cycle. The flood of
innovations produced would appear to overcome the depression by stimulating
investment.
A few years later, Freeman's team (1982) studied the relationship between
technical innovations and unemployment. The Brighton group considered that
innovations appeared to develop during the second half of the prosperous phase,
thus explaining the increase in unemployment. The most advanced form of this
approach is expressed by the concept of "New Technological Style" proposed by
Carlota Perez (1983) who intelligently combined Schumpeterian concepts with
the institutionalist theories of D. Gordon and the regulation theories of R. Boyer.
These approaches form the greater part of current research on the long-
fluctuation phenomena and have the common feature of making innovation play
a major role.
In general, innovation is considered a qualitative change in terms either of
product (creation of a new product) or of process (new manufacturing tech-
nique). When an inventory of innovation is drawn up ex post facto, one generally
tends to favor visible innovations that are concretized by clearly distinct new
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products or by characteristic material installations (the Bessemer furnace, for
example). In addition, in most cases only the first application is recorded, and
the following ones are ignored.
This manner of operation leads to isolating the innovation from the
economic and social context in which it was produced. It appears as a purely
technical, essentially material, fact that is produced directly by capital or its
engineers. The changes contributed by the workers themselves, who often
planned them, are generally forgotten and never figure in the inventory. In addi-
tion, studying technical change - in terms of innovation - tends to take it out of
its historical context. The innovation - cut off from its past - appears to be the
result of chance and not the result of a process that is part of a technical, social,
and economic rationality.
Long fluctuations thus appear to be caused essentially by technical progress
that is broadly exogenous with regard to the field of economy. The crises in
which they appear are forced on men like fate, forming the ransom that must be
paid to progress.
We obviously do not intend to negate the role played by innovations in
long movements but intend to give it a different position in the set of structural
processes that engender fluctuations.
Our theory of long fluctuations has been developed elsewhere. Very briefly,
fluctuations express the regulation of the growth of productive forces in their link
with the social relations of production in whose framework they are developed.
These production relations periodically block this development. Rate of profit is
the instrument through which regulation operates. A high rate of profit results
from developing production methods that favor the material means of production
at the expense of the workers who put them into operation. In time, the result-
ing imbalance leads to a fall in the efficiency of the production system and pro-
duction relations. This fall in profit weighs on behavior, thus leading to develop-
ment of new productive forces and encourages the adaptation of production rela-
tions.
In terms of productivity, the first type of development leads to economizing
live labor and excessive expenditure on past labor. In contrast, the second type
encourages the economizing of past labor and the development of live labor.
The coal survey started in 1981 verifies these hypotheses and the data at
the same time. In the first part we drew up a set of accounts describing the evo-
lution of the productive forces and the economic relations within whose frame-
work they were developed. We then attempted to analyze the qualitative
changes brought about by this development in terms of innovation and technical
change, on the one hand, and in terms of skill, qualification, way of life, and con-
sumption on the part of the labor force, on the other.[l]
It is doubtless excessive to try to establish a continuum between the
measurable economic transformations of production relations and the qualitative
evolution of the productive forces. However, if one wants to understand what is
happening one cannot just draw up accounts of economic activity. It is neces-
sary to enter the question, observe the transformations that take place, and actu-
ally see if they have measurable economic results. Thus, for example, the
hypothesis regarding the development of productivity that takes place during the
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long fluctuation, sometimes by privileging the live labor economy and sometimes
by privileging past labor, can be measured in terms of result through the evolu-
tion of labor and capital productivity. However, this measurement is soulless
and lacks history. Its only perspective is mechanistic if it is isolated from the
transformation of man and the tools that he fashions and from the social rela-
tions within whose framework these transformations take place.
We aim to set down a few markers along this pathway by means of study-
ing underground haulage in mines. It is of course difficult to limit the field of
investigation to a single aspect of a complex technological process. In any evolv-
ing productive activity, all the technical processes used interact; any change that
occurs in a particular domain has frequently originated in another.
The coal industry is no exception to this principle. It serves as an excellent
example of this principle owing to the increasing complexity of the operation, the
variety of the situations faced, and the techniques used to adapt to individual
situations. Indeed, the characteristic of the mining industry is the need to
integrate nature as a direct, immediate, productive force. This can only be
achieved by adapting to nature's own requirements.
This permanent, direct affront to nature gives the coal-mining industry a
special stamp. It consists of exploiting a natural, nonrenewable, fossil resource.
Apart from the discovery of new deposits, and if it is assumed that exploitation
begins with the most accessible part, the complexity of the problems increases
with time. Nature's productivity thus decreases. Increasingly remote deposits
must be sought at greater and greater depths, and this in itself is a factor of
technological evolution.
Underground coal mining consists of removing coal from the seam and con-
veying it to the surface. From the technical point of view, this operation
involves the solving of successive problems:
• Searching for, identifying, and characterizing the seams to be mined.
• Access to the seams mined.
• Management of cutting and the manner of exploiting the seams.
• Support of the workings.
• Lighting.
• Ventilation.
• Breaking down coal.
• Haulage of coal to the surface.
This last point can be divided into horizontal haulage or haulage along various
slopes at the bottom of the pit or in galleries leading directly to the surface and
vertical lifting in the shafts themselves.
These different aspects of mining are obviously interdependent and any
progress made in one field will modify the equilibrium and bring about changes
in the others. The study of a particular sector thus assumes at least overall
knowledge of the situation in the others. From this point of view, the evolution
of underground transport is conditioned by two essential factors: the increase in
the quantities mined and the increase in haulage distances. These two factors
exert continuous pressure with regard to modification of techniques to increase
the speed and capacity of transport.
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However, it would be a mistake to consider this evolution purely from its
technical aspect and with regard to the physical constraints that weigh on it.
Techniques are put into practice by labor. This assumes savoir-faire, skill, and
creativity on the part of the workers concerned, and the labor itself involves cost.
Combining these factors produces a technical change. This is what we would
like to demonstrate through study of underground haulage.
10.2. Mining at the End of the Eighteenth Century
Coal production in France remained at less than one million metric tons per year
until the end of the eighteenth century. Small operations were a general rule,
consisting of a few miners and an operator who managed the work. In many
cases it was an alternating activity, and the workers were sometimes in the field
and sometimes down the mine. Techniques were rudimentary, and were gen-
erally carried out using narrow galleries, in which a child could hardly stand,
leading directly to the open air. There was sometimes no propping.
The main technique for hauling was carrying the coal on miner's backs.
This is the most primitive type of haulage, characterized by the fact that every-
thing is supplied by human energy - both lift and displacement depend on the
carrier's muscular strength alone. It is the most simple method but also the
most flexible and the best adapted to thin seams, poor tunnels, and steep slopes.
Rouft" described the workings in the Saint-Etienne region toward the middle of
the eighteenth century:
Men and women and children of both sexes work in these diggings, the men
use pick-axes to break off corners and blocks of coal from the seams, boys
bring up the large coal and women and girls put the slack in long, narrow
bags holding a hundred to a hundred and fifty pounds. . . . Thus loaded,
these wretches climb the rampart of the dim galleries without lights. The
effort that they have to make to overcome the weight of the burden, the
difficulty of the route and the discomfort of their position forces them to make
violent inhaling and exhaling movements of the chests, whence emerge plain-
tive, broken sounds.[2]
More complex forms of organization were required in certain workings by
the depth of the seams and the difficulties to be overcome to reach them. In
1716, Desandrouin in the Nord departement was obliged to have recourse associ-
ates to assemble the capital necessary to dig the first shafts. An early steam
engine was used in 1730 to pump out water; there were four in 1751. However,
the shallow seams meant that the galleries were only 1.20 meters high, and the
coal was generally hauled.
Since it was impossible to use workers of normal height to go into these nar-
row caverns, young people went in, sorted the stones from the coal and loaded
each separately on small sledges which they took to the shaft, crouching and
sometimes on all fours the whole length of the seam.[3]
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Ha.uling was an improvement over carrying. The energy required was
divided, and workers provided only the displacement. However, in galleries
where the slope was greater than 12· the hauler had to be helped by a child who
pushed. This method could not be used when the slope was more than 20·. It
can thus be seen that the change to the new method of transport assumed pro-
gress in management of operations and in the driving of galleries whose gradient
had to be fixed according to the method of haulage used.
To improve the yield of the method and to increase the load of the sledges,
gallery floors were boarded or even lined with logs on slopes and the sledges were
fitted with iron skids.
Thus designed, underground haulage used the greater proportion of the
labor force. The observations available report that three workers were occupied
in conveyance for every two involved with breaking down coal. Measurement of
the useful work carried out each day by a worker showed that a carrier could
take loads of 50 to 75 kilograms as far as 50 to 100 meters up slopes of up to 50·.
He could thus move 200 to 300 kilograms in one day over one kilometer. The
hauler could carry loads of 60 to 160 kilograms for distances of 60 to 200 meters.
In all, he moved 350 to 800 kilograms over one kilometer.
In 1790, Dieudonne estimated that the average wages of the Compagnie
d'Anzin was 270 francs per year, Le., approximately 90 centimes per day. At
that time the company mined 75 metric tons per worker per year. This was sold
for 10 francs per metric ton. Under these conditions, any increase in production
implying more than a proportional increase of the distances to be traveled soon
reached a limit.
10.3. The Changes of 1820-1850
In spite of a significant increase in production, this haulage system remained
largely dominant in French mines until the early 1820s. The situation could not
remain as it was with the development of the depression phase. Prices were fall-
ing and labor costs, which were still 300 francs on average in 1820, rose rapidly
and reached 700 francs in 1847. In addition, production continued to increase at
a very high rate, which doubtless implied a more than proportional increase in
haulage volume.
Underground haulage underwent four decisive changes during this period:
• Carrying and hauling on skids were replaced by wheel-mounted dogs or
wagons.
• Rails were laid in the galleries.
• Man was progressively replaced by the horse as a driving force.
• Finally, self-acting inclines were installed on steep downward slopes.
Wheeled wagons were introduced in 1820 in the Aveyron department, in
1821 in Loire, in 1822 in Nord, in 1836 in Tarn, and in 1843 in Herault. The
Huelgoat mines in Brittany were influenced by the British, and were equipped
with dogs in 1806.
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Wheels were first made of wood with iron rims, then cast iron, and finally
iron. Car bodies were made of white wood, which was light but fragile, or oak.
Wood was later replaced by lighter and stronger sheet steel.
The oldest mine dogs held 150 kilograms of coal, which was the most that
would be hauled under the best conditions with a car on skids. However, loads
increased steadily. At Besseges in 1858 the cars carried 1,100 kilograms, but this
was an exception. In general, loads averaged between 250 and 500 kilograms.
In France, adoption of the wheel often coincided with the laying of metal
rails. There was thus a replacement of skid-mounted cars, sometimes guided by
longitudinals, with wheel-mounted cars running on rails. In contrast, wheel-
mounted dogs that ran on wooden rails were used in Germany before 1800.
The first rails used by Compagnie d'Anzin in 1822 were grooved and made
of cast iron. Aniche became equipped with iron-flat rails in 1825. Headed rails
were used later.
Horses were first used only in mines where the seams were thick enough to
support large galleries without having to mine the rock. This change was first
introduced in the Loire coalfields in 1824. The first horses were taken down the
mines in the Nord departement in 1847 and galleries had to be specially fitted.
Naturally, different types of haulage were present in mines simultaneously
for many years. The main roads were equipped first. In 1836, the engineer
Manes, described mine haulage in the Carmaux mines as follows:
Haulage inside is by sliding wagons fitted with iron skids and with a capacity
of 1.25 hectoliters over beams laid transversely along the galleries. The
haulers take these wagons along horizontal galleries and lower them in
inclined galleries using a winch. . .. This method will soon be replaced every-
where by haulage on rails as at the Ravin mine.
These railways consist of two lines of rolled steel bars 0.80 m apart laid
on wooden sleepers. In the horizontal parts there is a single track with stages
of 40 to 50 fathoms (about 80 to 100 meters). There are two metal tracks
with 3 or 4 rails in the inclined part,s.
The cars or wagons with four wheels and wooden bodies and a door for
unloading contain 5 to 6 hectoliters and run through the main galleries. They
are loaded by wagons from the face. They are hauled manually to an incline,
lowered using a braking hoist and then taken by trammers to the shaft where
they are emptied. The coal is shovelled into hoisting-buckets of the same
capacity and taken up to the surface either by means of a pit-head pulley or
steam engines.[4]
When this was written in 1836, coal was still discharged and loaded twice:
first in the main galleries receiving coal from the face and then at the bottom of
the pit.
The improvements made in management of the workings made it possible
for trammers to take the coal from the face. Unification of the haulage system
was complete when haulage cars were put into hoisting-cages in 1848. Coal
could be taken from the face to the sorting area in a single operation.
Manes described haulage in steeply sloping galleries starting from the use
of a braking-hoist. This is in fact a development that uses gravity as a source of
energy. A hoist fitted with a brake is used to lower loaded cars in 30· to 45·
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slopes. A pulley with a brake is also used in which the descending loaded cars
use the returning empty cars as counterweights. Of course, it appears paradoxi-
cal to lower the load when it subsequently has to be raised to take it out of the
mine. In fact, the system enabled the best use of extraction mechanization in the
mines created in the early nineteenth century. In the present case, the coal had
to be taken as rapidly and as cheaply as possible to the foot of the shaft.
This new technique was important because it opened the way to a second
reversal of the direction of movement of the loads with rising inclines. In this
case the force of gravity was formed by the horse that hauled empty cars down,
thus pulling full cars upward.
These improvements successively enabled considerable increase in the
amounts hauled. Whereas haulage on skids enabled useful work of about 400 to
800 kilograms per day over a kilometer, haulage using wheeled cars enabled an
increase to 2,000 or 3,000 kilograms under identical conditions. When the roads
had sufficient slope, useful work could attain 9,000 kilograms for a single worker.
Useful work over distances of 200 to 4,000 meters could reach 10,000 to 64,000
kilograms with the use of horses.
These new methods of haulage were most effective when the whole of the
workings was organized appropriately, with sufficiently spacious main galleries to
enable horses to be used and with slopes such as to enable them to move large
tonnages effortlessly. This could only be achieved progressively and above all in
new workings. The inertia factor here is certainly not related to the duration of
fluctuations.
Another aspect of evolution was that nature as a production force was
tamed, ordered, and regularized, paving the way for progress. Things had come
a long way since the narrow tunnels with slopes of often up to 50· through which
miners crawled at the end of the eighteenth century.
The first result of these changes was that it was now possible to cut coal at
increasing distances from the shaft. The length of galleries increased but the
number of pits decreased. Thus in 1810, Compagnie d'Anzin produced 280,000
metric tons from 25 pits. In 1876 only 13 pits producing 2,137,000 metric tons
remained, but there was a total of 39,220 kilometers of galleries. The
capital-product ratio fell, and the same capital could be used for more workers.
A second consequence was that the structure of intermediate consumption
was deeply modified, with a strong increase in the consumption of cast iron and
steel accompanied by a fall in the prices of these materials, whereas use of wood
decreased in relative terms and the price rose.
Finally, the third result was that the change in haulage made it possible to
reduce, at least comparatively, the number of workers involved in this unskilled
work. At the end of the 1840s, no more than one hauler was needed for two
hewers at the face whereas three had been necessary a century earlier. In addi-
tion, skilled workers were now needed to lay and maintain the roads and to
repair the cars. The change of the production tool thus required labor with more
skills. This trend certainly accounts in part for the rise in wages observed during
this period.
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The main changes in the haulage system were complete at the beginning of
the prosperous phase from 1850 onward. They led to considerable increase in
productivity and also made it possible to go beyond the limits that the develop-
ment of productive forces had reached with the previous haulage method. With
the exception of the installation of inclines and the fitting of axle-boxes to car
wheels, we noted no important technical changes during the phase of prosperity
from 1850 to 1873. Thus, all efforts were concentrated on generalizing the new
methods to reach the most remote parts of the mines. Equipping main galleries
at the beginning of the changes obviously had important repercussions on pro-
ductivity by removing bottlenecks, and reducing costs for the very large quanti-
ties hauled. As the system spread, the marginal productivity of the new exten-
sions tended to diminish. There was certainly an economy in live labor, but an
increasing amount of past labor had to be expended to achieve this result.
We have not found any information indicating conclusively that technical
progress might have lessened the quality of the coal during the prosperous phase.
However, this type of information is rarely given in technical publications that
ignore the improvements or simplifications that lead to employing unskilled labor
instead of better-paid workers.
In fact, during the prosperous phase, the whole technical tool changed pro-
gressively to make better use of the new potential. Galleries were given a very
slight slope in the direction of haulage, inclines were installed, tracks were
widened, horses were used more and more as motive force instead of men, etc.
While this occurred, the system was forced to its limits while further changes
were getting ready: innovation requires a favorable environment.
10.4. Mechanization of Haulage after 1870
Wheeled haulage on rails enabled a considerable increase in the tonnages trans-
ported. However, evolution of the production tool, that of haulage itself, tended
to make increasing amounts of coal converge toward the same point while the
cutting faces tended to become further from this center. In mining, digging a
shaft is a fixed cost while the driving of galleries to cut coal further away is a
proportional cost. It is thus advantageous to extend galleries to the point at
which the operation cost exceeds the depreciation cost that would be caused by
the installation of a new pit. This shows the strategic position of haulage. It is
essentially haulage and its cost that govern the point in which considerable sums
must be invested in a new installation and a new risk is taken.
Mine head pits, equipped with powerful apparatus, were thus the destina-
tion of large quantities of coal that tended to saturate the main access galleries.
Horse-drawn haulage became too slow to handle the quantities produced.
Animal traction had reached its limits, and the question of mechanization was
raised.
In 1870, the mechanization of draught could not go directly from horses to
motor engines serving the same function. This would have implied a degree of
miniaturization inside the mines that could not be attained by steam engines,
not to mention the risks of fire or fire damp.
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However, the principle of inclines, which was widely used in mines, made it
possible to combine a fixed engine and transport mobility. It was enough to
equip the main pulley with a mechanical engine or a transmission system con-
nected to an engine
English mines were the first to use the new method in 1851, and were fol-
lowed by Germany in 1862 and Belgium in 1865. The first mechanical traction
systems were installed at Blanzy in the Loire departement in 1872 on an incline.
Anzin used the method in 1873 in a horizontal gallery, and the method was soon
adapted by Aniche, Ferfay, and others.
Traction was by an endless chain or rope below the wagons or above the
wagons. In the first category, the wagons were hitched to the low part and ran
as complete trains drawn by a chain or a rope. The fore rope is called the main
rope, and the rear one is the tail rope. Each cable is alternately hauled or hauler
depending on whether the wagons are full and going to the shaft or empty and
returning to the face.
In the second category, suitably spaced wagons ran alone at a speed of
between 1.1 and 7.2 kilometers per hour. They were hitched above to a single
endless chain or rope running round horizontal pulleys at the end of the run.
One pulley was the driving pulley and operated continuously.
The decisive problem for this new type of haulage was that of putting the
driving power down the pit. In mines with no fire damp, it was possible to install
a steam engine at the bottom of the pit if there was adequate ventilation.
Numerous examples of this type were to be found in England, but it was rarer in
France. In 1888, 33 machines had been installed down mines, 31 of which were
in the Bouches-du-RhOne and Gard departements.
Steam engines were sometimes installed at the mine head and a driving
rope ran to the bottom of the shaft. The steam engine could also be installed at
the bottom and the boiler at the surface, but the steam rapidly lost its energy as
the temperature decreased. Thus, when the engine was separate from the boiler
it was preferred to use compressed air to run the engines down the mine.
In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, practically all the pits were equipped with one or
two 500 hp air compressors at the end of the nineteenth century.
The first mechanical installations in 1875 had a capacity of approximately
600 metric tons per day, but at the end of the century daily figures commonly
reached 1,000 metric tons and were sometimes as high as 2,000 metric tons.
In terms of employment, mechanical draught eliminated unskilled labor
once more. At Aniche in 1875, the mechanical system installed in the Saint-
Marie pit replaced 39 horses. Thus, unskilled workers - generally children -
were eliminated and operation of the new installations required highly skilled
labor, particularly for maintenance. The new technique also stimulated use of
skilled labor. In addition, although it resulted in a considerable increase in labor
productivity, it tended to increase that of capital. The installation at Aniche
cost 55,000 francs, which is distinctly less than the value of the horses.
Installation of mechanical traction involved the solving of complex prob-
lems, and the cost was high. It could therefore only be used in galleries with
sufficient discharge. Nevertheless, here again, the system gradually spread to
less profitable roads during the prosperous period. Thus in Westphalia, in 1905,
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there were 149 installations handling 372 metric tons per shift. In 1907 there
were 195 installations but the average amount handled had fallen to 312 metric
tons.
The disadvantage of rope traction is that it requires continuous supervi-
sion, made difficult by the fact that the parts are spread along the whole of the
route. In addition, a simple breakdown brings the whole system to a halt and
soon stops work upstream. A more flexible system was therefore needed to
enable engines to be smaller, and this became possible with the use of electricity
and internal-combustion engines. Compressed-air engines with independent
tanks were also used.
The first electric locomotives appeared in Germany in 1889, and the first
locomotives driven by petrol engines were used there in 1890. The first electric
locomotives in France were used at Gardanne in 1898. These were then installed
in Loire from 1900 onward. Mines in Nord-Pas-de-Calais began to use
compressed-air locomotives in 1910.
This new type of haulage became widespread after World War 1. In 1930,
450 locomotives were in use in mines and 178 of them were driven by compressed
air.
The locomotive - electric or not - was not a decisive advance in relation to
mechanical traction by rope, whose cost per metric ton was frequently lower.
The main advantage lay in its flexibility, but in secondary galleries it competed
with difficulty with horses. In 1930, it was estimated that threshold of
profitability of a locomotive was 240 metric tons per shift per day, which was
rarely the case in a secondary road. This explains why horses were still clearly
dominant at that date.
In fact, at the end of the Great Depression of 188~1890, haulage was no
longer an obstacle to developing operations and the decisive advances that deep-
ly modified mining. Whereas in the nineteenth century the most important
technical changes were in haulage, the techniques used to break down coal were
to be revolutionized in the twentieth century.
Although it is still incomplete, the study of technical changes in mining
confirms the results obtained with quantitative measurements and also gives a
different image of the innovation process by placing it in its technical, social, and
economic context.
Notes
[11 Within the framework of this survey, the study of underground haulage was car-
ried out by Anita Prigent and is the subject of a report entitled Evolution techno-
logique deB transports al'intirieur deB mineB en France de 1750 a1990 [Technical
Development of transport inside the mines in France from 1750 to 19901. The
information used in this article was taken from the report. In addition, five others
have examined the problems of ventilation, explosives, control of fire damp,
compressed air, and coal cutting.
[2] Rouff, M., 1922, Les mines de charbon en France au XVIIIe siecle, 1744-1791,
Rieder, Paris, France.
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[31
[41
Grar, E., 1847, Histoire de la recherche, de la decouverte et de l'exploitation de la
houille dans Ie Hainaut francais, dans la Frandre francais et dans I'Artoid
(1716-1791).
Manes, 1836, A nnale, de' mine,.
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CHAPTER 11
The Diffusion of Process Innovations
as a Factor Shaping Industrial Structures:
The Case of Shuttle-less Looms
Cristiano Antonelli
11.1. Introduction
Diffusion of innovation has long been analyzed within a static context where the
technology itself and the features of potential adopters were not allowed to
change over time.
The epidemic approach, elaborated by Griliches (1957) and Mansfield
(1961) modeled the diffusion of innovation as a logistic or S-shaped pattern
governed by the spread of information concerning the advantages of the innova-
tion among potential adopters, brought on by the cumulated epidemic effect of
adoptions. The epidemic approach considers the diffusion process as the out-
come of a contagion process in which, within a given population, at each point in
time the chances of new adoption are governed by the ratio of old adoptions to
total potential adopters. The relationship between the new adoptions and the
old ones is such that at the beginning of the diffusion new adoptions increase
very fast with respect to the small levels of shares of old adopters to total ones.
Later on however, after the share of old adopters to total ones has passed a
threshold laying between 37% and 50%, the rate of increase of new adoptions
tends to decline. [11 It will eventually stop in the proximity of a share of old
adopters to total close to unity.
In the epidemic model early adopters are the ones able to outguess the
higher profitability of the new product, while late adopters rely on the knowledge
of the higher total productivity of the innovation spread by the experience of
early adopters. In the epidemic models of diffusion, the profitability of the
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innovation as well as the ability of adopters to appreciate it remain (or can
remain) stable over time. The diffusion, in fact, is governed by the spreading of
the information concerning the innovation within a static population of
differentiated agents. Internal forces engendered by the demonstration effect of
cumulated adoptions are the one dynamic motor in the process.
It is thus clear that the basic as~umption of the epidemic model is in the
uneven and static distribution of innovative skills or outguessing capacity among
potential adopters.[2]
This rigid and static assumption seems more and more difficult to apply
when all the changes associated with the diffusion of an innovation - such as the
decline of costs, the learning effects, the role played by supply forces, the growth
or entry of early adopters, and the exit or decline of late ones - are considered.
A first attempt to introduce a proper consideration of some of these
dynamic factors into the analysis of diffusion process has been made by a recent
wave of so-called equilibrium models. Equilibrium models stress the change over
time in the ability of agents to appreciate the advantages of the innovation as
well as the changes in the innovation itself brought on by post-invention
improvements.
More precisely equilibrium models see the diffusion process as the result of
the rational decision process of differentiated categories of adopters that face
continuate changes of the features of the innovation to be adopted (Antonelli,
1987) and that are supposed to be able to take advantage of processes of learning
b" using (Davies, 1979).
At each point in time potential users decide to adopt the innovation when
its marginal productivity equals the opportunity cost of its delay. The marginal
productivity of the innovation, however, increases over time because of:
• Introduction of incremental technical change and consequent increase of its
total factor productivity.
• Learning by doing of innovation producers and consequent reductions in
costs to users.
• Learning by using among adopters and consequent increase of its total fac-
tor productivity.
• Erosion of monopolistic extra profits of innovation producers and conse-
quent reduction in prices thus in costs to users.
• Secular decline of the relative cost of capital with respect to wages (for
labor-saving process innovations) and consequent reduction in relative cost
to users.
When the size distribution of a firm is considered, the aggregation of these
results of the microeconomic analysis of the adoption process can yield an aggre-
gate process of diffusion characterized by a strong sigmoid pattern. Current size
distribution of a firm's potential adopters (Le., normal and lognormal ones)
proves in fact to yield sigmoid patterns of diffusion at the aggregate level, com-
patible with equilibrium models at the microeconomic one, given that large firms
have higher chances of adoption than smaller ones.
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Following an established literature with significant empirical evidence,
large firms are in fact expected to have, at the beginning of the diffusion process,
a higher level of anticipated payoff of the innovation and thus adopt it earlier
than smaller ones.[3] Eventually though, smaller firms will also appreciate,
thanks to the dynamic force already considered, the accrued marginal produc-
tivity of the innovation and will adopt it with some delay. Reasons for this
difference between larger firms and smaller ones include the following:
• The longer period necessary for small firms to acquire relevant information
about the real payoff of the innovation (David, 1969).
• The longer period in which large firms calculate the payoff with respect to
small ones (Davies, 1979).
As a final result we have a diffusion process characterized by the early
adoption of large firms and the eventual adoption of smaller ones fueled by
dynamic forces increasing the advantage of adoption. When such a diffusion
process takes place in a common industrial population, with a given and static
normal or lognormal size distribution of firms, it will follow an S-shaped aggre-
gate pattern.
The strength of these equilibrium models seems to be grounded in the
explanation of a microeconomic behavior of adoption consistent with the empiri-
cal observation of aggregate S-shaped diffusion patterns. Such a result, however,
is obtained from the static features of the population of potential adopters - such
as the number and the size distribution of firms and the role of ultimate deter-
minants of the diffusion process.
This preminent role of the size distribution of firms in determining the pat-
tern of aggregate diffusion seems to be a limit. It precludes in fact the integra-
tion into the analysis of diffusion of possible changes in the population of poten-
tial adopters engendered by the features of the diffusion process itself.
This limit seems especially relevant when one considers that the diffusion of
process innovation has major effects on the production costs of early adopters
and their competitive advantage over late adopters.
The adoption of a process innovation is expected to make possible a down-
ward shift of the average cost curve. Early adopters in such a context can be
considered innovators with a transient competitive advantage in terms of an
average cost curve lower than that of non-adopters. A variety of possible out-
comes of such a change in the competitive advantage of firms brought on by the
diffusion and the time lag in the adoption of the innovation is possible.
Early adopters can take advantage of lower production costs by expanding
their long-term production levels and, for a given demand, their market
shares.[4] In such a case, early adopters would not wait for the diffusion process
to reach late adopters but would rather push it by means of accelerated rates of
incremental adoption, which are a function of their rates of growth. The aggre-
gate diffusion would then be fostered by a form of expanded intrafirm diffusion
process. Moreover, the population of potential adopters would be affected by the
diffusion process. Late adopters would abandon the industry because of their
high production costs. In fact they would never adopt because of forced exit.[S]
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An alternative outcome is possible when early adopters do not expand their
long-term supply: entry of new competitors based on the early adoption of the
new process innovation can then take place. In this case new entrants would
take the place of late adopters and would force them to abandon the market: the
new entry in fact would increase supply and reduce costs. Only modern firms
equipped with the new capital equipment would be able to remain in the market.
In both cases the introduction of a new process innovation and the time lag
in its adoption induce major changes in the competitive advantage of firms: the
survival of late adopters is put at risk either by the growth of early adopters or
by the entry of new adopters that are more able to take advantage of the new
capital equipment available.
As a result of such a chain of events the number of firms and the size distri-
bution can change along the diffusion process. The diffusion process in fact
would be the ultimate cause of the size distribution of firms rather than a conse-
quence of it. It seems now clear that a major limit of equilibrium models is the
lack of appreciation of the effects of the differential ability of firms to adopt inno-
vations on their growth and survival. The timing of adoption of process innova-
tions becomes, in fact, a factor of competitive advantage and industrial selection.
11.2. Adoption Survival and Entry
11.2.1. The hypothesis
The features of the diffusion of shuttle-less looms in the Italian cotton-weaving
industry in the period 1973-1982 provide excellent empirical evidence to test the
role of diffusion of process innovation as a factor shaping industrial structure.
Main features of the sector can be summarized as follows:
• The market is open to international competition.
• Labor costs account for 50% to 60% of total added value.
• Products are technically homogeneous with low levels of technical
differentiation.
• Demand is highly price elastic.
• Markets are easily contestable, and the entry of new competitors takes
place by means of reductions in prices.
• Equilibrium prices show secular declining trends because of the competitive
pressure of new international producers characterized by low labor costs.
• New process innovations have been introduced in the entire production
cycle from spinning (open end rotors) to finishing (electronic regulation of
dying) through weaving (shuttle-less looms).
• The use of new synthetic materials and new product mix spread among
final consumers.
• Major changes in the costs of inputs, namely, raw materials, energy, and
labor, took place in the 1970s.
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The industry adjusted to the turbulence by means of fast rates of diffusion
of process and product innovation. The adjustment, however, was also the result
of a major process of industrial reorganization. Heavy mortality rates and an
inflow of new competitors changed the features of the structure of the Italian
cotton-weaving industry (see Table 11.1).
Total number of firms declined from 405 in 1971 to 305 in 1985. Employ-
ment shrank from 42,335 to 22,010 with the loss of 20,025 jobs, Le., 0.47% of the
1971 total. Overall average size of firms declined from 82 employees to 63. Pro-
duction levels of the weaving sector, however, increased from 163,296 million
tons of all products in 1973 to 226,401 in 1985. International competitiveness, as
measured by the ratio of export-import to export+import, remained stable in
relative terms at - 0.51 from 1971 to 1985.
In the same period the diffusion of shuttle-less looms spread quickly: the
cumulated stock jumped from 734 installed in 1974 to 14,078 in 1985 [6] and the
penetration index [7] passed from 1.05% to 20.18%.
Shuttle-less looms can be considered a major process innovation with major
effects on the production cost of weaving firms. The shuttle loom had reached in
the 1960s the maximum production capacity of 180-200 knots per minute, with a
work load of one employee per four machines. Shuttle-less looms in the late-
19708 had an average production capacity of 300 knots per minute with a work
load of one employee per eight machines. In short, the introduction of shuttle-
less looms made possible substantial increases in total factor productivity and
lowered production costs by 30%
These elements seem to provide an excellent opportunity to test the
hypothesis that the time of adoption of process innovation has major competitive
effects on the ultimate result of changing the features of the population of poten-
tial adopters as it was before the diffusion process took place.
In such a context, characterized by falling prices, high levels of interna-
tional competition, introduction of process innovations, price competition, and
domestic market contestability, we expect to find that the time of adoption of a
radical process innovation, such as shuttle-less looms, with major effects on pro-
duction costs is associated with:
• The survival of early adopters.
• The entry of new firms as early adopters.
• The exit of late adopters.
We expect to find that existing firms that adopt the new production tech-
nique will be able to reduce production costs and to match the competition
brought on by international producers localized in countries with low labor costs
and by new domestic competitors. Moreover, we expect that in a context
characterized by the decline of prices, late adopters using less-efficient techniques
will be forced to abandon the market because of their relative inefficiency and
consequent growing losses. Finally, we expect that the new production process
offered to new competitors will provide the opportunity to overcome the (low)
barriers to enter into the industry and make possible a flow of entries.
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11.2.2. The test
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The Archives of Associazione Cotoniera Italiana contains a large data set with
information on the time of first adoption of shuttle-less looms, total employment,
total production, and total looms installed in the period 1973-1982 for all the
members of the Associazione, Le., 116 firms of which 99 were active in 1973 in
the weaving sector and 17 were established later. The data make it possible to
analyze the features of the adoption process of shuttle-less looms, the relation-
ship between adoption and survival, and the change in the population of poten-
tial adopters along the diffusion process.
In 1982 at the end of the period, a total of 55 firms out of the 99 active in
1973 were still in operation and had adopted shuttle-less looms. In 1973, 20 had
already installed shuttle-less looms; the sequence of the adoptions in the follow-
ing years (see Table l1.t) shows a peak of adoptions in the period 1974-1976
with 24 new adoptions. The aggregate diffusion pattern of shuttle-less looms
within the 99 firms considered (see Table l1.t) closely follows the path of
diffusion (see Table 11.1) of all the industry.
TtJ61e H.!. Evolution of the stock of shuttle-less looms installed in the period
1973-1982 and Bow of new adopters.
1979 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 198!
Stock of shuttle-
less looms 661 974 1,409 1,805 1,999 1,628 1,686 2,002 2,852 2,937
Flow of new
adopters 20a 7 8 7 3 1 0 4 3 2
aFirms with shuttle-less looms already in place during the first year observation.
Econometric estimates of the logistic and log logistic are given in equation
below:
log I aT II \ = a + bIt
log I aT II \ = a + bllog t,
where II is the cumulated number of shuttle-less looms installed, N is the number
of total automatic looms in place in 1973, and t varies from 6 to 17 on the aggre-
gated data of the 99 firms. The data on all the industry provides an excellent
estimate of the diffusion pattern.
The following results, respectively, for industry one in equations (11.1) and
(ILIa) and industry two in equations (11.2) and (11.2a) provide a strong and
significant fit of the diffusion process:
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log aT Y = -5.042 + 0.196 TIME
- y (22.097) (11.032)
R2 = 0.936 F = 121.705
log NY = -4.709 + 0.142 TIME
- Y (15.368) (5.947)
R2 = 0.815 F = 35.371
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(11.1)
(11.1a)
log -----.1.N-y
R2 = 0.961
log -----.1.N-y
R2 = 0.849
-8.559 + 2.390 log TIME
(20.290) (14.218)
F = 202.157
-7.291 + 1.744 log TIME
(11.199) (6.724)
F = 45.215.
(11.2)
(11.2a)
The results confirm the following:
• The diffusion process at the aggregate level has a strong sigmoid character
that seems better approximated by the log logistic interpolation. After an
early start the pace of the adoption process, in fact, slowed down.
• The diffusion process within the sample of firms has a pattern close to that
of the universe but for the marked slowdown of the growth of installed
shuttle-less looms in the years 1978 and 1979.
Following the equilibrium approach to the analysis of diffusion we expect
such an aggregate result to be the consequence of the ability of the large firms to
adopt the process innovation earlier than the small firms: Large firms should, in
fact, have easier access to technical information, larger flows of investments, and
longer periods of payoff.
The evolution of the size of new adopters (see Table 11.9) confirms the
hypothesis. In the period 1974-1982, 35 firms already active in 1973 installed
the new process innovation. The evolution of the average size of new adopters
shows, in fact, a declining trend in terms of total employment. Moreover, the
evolution of the average size of the first installment of shuttle-less looms has a
stronger negative trend.
A further test of the positive role that the size of a firm has in determining
the chance of eventual adoption of shuttle-less looms is provided by the
econometric estimate of the probit equation (11.3) tested on the universe of 99
firms active in 1974:
ADOPTION = a + b1 SIZE, (11.3)
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Table 11.9. Evolution of size of new adoptors.
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Number of Average llize of Average number of
adopting firm. emplo,ment .huttle-lu. loom. in.talled
1974 7 828 39
1975 8 450 33
1976 7 244 15
1977 3 594 18
1978 1 22 12
1979 0 0 0
1980 4 281 18
1981 3 250 29
1982 2 376 18
Total 35
where ADOPTION is a dichotomous variable with value 1 for firms that adopted
shuttle-less looms in the period 1973-1982 and 0 otherwise; SIZE is a continuous
variable measuring the employment of firms.
The results of the test confirm that the size of a firm had a strong and
significant role in explaining the chances of adoption:
ADOPTION = -3.158 + 0.283 SIZE
(2.53) (4.74)
R = 0.324 P = 0.006 X 2 = 19.35
(11.3a)
(partial chi squared statistics between parentheses).
According to traditional equilibrium models, after large firms opened the
adoption process, fueling the first rapid phase of diffusion, smaller firms should
start their adoption, completing at a lower rate the second phase of the aggre-
gate diffusion process.
In the weaving sector a much more complex process seems, however, to
take place. Late adopters, in fact, are kicked out of the industry because of their
higher production costs in a context of declining market prices and aggressive
entry of new competitors.
In the same years 1973-1982 (see Table 11..4) 48 firms, out of 99 existing in
1973, died with a total mortality rate of 0.48. Exits peak in 1980 with 10 cases;
the period 1977-1978 with 10 is also noticeable. The size of firms forced to exit
is not significantly different from the average size of firms.[8]
The chances of a death of a firm seem to be associated with the timing of
the adoption of shuttle-less looms. The large majority of exits was non-adopters.
Only 19 firms, which eventually left the industry, had already adopted shuttle-
less looms, while the remaining 29 were non-adoptors. In 1982 only 51 firms out
of the original 99 were still active; of these 31 had already adopted shuttle-less
looms and 20 had not.
In absolute terms at the end of the period, the probability of the death of
adopters, 0.38 (19/50), was significantly lower than the probability of non-
adopters, 0.59 (29/49). This significant relationship is confirmed by the results
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of the test of the probit equation (11.4) where the chances of exit depend upon
the time lag in the adoption:
EXIT = a + b1 ADOPTIONLAG. (11.4)
The dependent dichotomous variable EXIT equals 0 if the firm is still
active in 1982 and 1 if it exits earlier. The independent variable ADOPTION-
LAG measures the time lag in adoption.[9]
The test of equation (11.4) yields a strong and significant result:
EXIT = 1.316 + 0.688 ADOPTIONLAG
(11.97) (14.91)
MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 16.25 PROBABILITY = 0.0001
(11.4a)
(partial chi-squared statistics between parantheses). Chances of death are
strongly and positively associated with the size of adoption lag: thus the longer
the delay in adopting the process innovation the greater the chances of exit.
The exit of 48 firms left considerable room in the industry. Early adopters,
however, did not take advantage of this chance to increase their size and market
share.[10] New firms entered the market taking advantage of the new process
innovation: the analysis of the entry process (see Table 11.5) suggests, in fact,
that to a large extent the room left by firms forced to exit has been occupied by
new entrants. In the period 1974-1982, 17 new firms entered the cotton-weaving
industry; 1 left in 1977; and 16 survived.
Features of the newcomers seem worth noting (see Table 11.5):
(1) New large firms entered the industry and filled the gap left by many small
firms. The average production level from new entrants was over 139,000
tons a year; the average production level from exits was 46,000 tons a year.
(2) The entry made it possible to expand the production capacity of the indus-
try. Newcomers added to total production of the cotton-weaving industry a
capacity of 2,376 million tons (calculated by the sum of first year produc-
tions) compared with a total loss caused by exits of 2,030 million tons (cal-
culated as the sum of last year productions). The entry process, thus,
added a production capacity of 0.356 million tons a year.
(3) The newcomers, however, had a much lower level of total employment with
3,147 units in the year of entry, while firms forced to leave the industry had
a total employment of 7,572 units. In fact, average physical productivity of
workers in the new firms, measured in the year of entry, was 755 tons per
head, against the 268 tons per head of firms forced to exit, measured in the
last year of production.
(4) The entry was favored by the technological opportunity offered by the
shuttle-less looms. Out of 17 entrants, by 1982, 14 had already adopted the
shuttle-less looms, and 13 of them actually entered with shuttle-less looms
already installed or adopted shuttle-less looms within one year.
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(5) The contribution of newcomers to the diffusion process of shuttle-less looms
has been impressive (see Table 11.6): the share of shuttle-less looms
installed by newcomers grew from 4.7% in 1976 to 28.4% in 1982.
As clearly shown by the data in Table 11. 7 the aggregate growth of the stock of
shuttle-less looms is the result of three different forces:
• Interfirms diffusion, Le., adoptions by existing firms.
• Entry, Le., adoption by newcomers.
• Intrafirm diffusion, Le., new adoptions by early adopters.[ll]
Analysis of the evolution in the time span considered of the contribution of the
three forces suggests that the actual interfirm diffusion process among existing
firms played an important role in the years 1974-1977. In the following years
the entry of new firms based on modern capital equipment such as on shuttle-less
looms gave the strongest contribution to the aggregate diffusion process. The
intrafirm diffusion contributed with an irregular pace.
11.3. Conclusions
In recent years with the introduction of equilibrium models, the economic
analysis of diffusion has made important progress and now has better tools to
account for the dynamic effect of incremental technical change, learning by
doing, learning by using, and interaction between demand and supply on the
microeconomic rationale of the adoption of process innovations.
According to equilibrium models the diffusion of process innovation takes
place because of the growing profitability of innovations - engendered by a
variety of dynamic forces - and the consequent increase in the scope of applica-
tion and opportunity for adoption by new categories of potential users.
Population of potential users, however, is considered to remain at a given
and static level: such an assumption seems unrealistic and unnecessary.
The timely adoption of radical process innovation can become a factor of
change on potential adopters; the survival of late adopters can be challenged
when production costs made possible by the adoption of the new technique are
sensibly lower than production costs with the old technique.
The empirical evidence on the diffusion of shuttle-less looms in the Italian
cotton-weaving industry confirms that the introduction of the new weaving tech-
nology gave a major competitive advantage to early adopters.
More specifically the diffusion of shuttle-less looms in the Italian cotton-
weaving industry has paralleled and fostered a major selection process. Early
adopters have been able to survive but not necessarily to increase their market
shares. Late adopters never had the chance to adopt: they were forced to exit.
Their place has been taken by new large firms that entered the industry with
shuttle-less looms in operation.
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The aggregate diffusion pattern does follow a sigmoid pattern; such a path,
however, is not explained by the sequence of adoption of large firms followed by
small ones, as supposed by equilibrium models, but rather by a sequence charac-
terized by the early adoption of large, efficient firms; the exit of late adopters;
and the entry of new firms based on modern capital equipment.
In sum, the evidence analyzed suggests that the diffusion of process innova-
tions can be the result of a selection process in the population of potential
adopters, which shapes the industrial structures according to the differential
ability of firms to adopt at the right time to available process innovations.
Such a case of diffusion of a process innovation that parallels and shapes a
process of industrial reorganization stresses the need to analyze the diffusion of
innovation in a dynamic context.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[61
[7]
[8]
The level of the threshold depends upon the cumulative lognormal and, respec-
tively, cumulative normal path of diffusion which in turn is determined by the role
of supply forces, learning by doing, and learning by using (Davies, 1979).
In other words, in an epidemic context the diffusion of innovations should be
instantaneous given that all potential adopters have the same amount of outguess-
ing capacity. No diffusion would take place if early adopters have no chance of
communicating their experience and satisfaction to potential adopters.
The role of large firms as early adopters has been confirmed also by the results of
the empirical analysis of diffusion based on the disequilibrium approach. See
Mansfield (1963 and 1966), Metcalfe (1971), Globerman (1975), Romeo (1975).
Consistent results of the analysis of the diffusion process of oxygen furnaces in the
US steel industry, however, suggest that larger firms can be late adopters rather
than early ones. See Adam and Dirlam (1966), Oster (1982), and Karlson (1986).
Antonelli (1986) provides an empirical test of the positive effects of higher rates of
international diffusion of a process innovation such as shuttle-less looms on inter-
national competitiveness as measured by the distribution of international market
share in the cotton fabric products.
It should be noted that, ceteris paribus of market forms and product
differentiation, the effect of the reduction in costs engendered by the adoption of a
process innovation, on the increase in supply of adopters, ultimately depends on
the changes in the shape of the new total and marginal cost curve. Only when a
reduction in variable costs flattens the total marginal cost curve can a relevant
positive increase in supply take place.
International comparison of rates of diffusion of shuttle-less looms, calculated with
interpolation of a logistic curve, for the period 1976-1983 places Italy as 10 out of
28. See Antonelli (1986).
Calculated as the percent share of shuttle-less looms in 1971 and 1985 to total
looms installed in 1971.
This is confirmed by the insignificant result of the estimate of the probit equation
tested on the 99 firms active in 1973
EXIT = 3.160 - 0.0003
(2.821) (0.602)
R2 =0.0048 F = 1.112
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[9]
[10]
(partial chi square between parentheses), where EXIT is a dichotomous variable
with value 1 for the firms that died during the period 1973-1982 and 0 otherwise;
SIZE is measured by total employment in 1973
ADOPTIONLAG = (YEAR OF ADOPTION - 1971) where for non-adopters 1990
has been set as the year of eventual adoption.
The results of the test of equation (11.5) where GROWTH measures the increase
in production in the period 1982-1973 for firms still active in 1982
GROWTH = 136.19 + 0.017 ADOPTIONLAG
(13.404) (0.043)
R 2 = 0.010 F = 0.907
(11.7)
(t statistics between parentheses) suggest that the hypothesis of a causal relation-
ship between adoption and growth can be rejected.
[11] Lack of data on scrap and resale of used shuttle-less looms by ailing firms reduce
the consistency of estimates on the role of the intrafirm diffusion process.
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CHAPTER 12
Determinants of Energy Technology
Transitions: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis Approach
Oliver S. Yu and Shu-Dong He
12.1. Introduction
The broad pattern of energy transition from muscle power to wood to coal and
then to oil, gas, and electricity has been widely observed in the histories of many
couniries. The driving forces of this transition process seem complex because
they involve a multitude of technological innovations and a wide variety of
socioeconomic factors for which data are scarce and difficult to obtain. As a
result, researchers, such as Marchetti and Nakicenovic (1979), have often concen-
trated on empirical modeling and analysis of the energy market share evolution
over time. Although highly useful and intellectually provocative, such models
and analyses generally do not provide an in-depth understanding of the underly-
ing energy transition process.
An alternative to the empirical analysis is the simulation approach. This
approach models technology transitions as the result of the economic and
management decisions of the users to substitute one technology for another to
maximize the utilities derived from technology use. However, most such studies
have analyzed technology substitution by examining important technology attri-
butes under a fixed set of user preferences (e.g., Stern et al., 1975). This study
attempts to broaden the approach by analyzing technology substitution under
changing user preferences. Specifically, it models energy transitions as the aggre-
gated result of shifting technology choices by energy users in the process of
optimizing the perceived costs and benefits of producing or consuming goods and
services under evolving social and economic conditions. In other words, evolving
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socioeconomic factors systematically alter the relative importance of technology
attributes and cause the successive rises and falls in energy technology.
The purpose of this study is to show that the simple cost-benefit analysis
approach can be used to simulate the energy technology decision process, and
approximate the energy transition process. Ultimately, understanding these
determinants and transitions will help us answer key questions on future energy
trends, such as will electricity intensity continue to increase in the US economy,
and address important energy policy issues, such as the changes that are needed
and possible if we wish to revive the US nuclear power industry.
To carry out this study, we first identify the major direct and indirect costs
and benefits of energy technology use and the socioeconomic and technology fac-
tors affecting these costs and benefits. We then use specific examples - home
heating and industrial motive power - to illustrate how these factors affect tech-
nology choices and cause technology transitions.
As an initial analysis, the study deliberately ignores the effects of energy
technology on economic development and the origin of technology innovation.
Essentially, it assumes that various energy technologies have always been avail-
able, and waiting to be selected by the users under the optimal conditions. This
assumption is reasonable if the results of the study are used mainly for under-
standing the potential energy technology transitions in the near future or the
likely technology choice for a developing country, as the technology candidates
are dominated by those currently available.
12.2. Perceived Costs and Benefits
of Energy Technology Users
There are two types of energy technology users: the business users who use
energy technologies in the production of goods and services (including energy
services) and the individual users who use energy technologies in the consump-
tion of goods and services. Because the choice of energy technologies in both
cases eventually rests in human hands, the human perception of costs of and
benefits from energy technology use is fundamental to the decision process.
The major perceived costs and benefits of energy technology use are listed
in Table 11!.1. In this table, we have grouped the more uniformly observable and
readily quantifiable costs and benefits in the direct category. Costs and benefits
in the indirect category are generally more perception-dependent and difficult to
quantify, yet they can be influential to energy technology choice. Even those in
the direct category, such as the cost of meeting regulatory requirements and the
benefit of energy supply reliability, can be difficult to determine. For example,
the purpose of meeting regulatory requirements, in principle, is to reduce the
perceived public risk resulting from specific technology use to a socially accept-
able level. It is difficult, however, to integrate the perception of risk over an
entire society. Furthermore, this perception evolves not only with the degree of
exposure, knowledge, and understanding, but also with many other
socioeconomic factors, such as personal income.
Oliver S. Yu and Shu-Don, He
Table 11.1. Major perceived costs and benefits of energy technology use.
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Costs
Direct
Indirect
Benefits
Direct
Indirect
Business user
Production
(capital, labor, energy,
material, time, and space)
Meeting regulatory requirements
Additional environmental impacts
Labor and organizational dislocations
Production cost savings
Production reliability
Avoid labor and time
(controllability and ftexibility)
Overall productivity improvement
Image and prestige
Individual user
Consumption or use
(capital, labor, energy,
material, time, and space)
Health and safety hazards
Environmental and aesthetic effects
Psychological effects
Consumption cost savings
Use reliability
Avoid labor and time
(convenience)
Overall quality of life improvement
Image and prestige
12.3. Major Factors Affecting the Perceived Primary Costs
and Benefits of Energy Technology Use
The major socioeconomic and technology factors affecting the perceived costs
and benefits of energy technology use are summarized in Table 1!U!. The first
and probably most important factor is personal income. In aggregate, the per-
sonal income in an economy affects the availability of capital and, hence, the cost
of capital both to businesses and to individuals. The costs of time and labor also
rise with average personal income. More importantly, aggregate consumer
preferences represented by consumption patterns (Figure le.l) change with
income (or per capita GNP), which in turn change production patterns of the
economy (Figure Ie.e). These changes affect the relative costs and benefits of
energy technologies. For example, expanding proportions of discretionary expen-
ditures for recreation reflect the increasing value of electricity for electronic
entertainment and oil for transportation use. Another example is that as health
expenditures rise, both in quantity and in proportion to total expenditures with
personal income, public concerns about the environmental effects of energy tech-
nology are also likely to heighten. Moreover, the "worth of life," perceived either
through total expected life earnings or through "the willingness to pay,"
increases with personal income. As a result, the perceived costs of health and
safety hazards for individual users increase with personal income, which in turn
result in added regulatory requirements and costs for energy technologies and
their use.
The second factor is population concentration or the rate of urbanization.
This factor directly affects the cost of land for energy facilities and the space for
fuel storage. It generally raises the costs of accessing wood, as urban centers
tend to locate away from forestland. Population concentration owing to urbani-
zation, however, provides the economies of scale for building the infrastructure
for energy delivery. On the other hand, crowding in urban centers is prone to
drive up regulatory requirements.
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Table le.e. Major factors affecting costs and benefits of energy technology use.
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Factor
Personal income
Urbanization scale
Industrialization
Energy availability
Energy form
Coata and benefit8 affected
Production costs particularly cost of capital
Consumption costs particularly labor and time
AIl other costs and benefits due to impact on consumption
and production patterns
Production and consumption costs due to the
effects of concentration and economy
Cost of meeting regulatory requirements
Production costs due to the effects of high
utilization and scale economy
Cost of meeting regulatory requirements
Production and consumption costs particularly
energy costs
Cost of meeting regulatory requirements due to national
security concerns
Image and prestige
Avoided labor and time in production and consumption
Overall productivity and quality of life improvement
The third factor is the degree of industrialization. The high levels and con-
centration of energy in industries provide scale economies for energy production
and delivery, but they are also likely to induce heavy regulatory requirements.
These three factors, income growth, urbanization, and industrialization, are
broadly related to the process of economic development (Rostow, 1962). How-
ever, this relation is not necessary; for example, an OPEC nation can have high
personal income without the attendant urbanization or industrialization.
The fourth factor is the availability of energy resources. Low availability
results in the high cost of these resources. Furthermore, dependence on foreign
energy resources often creates national security concerns and prestige issues and
gives rise to regulatory requirements or public policies in favor of more reliable
alternatives.
The last factor is the intrinsic characteristics of the energy form and its
ability to facilitate innovative uses, which is difficult to specify. Nevertheless, we
do see, for example, that oil- and gas-based plastic technologies and electricity-
based information technologies have given oil, gas, and electricity distinct advan-
tages over the direct use of wood and coal. The industrial motive power example
below will provide a further illustration of the value of energy form.
12.4. Application of the Cost-Benefit Analysis Approach to
Understanding of Energy Technology Transitions
We will apply the cost-benefit analysis approach to simulate technology transi-
tions in two specific cases of energy use: home heating and industrial motive
power.
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12.4.1. Home heating
U/e CflCle. and Long Walle.
Based on the cost-benefit analysis approach, the choice of home heating energy
technology by individual users may be modeled as a minimization of the total
annualized cost of providing a given level of heating comfort. This cost includes
the cost of heating appliance investment and operation, and fuel purchase and
storage. We will first analyze the historical energy transitions in US home heat-
ing, and then examine the residential energy technology choices in different
economies of the world.
In this analysis, we will use per capita real GNP as the proxy for economic
development, which has pervasive effects on both direct and indirect costs of
energy technology use. Figure If!.S shows the energy transition in US home
heating from wood to coal and then to oil, gas, and electricity as per capita GNP
increases. The direct costs of wood, coal, and oil (as a stand-in also for gas and
electricity) are shown in Figure If!.-I. Based on these direct fuel costs, assuming
equal capital costs and lifetimes for the heating appliances, the historical transi-
tion seems to defy economic common sense because it moved from the lowest-
cost fuel (wood) to increasingly expensive fuels. However, if we consider the
total cost to the individual user, including the indirect costs of fuel storage and
labor for fuel handling and appliance operation, this transition becomes sensible.
As shown by the simplified analysis in Table If!.S, as storage and labor costs
increase respectively with urbanization and income, total cost of home heating,
also show in Figure If!.-I, becomes highest for wood and lowest for oil, gas, and
electricity. This simple analysis also simulates recent energy transitions in the
US home heating. As oil costs rose sharply in the 19708, coal and wood heating
became once again competitive and enjoyed a brief revival until the oil price
dropped again in the 19808.
The same logic applies to historical transitions in US residential energy use
shown in Figure If!.5. It is interesting to see in Figure If!.6 that, in spite of the
large data noises owing to currency conversions and differences in energy'
resource availability, the technology choice for residential energy use of 44 coun-
tries as a function of per capita GNP forms a pattern similar to the US historical
experience. This similarity indicates that the simple cost-benefit analysis
approach can be used to understand the major driving forces in energy transi-
tions.
This case study demonstrates that energy transitions in home heating were
the aggregated results of shifting technology choices by individual users in the
process of minimizing the direct and indirect costs of heating energy consump-
tion. Personal income, energy cost and availability, and the space- and labor-
saving characteristics of oil, gas, and electricity were the key determinants of the
shift from wood to coal and to oil, gas, and electricity.
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Table 11.9. Comparison of US home heating costs (1982 $).
A verage monthly heating cost per household"
Fuelwood Coal
229
Oil
GNP Urban
Year per capita rate % Direct StorC Han,{- Totaf Direct StorC Han,{- Totaf Total
1867 1,000 24 1.0 1.5 1.1 3.6 4.0 0.4 1.1 5.5 10.0
1885 2,000 33 2.1 2.1 2.3 6.5 2.9 0.5 2.3 5.7 9.2
1905 3,000 43 18b 2.8 3.4 8.0 2.7 0.7 3.4 6.8 7.3
'b1921 4,000 51 3.0b 3.3 4.6 10.9 4.5 0.8 4.6 9.9 10.81926 5,000 54 2.1 3.5 5.7 11.3 3.1 0.9 5.7 9.7 11.4
1940 6,000 57 2.5b 3.6 6.9 13.0 3.7 0.9 6.9 11.5 7.9
1950 8,000 60 3.3b 4.0 9.1 16.4 5.0 1.0 9.1 15.1 10.5
1955 9,000 63 2.7b 4.3 10.3 17.3 4.1 1.1 10.3 15.5 10.2
1963 10,000 67 2.3b 4.5 11,4 18.2 3.5 1.1 11.4 16.0 9.2
1965 11,000 71 23b 4.5 12.6 19.4 3.4 1.1 12.6 17.1 8.7
'b1969 12,000 73 2.3b 4.7 13.7 20.7 3.4 1.2 13.7 18.3 8.51976 13,000 73 6.1b 4.7 14.8 25.6 9.2 1.2 14.8 25.2 17.31980 14,000 73 5.9 4.7 16.0 26.6 8.8 1.2 16.0 26.0 32.8
1985 15,000 73 4.6b 4.7 17.1 26.4 6.9 1.2 17.1 25.2 24.0
A verage monthly home heating requirements Space cost
Quantity Space Handling per ft2
Wood 0.50 cord 16 ft2 10 man-hours Rural Negligible
Coal 0.25 ton 4 ft2 10 man-hours Urban O,4e
Oil 1.00 bbl Negligible Negligible
~Excluding equipment costs, which are assumed approximately equal among different fuels.
Estimated at 2/3 of coal direct costs.
cStor = Storage = urban space cost X urbanization rate. Hand = Handling = man-hours X
dper capital GNP/(8,760 hours per year).
Total = Direct + Storage + Handling.
e 1,200 ft2home rented at $500/mo (1982$).
(Sources: Direct costs prior to 1955 and home heating quality estimates based on Schurr and
Netschert, 1960; direct costs after 1955 and space cost based on US EIA Annual Energy Review
and US Statistical Abstract.)
12.4.2. Industrial motive power
AB shown in Figure l1!.7, between 1870 and 1940, the production and distribu-
tion of motive power in US industries shifted from waterwheels to steam-driven
prime movers and finally to electric drive. To document the first transition,
Atack (1979) used a simulation approach to show that manufacturers adopted
steam power over water primarily for reasons of locational and seasonal availa-
bility and of direct cost savings.
The shift from steam engines to electric motors was more complex. Prior
to the introduction of electric motors in the late nineteenth century, production
machines in a factory were connected to a centrally located prime mover, such as
a waterwheel or steam engine, by line shafts, belts, and pulleys. Electric motors
first competed with steam engines in providing these "line drives." The ability
of electric motors to be miniaturized soon replaced the line drives by unit drives
230 Lile Cycle, and Long Waw:,
19401930
Electric motors
19201910
Steam engines
,
1880
Water
I
1870
Source: Devine (1983)
100
90
80
.....
*'
70
-~
.. 60
..:::
on
...
.. 50....:.
E
,., 40
bO
<;
c 30LU
20
10
0
Figure 1£.1. Energy transition patterns in US industrial motive power.
1940193519301925
Sources: Edison Electric Institute
1920
180
170
..... 160
..::: 150~
.... 140~
N 130CD
a>
.... 120~-.. 10.~
i3.. 100
~ 90:g 80...
u 70..c;
fti 60
'z 50c
..
"'C 40
'iii
.. 300::
20
10
0
1900 1905 1910 1915
Figure 1£.8. US electricity price, 1900-1940.
Oliwf S. Yu and Shu-Dong He 231
located closely to the production machines. Direct energy cost savings played a
role in this substitution. Rapid economic growth during this period provided
economies of scale to electricity production that, together with thermal efficiency
improvements, drastically reduced electricity costs (Figure 11!.8). In addition,
the energy efficiency of electric drive made it even more directly cost-competitive
against the steam engines (Table 11!.4). However, the shift from steam to electric
motive power, as observed by Devine (1983), was motivated primarily by the
pervasive productivity improvement potential of the unit motor drive. Unfor-
tunately, these important indirect benefits from overall manufacturing produc-
tivity improvement are difficult to quantify. The exhaustive research by Devine
lists the following major indirect benefits from unit drive:
• Increased the flow of production in factories. Unit drive gave manufactur-
ers flexibility in the design of factory buildings and in the arrangement of
machinery to maximize production throughput and minimize material han-
dling. Furthermore, production machines could be easily rearranged to
match changing production requirements.
• Improved the working environment. Absence of overhead shaft drives led
to improvements in illumination, ventilation, and cleanliness, and contri-
buted to the quantity and quality of work.
• Improved machine control. The speed of an electric unit motor drive could
be precisely and individually controlled to respond to specific production
needs.
• Facilitated plant expansion. The locational flexibility of electric unit drive
removed the constraints on plant expansion imposed by the rigid line drive.
In a case study of the Scoville Manufacturing Company of Waterbury, Con-
necticut, Kapstein (1981) argues that the removal of constraints on expan-
sion of production was the primary reasons for the company's switch to
electric unit drive.
As Devine observes:
Although unit drive used less energy and sometimes cost less than other
methods of driving machinery, manufacturers came to find these savings to be
far less important than their gains from increased production. With unit
drive, electricity was used with its greatest economic advantage: processes
could be arranged within factories to maximize throughput; plants could be
more readily expanded; and a better working environment and improved
machine control increased both quantity and quality of output. In essence,
electric unit drive offered opportunity - through innovation in processes and
procedures - to obtain greater output of goods per unit of capital, labor,
energy, and materials employed. Electricity was now viewed as a factor in
improving overall productive efficiency.
This observation appears to be supported by the productivity improvement in
US manufacturing following the penetration of electric motors shown in Figure
11!.9.
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This case study illustrates that energy transitions in industrial motive drive
were the aggregated results of shifting technology choices by business users' in
the process of optimizing the direct and indirect costs and benefits of production.
Economic growth and the form value of electricity had major effects on these
costs and benefits and were the key determinants of the shift from steam engines
to electric motors.
12.5. Summary and Conclusions
Understanding the driving forces in energy transition and technology choice is of
vital importance to planning both technology R&D and national policy. The
simple analyses presented in this paper demonstrate that the cost-benefit
analysis approach can be used to approximate the aggregate energy technology
decision-making process under changing socioeconomic conditions. Using this
approach, it identifies economic development, energy availability, and the energy
form as the major factors affecting the perceived costs and benefits of energy
technology use by businesses and individuals. These factors are, thus, the key
determinants of energy technology transitions.
Owing to data paucity and definitional complexity, the effects of these
determinants on perceived costs and benefits are far from being fully developed.
This problem is particularly acute for many indirect costs and benefits that have
pivotal importance in energy technology decisions. Continued data collection,
analysis, and refined modeling of these effects are essential to developing an
understanding of future technology transitions.
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Appendix: The empirical estimates by Ersson and Lane (1985)
The regreBSion model is
GROWTH = a+b * GNP + c *MODERNIZATION,
where economic growth 1960-1977 is used as the GROWTH variable and MODERNI-
ZATION is measured by the time of modernization of the country according to Taylor
and Hudson (1972). The following selection of countries have been used:
N = 78 OECD countries, LDCs, and socialist countries.
N = 70 without socialist countries.
N = 46 without OECD countries, i.e., mostly LDCs.
N = 24 OECD countries.
Estimates of the parameter c (t-value in parenthesis).
N=78
-.36
(-2.1)
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CHAPTER 13
Scientific-Technological and
Educational Cycles: Interconnection
and Planned Implementation
Y. V. Yakovets
The most characteristic feature of the last quarter of the twentieth century is a
profound upheaval in science, technology, education, ecology, and organizational
forms of production and management. These upheavals, taken together, form
the content of the contemporary revolution in productive forces as the basis for
the next stage in the progressive development of society. It is necessary to inves-
tigate the structure and interrelations of revolutionary leaps according to the
principal elements of these productive forces.
The structure of scientific-technological cycles is considered in the follow-
ing ways:
• The five phases of cycles (pre-birth, mastering, diffusion, stable develop-
ment, and aging - change of the next cycle).
• The kinds of cycles - scientific, invention, innovation, and technological
cycles in certain succession.
• The depth of revolutionary leaps, changes of generations of technology,
scientific-technological directions, and scientific-technological revolutions,
when transitions to new technological principles embrace leading branches
of industry.
Now a transition to new generations of technology is being carried out
nearly once every 8-10 years; to new directions, once every 40-50 years. The life
cycle is longer - 15-20 and 70-90 years.
Historically, nearly 17 comprehensive upheavals in the technical basis of
society and 7 revolutions in science have been observed. I regard the contem-
porary upheaval as the second scientific-technological revolution. The third
revolution may be expected between 2010-2020.
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Every revolution has its own structure. In the structure of the second
scientific-technological revolution, one may single out a nucleus (microelectron-
ics, biotechnology, and informatics); a radical transformation of production tech-
nology (complex flexible automation of production, new, highly effective techno-
logies, new generations of materials, mastering of nontraditional energy sources,
new kinds of transportation and communication, industrial mastering of outer
space and the ocean); a qualitative leap in the service sphere (medicine, educa-
tion, science, personal consumption); and a new military-technical revolution.
The modern scientific-technological revolution begins in a number of
developed countries, fully prepared to accept it, then it spreads from the epi-
center embracing more and more countries. The countries formerly lagging
behind may skip several stages in their technological development, on the basis
of international division and cooperation of labor in this particular field.
The consequences of scientific-technological revolutions are a leaplike
increase of labor productivity, a sharp renovation and considerable expansion of
the assortment of the goods produced, solutions to ecological crises, and
affordable machinery.
But a revolutionary upheaval engenders new contradictions - a reduced
demand for man power, a growth in unemployment in developed capitalist coun-
tries, and the creation of new weapons of mass destruction.
Scientific-technological cycles are interconnected with the educational
cycles. The structure of educational cycles includes:
• Changes from generation to generation in terms of knowledge, skills, and
qualification levels, as well as by forms of labor organization.
• Periodical revolutions in education, which are accompanied by qualitative
leaps in content and technical methods of teaching and in the organiza-
tional forms of education.
Changes between generations are likely to occur every 30 to 40 years.
Revolutions in education occur less often than upheavals in technology and are
connected with scientific revolutions.
The peculiar features of the current revolution in education (the seventh in
the history of mankind) are the restructuring of comprehensive and professional
education as applied to the structure of modern scientific-technological revolu-
tion; the introduction of active methods and effective technical means of teaching
on the basis of computer instruction, videotechnology, and TV; and the creation
of the system of unbroken education, systematic reviewing, and increasing
knowledge throughout the period of active labor performance of man.
It is necessary to elaborate the effective mechanism of planned use of
scientific-technological and educational cycles. In the USSR this mechanism
includes a transition to the through-planning of the scientific-technological pro-
gress on the basis of economic methods and reconstruction of the system of per-
sonnel training and retraining.
The essence of through-planning of scientific and technological progress is a
strategic breakthrough on the basis of mastering and diffusing new highly
efficient generations of technology. The through-planning embraces all levels of
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management: national economy, branch, territorial, and enterprise level. It is
necessary to combine state orders with business contracts, financial and credit
advantages, differentiated flexible prices, and economic incentives for the enter-
prises.
Various forms of integrating research and production spheres are being
developed: inter-branch scientific-technological complexes, temporary creative
teams, scientific-industrial associations, and engineering centers.
The reconstruction of an educational system includes the reform of the
comprehensive school and vocational training, profound restructuring of higher
and secondary education, and qualification improvement. Conditions are pro-
vided to activate the human factor of the scientific-technological progress; tech-
nical creativity is encouraged on a wide scale.
Scientific-technological and educational revolutions are by nature global.
Even greater now are the possibilities of international cooperation in research
and development for implementing global scientific and technological programs
and for assisting developing countries to master the new technologies to carry
out the educational revolution.
It is advisable to unite the efforts of scientists from different countries to
study the regularities of the scientific, technological, and educational develop-
ment, to organize forms of production and management, and to elaborate
effective methods of implementing these regularities.

CHAPTER 14
Long-Term Movement of the ,Economy:
Terminology and Theoretical Options
J.-L. Escudier
14.1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, analysis of possible long move-
ments in the economy has resulted in a large volume of literature written by
economists but also - more recently - by certain historians. However, from one
author to another the words used differ according to the language used (which is
increasingly not the mother tongue of the writers); the doctrinal and theoretical
references also differ, in relation to a frequent lack of lexical and conceptual
rigor, features that characterize the economic discipline of analysis of long
swings. The same words, or the same expressions, are sometimes used to define
different concepts and, conversely, a single concept may be defined by several
expressions that the author considers to be synonymous. The use of different
languages and translations obviously accentuates these disparities and tends to
imbue this field of research with a "soft focus" effect. Thus, certain American
economists tend to use the term "long cycle" for economic movements that are
shorter than the long movement and closer to Kuznets's "secondary move-
ments," Arthur Burns's "trend cycle," or Walter Isard's "transport building"
cycle. Confusion with regard to terms increases when American economists fre-
quently refer to the cycle revealed by Juglar as the "major cycle" and that Kon-
dratieff himself sometimes used the same expression for his long cycles.
Questioning the opportuneness of favoring a particular expression to sup-
port a theory is comparatively rare, as most economists do not refer to the intel-
lectual process that led them to using one expression rather than another. When
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a single expression is used, has it been chosen with reference to the author's
theoretical options or is it the result of a desire to be understood by the whole of
the scientific community that is likely to approach this discipline? When several
expressions are used in the same text to describe and analyze the process of the
long movement in economics, can it be concluded that the author considers them
to be equivalent and that he has chosen the solution of "not sticking to the
words" in order to devote himself more thoroughly to the study of the
phenomenon?
Attempting to analyze the denominations used by different authors to qual-
ify the concept of the long movement immediately brings up the problem of
choice of the expression to be used throughout this paper. By definition there is
no "neutral" expression that would bear neither a positive nor a negative conno-
tation; choice is all the more delicate because there is an impressively long list of
expressions. Being aware of this difficulty but wishing to overcome it, I have
opted for the expression "long movement of the economy" ["mouvement long de
l'tkonomie"], which does not seem to have been the subject of much debate,
perhaps because generally it is not translated literally. Such a choice is purely
contingent to the argument and is not the affirmation of any theoretical option
whatsoever.
I try first to show the emergence of the ambiguities to which economic
analysis of long cycles leads. An attempt is then made to provide a more
coherent framework for the expressions used in the study of long cycles, and the
suitability of the name "cycle" for long movements of the economy is discussed.
14.2. Confusion and Dispersion of Economic Thinking
With Regard to the Long Cycle
Pre-Kondriatieff analysis of long-term movements of the economy can be
described as embryonic insofar as discussion was more intuitive than theoretical
or statistical. In 1896, Parvus wrote in terms of "long waves with expansive ten-
dency" and "long waves of economic depression,"[I] and in 1913 Van Gelderen
referred to the two phases of the long wave as "flux" and "reflux." [2] There was
more concern with describing the two phases of expansion and depression than
the movement as a whole. Designations of the long movement remained evasive.
In this context, Kondratieff's contribution was considerable from both the
methodological and theoretical points of view.
14.2.1. The beginnings of incomprehension:
The controversy concerning Kondratieff
No doubt a number of the present inaccuracies and points of incomprehension or
disagreement concerning suitable terminology for describing the long movement
already existed when Kondratieff was writing. It also seems obvious that the
thinking - perhaps insufficiently expressed on this point - of the man who was to
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be posthumously consecrated as the pioneer in this field of investigation was sub-
jected to semantic slide at the mercy of translators.
The conflicts between Kondratieff and other writers is therefore examined
before discussion of the inherent difficulty in problems of translation. Finally, an
attempt is made to explain the terminology chosen by Kondratieff.
The Controversy Concerning Kondratieff
We shall not reanalyze the controversies between Kondratieff and Soviet
economists concerning the causes of long economic movements. Several authors
such as George Garvy have discussed the theories of Oparin, Gerstein, and Trot-
sky.[3] We are concerned here with the role terminology played in these quar-
rels.
Trotsky was perhaps the most energetic critic of the expressions used by
Kondratieff, refuting the latter's use of the expression "long cycles" by analogy
with "short cycles." Trotsky saw in this a uniquely formal analogy insofar as the
periodic repetition of short cycles is conditioned by the internal dynamics of cap-
italism, but
As for those large phases of the trend of the capitalist evolution (of 50 years)
for which Professor Kondratieff'incautiously suggests use of the term "cycles,"
we must stress that their character and duration are determined not by the
internal dynamics of the capitalist economy but by the external conditions
which constitute the framework of capitalist evolution.[4]
Ernest Mandel took up this polemic to back Trotsky's position:
When Trotsky correctly rejected Kondratieff's use of the term "long-term
cycle" in analogy with the normal industrial cycle, it was essentially because
the sudden upward turning points of the long waves cannot be explained pri-
marily by internal economic causes. For that same reason, there can be no
mechanical symmetry between the length of the industrial cycle and the
length of the long wave.[5]
As Kondriateff's theoretical positions were criticized by most orthodox Soviet
economists, particular attention should be paid to the support that he received
from one of his contemporaries, W. E. Motyleff, on the highly controversial point
of whether long movements are cyclic or not: "If there are Marxists who deny
the cyclical character of the long cycles, this can only be imputed to their
insufficiently profound analysis of the evolution of the capitalist society during
the 19th century." [61
Did Kondratieff's Thinking Suffer From a Perverse Effect of the Translations?
Kondratieff's thinking was very rapidly deformed by translations from the first
distribution of his work. For example, one of his articles illustrates the way in
which the changing of terms led to a conceptual shift.
242 life Crcle. and LoI1f Waue.
In the spring of 1925, Kondratieff published an article that he entitled "Bol'
schije cycly Konjonktury" in the collection of the Conjuncture Institute in Mos-
cow. In 1926 this article was translated into German and entitled "Die languen
Wellen der Konjunktur."[7j The term cycle used unambiguously by Kondratieff
had already been replaced by the term waves. In 1935, The Review of Economic
Statistics decided to publish a summary of this paper by Kondratieff and the edi-
torial committee entrusted the work of translation to W.F. Stolper. It is obvious
that the translation and the summary were derived from the German version
and not from the original in Russian. Stolper or the editors of the journal took
the liberty of entitling the translation "The Long Waves in Economic Life" [8j
whereas a literal translation would have been "The Long Cycles of the Conjunc-
ture." However, this summary-translation of one of Kondratieff's most famous
papers was very widely distributed in the United States and in the world
scientific community. In 1950 it was even incorporated in one of the American
Economic Association publications Readings in Business Cycle Theory.[9j
The confusion - if such confusion exists - between the terms "cycles" and
"waves" with regard to Kondratieff's article still exists today. In 1979, the Fer-
nand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civili-
zations published the whole of Kondratieff's article under the same title, using
the chapters translated by Stolper in 1935 and translating the chapters that had
been summarized at the time.[10j An Italian translation was published in a book
in 1981 and entitled Le onde lunghe della congiuntura.[llj Within this context,
Patrick Verley's greater rigor should be acknowledged since in 1981 he published
several translations of extracts of Kondratieff's work, and entitled the 1925 arti-
cle "Les grands cycle de la conjoncture." [12j
Inaccuracies, first in the German translation and then in the English trans-
lation, are all the more regrettable since the scientific community will, hen-
ceforth, refer in a general manner to these translations and not to the text pub-
lished in Russian.
Inadequate Lexical Accuracy
In the famous article of 1943 in which he relates the controversies between Kon-
dratieff and orthodox Russian authors, G. Garvy stressed that Kondratieff
always used the expression "long cycles" and not "long waves." [13j In contrast,
Pierre Dockes and Bernard Rosier affirmed that "Kondratieff himself stressed
the idea of 'movement' or 'waves' and refused the term 'cycle'."[14J Ernest Man-
del adopted an intermediary position, considering that the terminology used by
Kondratieff evolved over the years: "Probably under the influence of criticism by
Trotsky and other Russian Marxists, in 1926 Kondratieff replaced the concept of
"long cycles" by that of "long waves."[15j However, Mandel was quick to add
that "in the light of their contents, his 'waves' are identical to the 'cycles'." [16J
This statement is clear at the least and, from Mandel's point of view, such as to
reject Kondratieff's analysis.
These quotations alone express the measure of the difficulty in reaching an
agreement today on the meaning of Kondratieff's work and even on the terminol-
ogy that he used.
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A process 0/ fluctuation 0/ each economic variable. Probably sensitive to the cri-
ticisms made concerning the cyclic nature of long movements, in 1925 Kondra-
tieff attempted to determine what he meant by "wave-like" or "fluctuating"
processes:
By "wave-like" or "fluctuating" processes are meant processes of variation
which are changing their direction in the course of time and are subject to
repetition and reversion. Such are changes in prices, in the rate of interest, in
the percentage of unemployed. These elements are subject to change in vari-
ous directions. Considered as continuous, the processes of change may be
represented by curves whose directions and slopes vary, exhibiting a series of
recurring maxima and minima. None of the points of these curves is identical
with any other, since it represents a different moment of time and a different
combination of economic factors in productioD, distribution, etc. Hence the
statement that the process is subject to reversioD and repetition is not to be
applied in an absolute sense, but is to be used only to distinguish this class of
change from the other, which admits of no repetition or reversion.
The conceptions of reversible and non-reversible processes, as well as
those of statics and dynamics, belong, strictly speaking, to the domain of
natural science in the narrower sense of the word, such as physics, chemistry,
and biology; and their importance in those sciences is very great. But if the
necessary caution is exercised in making use of the conceptions in economics,
there would appear to be no obstacles to their application in this field as well;
and the use of the conceptions of reversible and non-reversible processes in
economics may be looked upon as an application of a general idea to a specific
class of cases.[17]
These "wave-like processes" to which Kondratieff refers are often not con-
sidered by him to be cyclic since reversible processes are either regular or irregu-
lar: only the first are cyclic. Kondratieff sometimes used the expression "wave-
like movements." He developed the idea in which he went from a "wave-like
movement" to a "long cycle." In "The Long Wave in Economic Life" he wrote:
"The long cycles appear as a wave-like movement about the average level." [18]
It could be argued from such a definition that the definitions used by Kondratieff
were not semantically based. Indeed, he first referred to "fluctuating" or "wave-
like" as a process that was not necessarily cyclic, and then defined the long cycle
in a way that came down to reusing a characteristic of fluctuating phenomena:
movement around a level or a mean point.
Long waves constituting a long cycle. In 1925, Kondratieff used the expression
"major cycles" to refer to the long movement that later bore his name.[19] His
use of such an expression could only stimulate terminological confusion, since the
Americans already used the term "major cycles" to refer to 7-to-ll-year cycles.
However, this label also implies a hierarchy of cycles going beyond their respec-
tive durations: whatever it is, the major cycle is the one that accounts for
and/or has more importance than minor cycles. Thus, very logically, since their
analyses of cyclic phenomena are different, Mitchell, on the one hand, and Kon-
dratieff, on the other, do not place the major cycle at the same level. It clearly
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appears that Kondratieff preferred the expression "long cycles" to "major
cycles." Nevertheless, this double denomination did not lead to any ambiguity in
the interpretation of Kondratieff's thinking.
In contrast, simultaneous use of the expressions "long cycle" and "long
waves" or "undulating movement" [in German "Wellenbewegungen"J is not such
as to render Kondratieff's thinking in the clearest way possible. Close imbrica-
tion of waves and cycles occurs frequently in his work, particularly when he con-
siders that "the objection to the regular cyclical character of the long waves,
therefore, seems to us to be unconvincing." [20J One has the feeling that Kondra-
tieff preferred to use the expression "long waves" when he described movement
of the different economic variables taken individually or as a whole. However, he
reserved the term "long cycle" for his interpretation of these movements. In
fact, this distribution between the time of observation and the time of analysis
often appears in Kondratieff's work.
14.2.2. The period of lexical anarchy
After the intellectual and physical elimination of Kondratieff, his work began to
be very widely distributed from 1935 onward with the publication in The Review
0/ Economic Statistics of a summary of one of his major articles.
Thus, from 1930 onward, two attitudes can be detected in the analysis of
long movements, depending on whether the authors were acquainted with
Kondratieff's work or not. After World War II, Kondratieff's articles were the
subject of exegeses in the best universities. However, the terminology used by
supporters of the various schools to qualify long movements in economics did not
become any more accurate - quite the opposite.
The Isolation 0/ French Economists
Kondratieff's work was not only a posthumous discovery of the American
scientific community. In February 1925, he published an article in The Quar-
terly Journal 0/ Economics describing the work of the Institute of Conjuncture in
Moscow, and in August 1925 the same journal published one of his articles enti-
tled The Static and the Dynamic View 0/ Economics.[21] In 1929, Jan Tinber-
gen referred to Kondratieff's work in an article published in Dutch.[22] In 1933,
Leon Dupriez quoted Kondratieff's 1926 article.[23]
In spite of this, in the 1930s the majority of French economists was totally
unaware of the work of Kondratieff. Neither Simiand [24] nor Lescure [25]
referred to Kondratieff's work or, hence, to the terminology that he used. Simi-
and described long movements in economy as "long phase economic fluctuations"
["fluctuations economiques a longue periode"]. He was the first to call upward
and downward phases "phase A" and "phase B." After the World War II,
numerous authors talked in terms of phase or period A and B of the Kondratieff,
thus associating two economists who knew nothing of each other's work. Lescure
moved even further from the notion of "long cycle" since he did not talk in terms
of long movement but only of its two components that he called the "long up-
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swing" ["periode longue d'essor"] and the "downswing period" ["periode de
depression"]. This procedure was the same as that used by pre-Kondratieff
economists. There are also no references to Kondratieff in Albert Aftalion [26] or
in Louis Baudinj these authors used the expression "long duration movements"
["mouvements de longue duree"], which Baudin separated explicitly from cycles
since "long duration price movements cannot be considered as obeying a
law." [27] The same silence is observed in Bertrand Nogaro and Charles Rist,
although it is true that they are much more circumspect with regard to
hypotheses of long movements of the economy. No doubt some economists fully
acquainted with the work of Joseph Schumpeter heard of Kondratieff's publica-
tions through the writings of the Austrian scholar. We have no hesitation in
placing Francois Perroux and G. Bousquet in this category, although they were
occupied with other fields of research.
In this context, which shows the relative isolation suffered by analysis of
long movements in France during the inter-war period, Robert Marjolin figures
as a precursor among French economists for several reasons. In 1938, in an arti-
cle for an American journal, he presented the work of Francois Simiand and
referred to Kondratieff. [28] In his thesis, published in 1941, Marjolin gave the
first analysis of the work of Kondratieff to be published by a French econo-
mist.[29] In this work he did not use the expression "Ie Kondratieff" that
Schumpeter had invented several years before but remained faithful to the
expression "long duration movements." However, Marjolin's terminology
evolved rapidly since in the same year he published an article in which he used
only the term "long cycle." [30]
It was only after World War II that references to Kondratieff appeared in
French economics textbooks, in particular under the influence of Henri Guitton
who mentioned Kondratieff's work in his Fluctuations Economiques in 1951 and
in his contribution to the Traiti d'Economie Politique edited by Louis Baudin in
1953. It was Henri Guitton who wrote the article on the Kondratieff cycle in the
Dictionnaire des Sciences Economiques edited by Jean Romeuf and published in
1956.
Schumpeter's Skill
When in the 1930s Schumpeter took up analysis of long-term movement of the
economy, he obviously found himself faced with the difficulties that Kondratieff,
Van Gelderen, and a number of others had faced before him in qualifying a pro-
cess whose complexity turned any denomination into a simplification or a fallacy.
He was thus skillful enough to use an expression that turned out to be easily
accepted by the media.
Historical knowledge of what actually happened at any time in the industrial
organism, and of the way in which it happened, reveals first the existence of
what is often referred to as the "Long Wave" of a period of between 54 and 60
years. Occasionally recognized and even measured before, especially by
Spiethoff, it has been worked out in more detail by Kondratieff, and may
therefore be called the Kondratieff Cycle.[31]
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Thus, the "Kondratieff" cycle was born and Schumpeter concentrated on
defining the framework within which he would use it:
The term Kondratieff Cycle is for us but a name for a certain set of facts (a
certain long-time behavior of the price level, the interest rate, employment,
and so on), none of which is open to doubt. It is true that the term also
implies an interpretation to the effect that this behavior of our series is amen-
able to interpretation on the same lines as their behavior in shorter cycles.[32]
However, it is explained below that the expression "Kondratieff cycle," or "Kon-
dratieff" alone as is sometimes used by Schumpeter in Business Cycles, has been
considerably misused since its invention.
Once he had decided to name the long movement in economics after one of
the first to study it, Schumpeter did not worry about whether it was a long cycle,
long waves, or oscillation phenomena. He frequently used the expression "long
waves" but sometimes talked in terms of "cyclic process." He also used - but
more rarely - the expression "long swbg of the Kondratieff" [33] and makes at
least one sacrifice to lyricism with "the long and gentle sweep of the Kondra-
tieff." [34] Regarding the period from 1782 to 1842, Schumpeter declared that,
"Those years ... cover what according to our tentative schema - it is very ten-
tative - we call a Long Cycle or a Kondratieff." He adds immediately that, "We
have seen reasons to believe that this long wave was not the first of its kind." [35]
Should it be considered that in Schumpeter as in Kondratieff there is a
division between the long wave that would be derived from the observed
phenomenon and the long cycle that would correspond to a name resulting from
the analytical procedure applied to this observation by the author? We do not
think so, precisely because use of the term Kondratieff "released" Schumpeter
from these preoccupations.
Whereas Schumpeter - as we have seen - was ready to use the expression
"long cycle" and since his explicit reference to Kondratieff might bring him
closer to the term, these theoretical options appear to us to be more appropriate
to the expression "long waves" insofar as the innovation process that he
describes appears to be largely exogenous in relation to overall economic move-
ment. His very definition of the Kondratieff cycle seems to be marked with this
trend. It could also be added that all the neo-Schumpeterians have adopted the
term "long waves."
The "Kondratieff" After Schumpeter
The expression "Kondratieff" used incidentally by most authors since Schum-
peter adopted the term appears to us to be as ambiguous as the expression "long
waves." Talking in terms of just the "Kondratieff" avoids saying whether one
considers that there is a cycle, wave, or turbulence during the long period. To
talk of the "Kondratieff" also avoids facing the always delicate problems of
translation. However, doing this means using what is perhaps the most ambigu-
ous and hazy expression.
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Some authors have profited from the indeterminant character of the term
and have chosen it as a neutral expression. It is surprising to note that Gaston
Imbert used this procedure in his very serious work of synthesis. Admitting that
he was frequently faced with lack of precision in the terminology used since the
beginning of this field of research, he noted in his introduction that "It is neces-
sary to avoid any confusion by using terminology which is free of any ambi-
guity." For him,
the term "Kondratieff" that we use to designate the 1733-1743 through
1787-1789 movement does not contain in itself any hypotheses with regard to
the nature of the movement. It signifies only a long duration movement. It is
a simple question of facility of terminology which leads us, concerning
1733-1743 onwards with the increase in the capitalist price trend, to talk in
terms of Kondratieff' movement 1, 2, etc., without making prior judgment
concerning their nature and simply to indicate long movements.[37]
It appears to us that a neutral expression is difficult to personalize, particu-
larly when this expression must be unique so as not to leave as subjacent a
debate that one claims to clarify. Gaston Imbert specifies that
In order to avoid any a priori judgment on the nature of this movement, we
shall avoid the terms "long cycles" and "long waves" used by Schumpeter and
Kondratieff'. We shall use the expressions "long duration movement"
["mouvement de long duree"], "long movement" ["mouvement long"], and
"Kondratieff' movement" ["mouvement Kondratieff"] and we shall talk of
"long upward movement" ["hausse the longue duree"], "long downward move-
ment" ["baisse de longue duree"], "hausse longue," and "baisse longue." [38]
It could be added that it is out of place to talk in terms of "Kondratieff move-
ment" when the latter described the phenomena that he revealed as being cycles
or waves.
Indeed, the most logical reasoning would require use of the expression "the
Kondratieff" to be made by authors who are descendants of Kondratieff, that is,
by those who consider that the movement of investments in infrastructures - or
at least productive investment in general - is the main axis around which the
long movement of the economy revolves. If one does not claim as mich rigor as
above (so as not to be accused of rigorism), and if one integrates the evolution of
economic thinking, it can be accepted that talking in terms of "the Kondratieff"
means making a reference to the theoretical opinions of the person who popular-
ized the expression, Le., Schumpeter. But this is not so. The expression is cer-
tainly found in the work of the neo-Schumpeterians but has also been used by
monetary theorists like Leon Dupriez ("Le Kondratieff a. partir de 1974") and by
Marxists like Louis Fontvieille.
If one continues a little on scope that the expression "Kondratieff" should
have, it seems obvious that it is a long cycle and not long waves. There are two
reasons for this. Firstly, as has already been mentioned, Kondratieff preferred to
call the long movement that he analyzed a "long cycle." Secondly, Schumpeter
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referred to the long movement as a "Kondratieff" by analogy with the "Kitchin"
and the "Juglar," which nobody - particularly Schumpeter - would deny are
"cycles."
Schumpeter's cleverness in naming long movements "Kondratieff's," thus
providing a loophole, served as an example concerning movements lasting 20 to
25 years and revealed mainly in the United States. O'Leary and Lewis con-
sidered that
It is convenient to have a name to distinguish a secular swing from the other
cycles in economic activity. Following the precedent of naming each cycle
after the person who first focused attention upon it ... we suggest calling this
the "Kuznets" cycle, hoping that Professor Kuznets will not take amiss this
tribute to his pioneering work.[39]
However, the "Kuznets," which was named with reference to the personalization
procedure generated by the "Kondratieff" and which is frequently compared
with, if not opposed to, the latter has the same problems of interpretation, as is
shown by this desire for clarification expressed by Moses Abramovitz:
W.A. Lewis has suggested that we recognize this long record of work by refer-
ring to the 15-25 year general waves in economic changes as Kunets cycles,
and I propose to accept this suggestion with the understanding that the use of
the term "cycles" is not meant to prejudge the question whether these waves
are significantly self-generating, a matter about which Kuznets is dubious and
which the present writer regards as unsettled. Following Kuznets' own prac-
tice in recent writings, it may be better to substitute "swings" or "waves" for
"cycles." [40]
14:.3. Long-Term Movement Terminology in
Contemporary Economic Thinking
Although terminological inaccuracy concerning the study of long movements in
economics forms part of the history of economic thinking, it is even more marked
today insofar as the increased amount of work in the field operates using
numerous theoretical procedures. A critical presentation of the terminology is
followed by discussion of the theoretical validity of the term "long cycle."
14.3.1. Different expressions in different languages
We attempted to determine whether theoretical logic prevailed in the use of four
expressions in the terminology specific to the analysis of long movement in
economics. It appears that the expressions concerned are governed to a consider-
able extent by the author's language, and to date the use of one term rather than
another is not for reasons of methodological or theoretical clarification.
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English-speakers seem to have clearly established a distinction between "long
waves" and "long swings"; "long waves" is a fairly general term for the concept
that the French describe as "mouvement de longue duree," "mouvement long de
l'economie," or "fluctuations de longue duree." For English-speakers, talking in
terms of "long swings" means placing oneself outside the field of investigation
and above all outside the hypotheses of accepting a movement with an average
length of 50 years. However, the term "swing" is widely used by English-
speaking writers when they wish to refer to the theories of Kuznets and Burns.
Thus, an author like S. Solomou, for whom the reality of the long movement is
not obvious and who considers "that Kuznets swings are a much more general-
ized growth pattern than previously thought," [41] is at odds with those who use
the expression "Kuznets swings" with "Kondratieff waves."
This distinction appears to be less well established for German and French
economists. Thus, Thomas Kuczinski, referring to a passage in Book III of Das
Capital in which Marx may have suggested the problematics of the long move-
ment of the economy, translated "sehr lange Zeitraiime sich erstreckender
Schwingungen" by "fluctuations extending over very long periods" and deduced
that Marx was talking about "long waves." [43] However, "Schwingungen"
means "oscillation" and the suitable term in English would be "long swing." [44]
Likewise, French-speaking economists now rarely use the expressions
"oscillation longue" or "oscillation de longue duree," which would be literal
translations of "long swing." The reason for this attitude is probably that the
cycle shown by Kuznets for the United States does not seem to be established for
European economies. There is quite a clear reference in fairly old work by
Dupriez:
We have intentionally used here the expression "long movements" rather than
"long swing." Indeed, interpretation is more neutral and does not make an a
priori judgment concerning the character of the movement.... It should be
accepted that historical experience is still too short to enable a final judgment
to be made ... , if the movement really is a swing, it now concerns exactly
three cycles; if it is not a swing there have been five or six known inversions.
It will be agreed that this is a fragile basis for generalization, particularly
without the backing of logical arguments, using certain statistical regulari-
ties. [45]
Subsequently, Dupriez used the expression "Ie Kondratieff" much more fre-
quently without any further details.
When talking of "swings" to describe the long movement it should be
understood that there is a central point or "pivot" at the source of the move-
ment. What could this central point be in a process integrated in the broader
framework of the secular trend and which, in essence, undergoes continuous
transformation (transformations of salary relations, technological conditions,
socially necessary requirements, qualification, organic composition of capital,
etc.)?
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A French Expression: Fluctuations Longues [Long Fluctuations]
The expression "fluctuations longues" or "fluctuations de longue duree" is often
used by French-speaking authors but is rarely translated into English and even
more rarely used by English-speaking authors. The very fact that it is widely
used results in its appearing to have no particular connotation; it does not refer
to any precise option in French economic thinking. However, etymologically the
word "fluctuations" refers more to the irregularity of a movement than to its
periodicity.
Some authors consider that fluctuations may contain the long cycle; this
can be seen already in Kondratieff if it is allowed that "long wave" is the transla-
tion of "fluctuations longues" and also in the work of several contemporary
authors such as Louis Fontvieille, who discusses long cycles in an article entitled
"Fluctuations longues et rapports de production." [46)
"Long waves": An International Expression
The expression "long waves" is very dominant in the literature in English and
perhaps even more so in English translations of French, Dutch, Italian, and Ger-
man articles. The expression "long waves" is used extremely frequently because
it is convenient. The framework of one's research is situated by the international
scientific community with no apparent difficulty when one refers to "long
waves"; economists who have not concentrated specifically on this discipline
place others easily (perhaps too easily) with Kondratieff and Schumpeter when
they hear or read this expression. More than the term "Kondratieff," the expres-
sion "long waves" also appears to be the largest common denominator for
researchers of different schools and different nationalities to be able to communi-
cate with each other in this discipline without directly encountering
incomprehension or risking rejection. It can be seen that the meaning of this
expression has been considerably devalued and that this semantic inaccuracy
appears to indicate theoretical inaccuracies.
J. Tinbergen is one of the rare authors to have tried to define a framework
for the use of the term "waves" for the description of long movements. For Tin-
bergen,
The alternation of rising and declining movements can be regarded as waves,
meaning that successive phases are connected by a causal mechanism or a log-
ical interrelationship. Those who adhere to this interpretation prefer to speak
of "waves" or more precisely "long waves," because the existence of two or
three shorter cycles has been established, including the scrcalled business
cycle, also called a "Juglar" after the French economist who discovered it.
Those who are not yet convinced of the existence of a causal relationship
between the various phases are inclined to avoid the use of the term "waves,"
and prefer to speak instead of "scrcalled long waves." [47]
This attempt at clarification does not seem satisfactory for several reasons.
Firstly, Tinbergen does not adopt a definite position on the term "Kondratieff
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cycles," which he nevertheless uses in the title of his article. Secondly, he sug-
gests that a distinction should be drawn between the expression "long waves,"
which is effectively much-used, and the term "so-called long waves," which is
hardly ever found in the literature on long movements. Finally, and most impor-
tant, he considers that the defenders of an interpretation based on a "causal
mechanism" or logical interrelation prefer to use the expression "long waves."
However, many authors plainly use the term "long waves" to distinguish "long
cycles" from "Kondratieff."
For French-speakers, the term "long waves" can refer to two different con-
cepts depending on whether it is understood as "ondes longues" or "longues
vagues." The word "ondes" includes the idea of recurrence and not just that of
repetition, which is not the case with the word "vagues." In French at least, the
latter term describes a concept that leaves more room for the irregularity of the
phenomenon.
"Long cycle": A Forbidden Expression
After the polemic concerning Kondratieff's work, the debate on whether the long
movement was cyclic or not quieted somewhat, in particular because of the
popularization of the expression "the Kondratieff" by Schumpeter. The contro-
versy resumed in the 1950s. The method of someone like Henry Guitton is
revealing on this point:
The Kondratieff cycle is an intermediate being and as such is difficult to clas-
sify. Since it is called a cycle, it should be studied with the other cycles.
Nevertheless, since it is said to be long it is generally discussed with growth
phenomena. Is it a conjunctural event or a structural feature? Is it caused
from inside (endogenous) or from outside (exogenous)? ... It is true that one
should be certain of the existence of this long cycle before answering these
questions. [48]
However, these questions received less attention since, during the years of great
prosperity, the problems of the long movement were not topical. In recent years,
the expression "long cycle" has been used in passing by numerous authors, but
there has rarely been exclusive use of the term. In addition, it appears that there
is no significant link between the use of this expression and a theoretical pro-
cedure centered on a cyclic analysis of the long movement of the economy.
Ernesto Screpenti, who made several attempts at modeling long movements
of the economy, is one of the few authors to make systematic and exclusive use of
the expression "long cycle" ["cycli lunghi"] in Italian. Screpenti is, nevertheless,
far from having a deterministic view of the long cycle, as is expressed clearly in
his own words:
My personal view is that it is neither possible nor reasonable to explain deter-
ministically Kondratieff cycle periodicity on the ground of a unique, regular
and general process. This is a phenomenon in which random shocks may play
a major role.... The 50-60 year, quasi-regular periodicity that does appear
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to have occurred in the four Kondratieff cycles historically observed may well
be the consequence of a fortunate synergy of some different phenomena.[49]
It can even be considered that such a theoretical position would be more likely to
refute the long-cycle notion. Insofar as one considers that periodicity is random,
it becomes difficult to accept the endogenous nature of the process. However, it
appears to us that periodicity and endogeneity are necessary for it to be possible
to call an economic movement a "cycle." Thus the expressions "long waves" or,
better still, "long-term movements" would be better suited to Screpenti's
theoretical position.
One might also express astonishment at the position of Angelo Reati who,
although close to Mandel's theories, uses the expression "long cycles" while men-
tioning that "the defenders of this theory prefer to talk in terms of long waves to
show clearly that it is not a phenomenon which recurs automatically as the word
'cycle' would suggest." Reati added to the confusion when he specified that "the
expression 'long cycles' used here is therefore equivalent to long waves."
In contrast, certain authors whose theoretical options could lead to use of
the term "long cycle" do not use it, preferring the equivocal expression "long
waves." One sometimes has the feeling that, faced with accusations of "deter-
minism" and "mechanistic analysis" from their detractors, certain authors prefer
to censor their own work rather than deepen their terminological choices in the
light of their theoretical options. Thus, not so long ago, Bernard Rosier and
Pierre Dockes wrote the following:
As for the designation of long rhythm, recognizing its cyclic character does
not appear to us to be synonymous with proposing a mechanistic analysis.
On the contrary I we shall see that the inversion of the long conjuncture is
always problematic. We therefore retain the clearer term of long cycles.[51]
Since taking this position, which appeared to us to be judicious, Dockes and
Rosier chose to stop using the term "cycle long" and henceforth used "rythme
long," which nevertheless implies just as much as "cycle" the repetitive nature of
the long movement.[52J
14.3.2. Can the term "cycle" be used to describe the long movement of
the economy?
Today, the term "long cycle" is still the most criticized of the expressions used to
define the long movement of the economy. It is true that the period of large-
scale polemic on the theme is over, but the few adepts of the expression are still
subjected to comments or even calls to order from detractors of the long cycle.
Renewed activity in research on the long movement of the economy has,
nevertheless, far from resulted in clarification of terminology use. We shall
therefore attempt to determine the reasons for the acceptance or refusal of the
expression "long cycle" before proposing a semantic and theoretical framework
for the long cycle of the economy.
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Given the context of semantic imprecision that characterizes the discipline, it is
understandable that the authors who keep away from the "long cycle" label do
not do this in the name of similar semantic analysis and theoretical procedure.
Gaston Imbert gave an extremely restrictive definition of the term
"cyclique," which led him to refuse the attribution of this term to all fluctuations
in economic activity:
The regularity of a movement in space is expressed by the term "cyclic." In
this case, as in a swing movement, fluctuation runs through the same or
nearby points. The movement closes in on itself and thus has the geometrical
appearance of circle, the etymological source of the word "cycle." [53J
Imbert bases his argument on the fact (which remains to be demonstrated) that
"the more fundamental the movement, the more real evolution closely follows the
positions of equilibrium; amplitude and shifts become relatively smaller for long
movements than for economic cycles," [54] and he deduced that
within this narrow limit of long-term shifts it is not possible to talk in terms
of long duration movements since even in the most perfect case of fluctuation
around an equilibrium level through nearby zones, the circle does not appear
to us to be a satisfactory geometrical representation. The idea of duration
must be reintroduced, resulting in a spiral image.[55J
Imbert follows his argument through to the end and finishes as follows: "We are
thus led to rejecting the spatial image of "cyclical" fluctuations in favor of a
'spiroidal shape'." This opinion is made all the more surprising by the fact that
Imbert describes the cycle demonstrated by Juglar as an "economic cycle"
throughout his book.
Meanwhile, Jean-Claude Asselain wrote:
The cyclic representation of price movements has the disadvantage of wrongly
suggesting symmetry between rise and fall phases and of ignoring the specific
nature of industrial prices; for the latter, there was a dominant downward
trend throughout the 19th century. . .. The regularity of alternance cannot
in any case be attested with as much certitude as for the Juglar cycle. In
addition, before being able to affirm the existence of the cycle in the strict
sense of the term, it is necessary to demonstrate the mechanisms of cyclic
return: this leads back to the problem of explaining the long movement of
prices.
Reference to the so-called mechanistic or mechanical nature that could be
included in the notion of "long cycle" appeared in 1975 when Paul Hanappe won-
dered about the possible inversion of the long movement of the economy. It
should be noted that at the same time Hanappe used the term "Kondratieff" as a
neutral expression; he refuted the "long cycle" in favor of "long fluctuations":
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It is strange that the Kondratieff is felt to be a movement of a mechanical or
magic nature. Of all the large general economic movements, this effect
appears to be the one most closely related to the expression of the liberty of
men, the one whose occurrence results most directly from major confronta-
tions between social groups, in generation choices, in victories, in the great
strategic struggles whose range is neither episodic nor definitive. . . . The
Kondratieff thus appears as the mark of profound coherence at generation
scale and which derives from historical choices. [58]
This observation - which is in fact very general and likely to be accepted by the
majority - leads to Hanappe's conclusion:
As a result of this global nature of the Kondratieff and the non-determinist
character of the underlying options, the expression "long cycle" which is used
in connection with it is not very appropriate. Indeed, the word "cycle" sug-
gest recurrence and regularities of the type expressed in an econometric
model. . .. This type of "theoretical" approach is even less suited to the Kon-
dratieff than to other economic movements, and particularly shorter conjunc-
tural movements. The expression "fluctuations de longue periode" (long
fluctuations) is thus much more appropriate for all the phenomena con-
cerned.[59]
Alfred Kleinknecht's position is original insofar as he is one of the few
authors to consider explicitly as similar and equally erroneous the terms "long
waves" and "long cycles." He prefers to draw up a theory of long-term change in
trends in economic growth rather than attempting to build a new model of long
economic cycles. Kleinknecht thus specifies:
Conceivably it may be better in this connection to avoid the admittedly popu-
lar, but misleading, notion of "long waves" or "long cycles," and instead to
speak of "periods of accelerated or decelerated growth" (Mandel). Terms
synonymous to this could be Dupriez's "mouvements de fond" or Spiethoff's
"Wechsellagen." [60]
Curiously, Kleinknecht refers to an expression used by Mandel to define the two
phases of the long movement. However, far from rejecting the term "long
waves," since he generally described the long movement in this way, Mandel
very clearly contrasted the expressions "long waves" and "long cycles." In a
recent work, Kleinknecht develops a more traditional critique of the "long cycle":
No evidence has been given for the existence of Kondratieff long waves as true
cycles . . . a concept of long cycles can only attain credibility if long cycle
theorists develop convincing endogenous models of the long cycle - i.e., it has
to be demonstrated that A periods necessarily develop into B periods, and
vice versa.[61]
Robert Boyer's position is similar to Kleinknecht's even if the former
appears to keep away much more clearly than the latter from the problematics of
the long movement. To refute the "probIematique des ondes longues," Boyer put
forward an argument that has frequently been expressed since Kondratieff:
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AB much as the inversion from expansion to crisis is mainly endogenous,
recovery appears to be strongly dependent on the political, social and techno-
logical context, ... which tends to confirm the strong variability of the dura-
tion of the downward phases of the Kondratieff.[62]
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However, it is clear that many economists use the terms "ondes longues," "long
waves," or "ouvement long de l'economie," whereas they put forward exogenous
interpretations of this movement for both downward and upward reversals. This
intransigence is all the more astonishing since for the period from the
nineteenth-century Great Depression until today R. Boyer uses the same sequen-
tial chronology as most supporters of the long movement. His system of analysis
refers to long phases of expansion followed by crisis phases during which regula-
tion is thought not to function. Thus, one might consider that Boyer and Mis-
tral glimpse a form of long movement of the economy when they write that "the
current crisis ... shows that an original growth mode has reached its limits; its
successes since WorId War II have resulted mainly from a combination of accu-
mulation conditions (of the 'Fordist' type to put it in a nutshell) and a form of
overall regulation (of the 'administered type')." [63] It might be considered that
they glimpsed a form of long movement of the economy. However, this is not so
since they are quick to add that "the present crisis is not a transitory accident
and even less the downward phase of a Kondratieff cycle foreseeable long
ago." [64]
In the same work, these authors put long movement and determinism in
the same class: "everything indicates that the solution to present imbalances
does not result mechanically from previous economic determinism, unlike what is
implied for example by conceptions in terms of Kondratieff cycles." [65] How-
ever, we feel that there is no more determinism in Kondratieff's procedure than
in the very notion of economic cycle, whatever its length.
A Semantic and Theoretical Framework for the Long Economic Cycle
No movement in economics can lead to a return to its initial position for the sin-
gle reason that duration is in itself a variable that is liable to modify economic
relations. Even if growth is excluded, no identical reproduction can occur in
economics since the time that passes modifies the variables. Thus, in the strict
sense there should be no cyclic phenomena in economics. However, this is a lim-
iting view that would deny the use in the social science and the humanities of
terms that have been forged etymologically and conceptually in astronomy, phy-
sics, or biology. In fact, why should one require that an economic cycle should
meet the conditions of an astronomical cycle? Use of the term "cycle" occurred
by analogy and not by similitude. In addition, biological, climatic, or chemical
cycles do not lead back to the initial position either. Why not accept, like H.
Guitton, that although a "cycle" is etymologically a closed movement that would
ensure a return to the precise point of departure, a cycle with growth would be
an open cycle. [66] Once this has been stated, two essential factors appear to
emerge for the determination of a cycle in economics: the endogenic nature of a
process and the repetition of this process.
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The endogenic nature 0/ the cyclic process. We have seen that the exogenous or
endogenous nature of the variables put forward to account for the trend reversals
in the long movement has been for many authors the prime condition for the
possible denomination "long cycle." The debate between Kondratieff and his
detractors was based on this: Kondratieff talked in terms of a long cycle since he
considered that savings and investment were at the root of changes in trend, and
his detractors refused the expression "long cycle" since they considered that exo-
genous causes governed trend reversals. Ernest Mandel, as a faithful follower of
Trotsky, wrote of the movements demonstrated by Kondratieff that even if the
latter had replaced the expression "long cycle" by "long waves," "judging by
their contents, these waves are identical to the cycles." [67] Beyond the debate
on vocabulary, there is clearly a difference of opinion regarding theoretical
options.
Today, for the supporters of the Marxist school of regulation, the procedure
as regards the study of long movements is based on analysis of the contradictions
that occur at the heart of the production process. Overaccumulation results
from a process of lowering of the rate of profit itself as a result of a fall in the
productivity of capital from the middle of the recession period onward. Recovery
only occurs when there is a process of revalorization of the labor force and
devalorization of part of the capital.
Repetition 0/ an endogenous process. Since there is no question in economics of
claiming to obtain for any phenomenon whatsoever a regularity as close to the
absolute as for certain astronomical, physical, biological, or chemical phenomena,
it must be decided within what limits one can talk of "regular repetition." Kon-
dratieff himself replied to this important question:
It has been objected that long waves lack the regularity which business cycles
display. But this is wrong. If one defines "regularity" as repetition in regular
time-intervals, then long waves possess this characteristic as much as the
intermediate ones. A strict periodicity in social and economic phenomena
does not exist at all - neither in the long nor in the intermediate waves. The
length of the latter fluctuates at least between 7 and 11 years, i.e., 57 percent.
The length of the long cycles fluctuates between 48 and 60 years, i.e., 25 per-
cent only.
If regularity is understood to be the similarity and simultaneity of the
fluctuations of different series, then it is present to the same degree in the long
as in the intermediate waves.
If, finally, regularity is understood to consist in the fact that the inter-
mediate waves are an international phenomeon, the long waves do not differ
from the latter in this respect either.
Consequently, there is not less regularity in the long waves than in the
intermediate ones, and if we want to designate the latter as cyclical, we are
bound not to deny this characterization to the former.1681
This regularity of the cycle cannot be interpreted as determinism. There is
no determinism in the long movement of the economy insofar as an upward
phase is not the inexorable result of the downward phase. There is no objective
need to return to the growth phase since three solutions can occur during a slow
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growth period: either a slide toward a "stationary economy" or a change to
another form of production or a solution to internal contradictions enabling the
capitalist mode of production to a.ttain a fresh phase of expansion. Repetition of
structures and economic behavior does not occur from one long cycle to another.
On the contrary, since it corresponds to a. phase in the evolution of the mode of
capitalist production, each long cycle contains the transformations of the preced-
ing cycle. Overaccumulation of capital and the necessary devalorization of this
capital to recover the conditions for prosperity are part of repetition, as is also
the revalorization of the labor force that occurs during the depression phase.
Obviously, the devalorization of capital and the revalorization of labor display
different, indeterminate forms during each long cycle. For P. Boccara, "the
repetition makes it possible to make a more rigorous distinction between the very
originality of each long cycle, without which no comparison is possible in the
strict sense of the term between the series of capitalist long cycles."[69J Thus,
from this viewpoint the long cycle does not signify "reproduction" but transfor-
mation of the capitalist mode of production through a nonlinear movement.
14.4. Conclusion
Kondratieff's insufficiently explained position with regard to use of words,
Schumpeter's choice of "Kondratieff" as a term for a movement about which
there had already been 30 years of controversy concerning its nature and its very
existence, and the interpretations subsequent to the thinking of Kondratieff and
Schumpeter have tended to create an extremely confused situation in which it is
difficult to rely on words to communicate a concept and, beyond this, a theoreti-
cal position.
It is surprising that the progress in economic thinking that has led to the
refining of the methods, theoretical procedures, and concepts used has hardly
emerged in the field of the long movement of the economy. The terms used
today are as vague and sometimes even more watered down than when Kondra-
tieff went on the warpath against his Soviet colleagues in the 1920s. However,
the lack of precision in the terminology concerning the notion of long-term
movement is indubitably related to the small extent of knowledge of the
phenomena that involve the long term to such a point that this field of economic
investigation has been qualified as a "dark area."
To date, the terms used to analyze the long movement of the economy have
too frequently been a source of confusion, misunderstanding, and incomprehen-
sion. Nevertheless, this diversity will become a factor in the clarification and
deepening of the debate if an effort is made to enrich the statistical apparatus of
quantitative history. The scientific bases of the various theoretical options will
thus be strengthened, and the terminology used will be more precise. This
detour by way of deepening the scientific material seems to us to be indispens-
able for the reconciliation of theory and terminology in the investigation of the
long movement of the economy.
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CHAPTER 15
Generational Factors in an
Evolutionary Theory of the Long Wave
Andrew Tylecote
15.1. Introduction
If we choose to define the long wave as a cycle, of some 40 to 60 years duration,
in rates of economic growth of the world economy and/or its components, it
must be clear that we are not dealing with something regular or constant. We
should then not seek much regularity or constancy in the elements of a long-
wave theory: my theory, accordingly, is an evolutionary one, which seeks to
reflect the evolution of the political, social, and economic factors affecting the
world economy. One element of regularity is the fairly regular appearance of
new technological styles (Perez, 1983) that have the potential to produce a quan-
tum jump in productivity, but only once the socio-institutional framework has
adjusted sufficiently; initially, this framework is mismatched with the style, tend-
ing to cause economic deceleration and a socio-institutional crisis that are likely
to accentuate each other, combining in a depression crisis which in time leads to
the necessary socio-institutional adjustments (Figure 15.1). Alongside this sys-
tem, and interacting with it, is a system of various long and short feedback
loops, which for a more-or-Iess regular wave should behave as shown in the
diagram in Figure 15.e.
The short feedback loops are positive and weak, tending to accentuate
downswings and upswings, while the long feedback loops - of the order of 20 or
30 years in length - are negative and strong, tending, at the appropriate stage, to
turn the long wave. It is not difficult to integrate the two systems, at least par-
tially, by making technological change at least partly endogenous: we need only
assume, plausibly, that the economic upswing (involving fast diffusion of the
established style) hastens the appearance of the next style, which (as already
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argued) interacts with the mismatched sodo-institutional framework to help
bring about a downswing and a "depression crisis." This is then a powerful
negative feedback loop from upswing to downswing; a corresponding loop from
downswing to upswing is provided by the socio-institutional renewal brought
about by the depression crisis, for the renewal releases the potential of the new
style.
Now let us spoil the neatness and regularity of our combined system. Let
us suppose, for example, that the socio-institutional renewal is for some reason
insufficient to release fully the potential of the new style, which then continues to
diffuse slowly, without any general upswing in economic growth. [I argue that
this was true of the French Revolution renewal and the "water transport style"
whose appea.rance in the UK had provoked it (Tylecote, 1987)]. Or we may find,
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at a particular period, negative feedback loops that are short. Such periods tend
to cause what I have called "crises of the peak." The rapid expansion of the
upswing and the fast diffusion of the new style that accompanies it put their own
strains on society and polity, which find expression in crises of the peak of vari-
ous kinds: waves of strikes, revolutions, wars, and civil wars. When and where
the previous depression crisis had led to radical reform, the crises of the peak
will not be severe, and their chief importance will be in the dysfunctional
changes they bring about in polity and economy - changes that take time to
have an effect. They can then be regarded as part of a negative feedback loop of
the right length. (See below for an example.) However, where the strains of the
upswing bear on an "unreformed" structure - the United States of the 18505,
Germany and Austria-Hungary of the 1900s - the crises of the peak thus pro-
voked are severe and have an immediate effect on the rate of growth of the world
economy: thus, the US Civil War depressed the world economy during the 18605
and World War I depressed it between 1914 and about 1924. This produces
what I call a "dent" in the long-wave upswing, which makes it harder to estab-
lish statistically, and may make the upper turning point impossible to locate,
since (as in the case of the 1910-1929 period) there is a "double top" before and
after the dent.
I am concerned here primarily with feedback loops that have a definite gen-
erational character: that is, their length is defined by the rhythms of the life of
man. I believe I have found three such loops, which I call, respectively, popula-
tion feedback, Easterlin-Modigliani feedback, and policymakers' feedback (or the
Thatcher-Chirac effect). The first is multifaceted, and can at some periods
involve slow, positive feedback (counter-cyclical) while at other times it causes
pro-cyclical slow negative feedback. The other two have only been pro-cyclical
in character, with slow, negative feedback.
15.2. Loop 1: Population Feedback
The very length of the long wave hints at a link with population: just two gen-
erations. Perhaps the upswing has an effect on the birthrate, which (once the
babies are adults) makes for a downswing, and the downswing has an opposite
effect on the birthrate, which - in turn, a generation later - makes for an up-
swing? I shall argue in this section that population feedback can, in certain cir-
cumstances, work in this way, to accentuate the long wave - pro-cyclically; it can
also, in other circumstances, work to weaken or mitigate the wave - counter-
cyclically. It depends on economic and social arrangements, and international
relationships, as we shall see. Let us begin by looking at the first link in the
chain of causation - the effect of a long wave upswing on population.
15.2.1. The effect of the long wave on population
Two hundred years ago it was taken for granted - by Adam Smith, for example
- that an upswing in economic growth would lead to a corresponding upswing in
the growth of population. Birthrates would rise, death rates would fall, and
264 lAle Cycle, and Long Wavel
there would be an inflow rather than an outflow of migrants. But since that time
we have seen, in the countries that have grown richer, that the birthrate has fal-
len to an extraordinarily low level - so low that even similar falls in the death
rate, and at least some net immigration, have left the populations in these richer
countries virtually stagnant, while the populations in poorer nations increase at
an unprecedented rate. Does this not cast doubt on the relation between income
and population?
Certainly, the long-term effect of economic growth on the population is a
complex one. Once it has had time to affect women's status in society, and
people's attitude to children, then the way is open for the perverse effect of pros-
perity on fertility. But such shifts are not the immediate and automatic response
to a few years' fast growth; on the contrary, as we shall see later in the argu-
ment, the effect may rather be to entrench the status quo, until a crisis sets the
social currents moving again. When we look at the statistics, the old simplicities
turn out to be not a bad guide to population growth over the long wave. In the
upswing, the death rate does tend to fall, and the birthrate to rise; in the
downswing, these changes are reversed, at least relatively (that is, if the death
rate does not actually rise, it falls more slowly than before).
These fluctuations are usually greatest among the poorer strata in each
country, and the poorer countries in the world - naturally enough, for these are
the people who live closest to the margins of subsistence.
In the twentieth century, the core countries have enjoyed too high a stan-
dard of living for their death rates to be very sensitive to the long wave. But
birthrates are another matter; right across the continent and across social struc-
ture (though as I said, most particularly among the poor), the upswing brings a
"baby boom," like that of the late 1940s to 19608 in the core, and the downswing
brings a "baby slump" like that of the 1930s (and the 1970s and 1980s). It seems
clear that the prospective parents of each generation set standards for them-
selves and their children according to the circumstances in which they have
grown up. If, when their childbearing age arrives, it looks as though it will be
difficult to reach those standards, they economize on the number of their chil-
dren in one way or another (perhaps by postponing marriage). If their economic
situation seems unexpectedly favorable, on the other hand, they "treat them-
selves" to an extra child or two. This would explain the findings of d'Souza
(1985) in a study of rural Indian families that it was above all the "downwardly
mobile" who restricted their families; it certainly accounts for the way the "chil-
dren of the downswing" have large families in the upswing, while the children of
the upswing limit the size of their families, in the downswing. As Richard Eas-
terlin, who gave his name to these long cycles in fertility, points out, these
fluctuations are the more remarkable because the children of the downswing are
relatively few in number; for them to produce a baby boom the increase in births
per parent must more than compensate for the drop in numbers of possible
parents. It does, comfortably; the number of parents in the USA in the 1950s
was around 10% under trend, while birthrates were 20% over trend (Keyfitz,
1972). This overcompensation is encouraged precisely by the small numbers in
the childbearing ages:
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Not only would their promotion be relatively rapid, but in anyone position,
in so far as there is age-complementarity in production, they would frequently
have the advantage of meeting situations in which they were too few to do the
necessary work, with resulting appreciation of their services. This would
often be expressed in material terms and would result in high wages and good
prospects relative to what people of their age would be paid in a different age
configuration, and they would have a sense of security and well-being. Their
confidence is well-founded, for they will spend their whole working lives in the
same advantageous position. They translate their advantage into child-
bearing, perhaps projecting their security into the next generation and feeling
that their children will be in demand just as they are [Keyfitz, 1972].
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The unfortunate children, of course, are not in demand: not only do they
have to rear their families in the downswing, but they have to compete with a
crowd of rivals of their own age for whatever job opportunities there are.
15.2.2. The effect of the long wave on migration
So far we have discussed only the natural growth of population - that is, fertility
and mortality. For the population of the world as a whole, this is all that
matters; but it may be important for the world economy just how the world's
population is distributed among different countries, which may be very much
affected by migration. Every international migration is of course an emigration
and an immigration (except for those unfortunates who do not survive the jour-
ney), and its causes can be grouped into those relating to circumstances in the
country of emigration and those in the country of immigration; in other words,
migration push and migration pull.
For our purposes the relative strength of migration push and migration pull
is of great importance. In the downswing we may take it that push generally
increases, but pull decreases; in the upswing it will be the other way around.
Since the 19208 it has been generally known that pull has predominated: for
people in poorer countries have generally been quite glad to move to richer ones,
even during the upswing, but the richer countries have only been prepared to let
them in, in large numbers, when they were short of labor - that is, in the (late)
upswing. So during the upswing migration has risen; during the downswing it
has fallen (but see below).
In terms of population growth in the richer countries, this pattern of migra-
tion has been pro-cyclical: it has tended to quicken growth when it was rela-
tively quick already. However, most migrants are young adults, of whom there
was, as we have seen, a shortage in the upswing and a surplus in the downswing,
so the effect on the population in this age group has been counter-cyclical.
(Whether this has had much effect on the life chances of the natives is doubtful:
immigrants generally take a lower place on the ladder than most natives, so their
arrival in the upswing, by allowing employers to go on expanding their
businesses, creates more senior/skilled openings for native workers.)
Before the 1920s - certainly between the early 1840s and World War I -
migration pull was far more important, for during that period migration was not
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so much from poor to rich countries, as from overpopulated to underpopulated,
from the old world to the new, from Europe to the Americas. Until the War the
door to the Americas stood open - restrictions on immigration were insignificant
(for the healthy, in any case), and there was usually a fair chance of finding work
somewhere, although clearly it was much better during times of boom (which
were not necessarily the same there as in Europe). All the would-be migrant
needed was the fare; the importance of the early 1840s as the beginning of this
period, was the occurrence of a very sharp fall in fares, with the development of
the railways and of cheap steamship travel on the North Atlantic (Thomas,
1973). In this period, then, it was above all hard times and poor prospects in
Europe that drove people across the Atlantic; if there was a boom in the Ameri-
cas to go to, so much the better. In fact, as Brinley Thomas has shown, their
arrival tended to create a boom, such was the shortage of labor (Thomas, 1973).
There has been a strange echo of this period, in the last decade and a half,
within the Americas. Although rules on immigration into the United States have
been quite restrictive, they have not been effectively enforced: it has been easy
to get into the United States (and stay there) not only over land from Mexico,
but also by air on tourist visas (Crewdson, 1983); once there, jobs, of a sort, have
been available, with no questions asked. In consequence the flow has responded
to the migrants' need, to migration push, which has of course increased as the
situation among potential immigrants - notably in Latin America - grew more
and more desperate; by the early 1980s the inflow was running, according to
some estimates, at around two million a year. Whether this immigration could
be expected to have the same economic effects as that of the nineteenth century
is discussed below.
15.2.3. The effect of population on the long wave
Early in history high density of population made it practicable, as Ester Boserup
(1981) has shown, to develop sophisticated methods of production for the market
to replace primitive subsistence forms. Slowly, high population density, and
above all high growth of population became neutral, then detrimental. For
improvements in transport made it economical to carryon market relationships
over greater and greater distances, and thus keep plants of a given size busy with
a lower density of population. As that factor demanding population growth
faded, another, with the opposite tendency, became more important: with scarce
land and capital, rising population means less for each; and by the nineteenth
century, in Europe and Asia, land as well as capital was decidely scarce. On the
other hand, there was abundant land and work in the Americas, so a surge in
population could vent itself to some extent in migration; if there were higher
birthrates and/or lower infant mortality, the upturn in migration would follow
some 20 years later.
The vent of migration was not perfect - although, as I said above, the gates
to the United States were open, still the uprooting would be cruel, and of course
the journey there would cost more than many could afford - particularly for
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those who most needed to go. So a surplus of labor would be reflected in poverty
and hidden unemployment in the countryside, and open unemployment in the
cities, with the driving down of wages in the occupations easiest to enter. Those
years or decades, then, in which the labor force grew more than usual, would be
marked, in the old lands, by more social distress; but the total national output
would not be depressed. On the contrary: there is always some use for an extra
hand on a farm - land can be worked more intensively, a hillside can be terraced,
a marshy patch drained. In other areas of the economy too, there would be more
investment - more housing and more capital being laid out by the more pros-
perous fathers to set their sons up in business. And if that was so in Europe,
how much more true was it in labor-hungry North America, with its abundant
natural resources - with more workers, whether native or immigrant, there
would assuredly be more output, and roughly in proportion.
As we have already seen, the vent of unhindered immigration to the United
States was closed, rather abruptly, in the 1920s (and to the rest of the Americas
virtually closed in slump) and only reopened when it was less needed, after the
Depression was over. Migration push could then do nothing to mitigate the
downswing of the late 1920s and 1930s, while migration pull accentuated the
upswing of the 19508 and 1960s. But in any case, by the 1920s it was beginning
to be doubtful whether high immigration was likely to have much effect on the
American economy. The Prairies and the Pampas and the other good land avail-
able for European settlement had been settled: the frontier had now been
"closed," and the amount of new labor the Americas could absorb depended -
much like other countries - on the rate of expansion of their industry.
A more gradual change to be reckoned with has continued to this day, and
still has a long way to go in the periphery and semi-periphery: the divorce
between the factors that affect the supply of labor and those that affect the
demand for it. The peasant farmer if he has another son (supply of labor) will
find some use for him (demand for labor). This is particularly easy when he is
producing, at least partly, for the family's own consumption - for that, with an
extra mouth to feed, will presumably increase. But even when he is producing
for the market, he can count on selling the extra output, since agricultural mark-
ets are competitive - you sell what you choose at a price you cannot choose, and
cannot affect. For the nineteenth century artisan or entrepreneur, the situation
was not dissimilar. The employee, on the other hand, cannot call work into
existence for any extra children he may have - and we are, in the core, most of
us employees now. Even the self-employed are now rarely producing for com-
petitive markets on which they could unload whatever extra output a larger fam-
ily enabled them to produce; they are certainly not producing for their own sub-
sistence.
The neoclassical economist would say that, nonetheless, the extra children
can call the extra work into existence for themselves by bidding down the price
of labor. Along with other post-Keynesian economists, most notable Joan
Robinson - and indeed Keynes himself, in Chapter 19 of the General Theory - I
reject that supposition. There is no room to rake over the controversy now,
except for one post-Keynesian point that fits well into my reasoning here: in so
far as excess labor does drive down real wages it increases inequality, and that,
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as I argue elsewhere, tends nowadays to depress the economy decidedly
(Tylecote, 1985 and 1986).
This argument leads us to rather complex conclusions about the effect of
population increase on the long wave. Everywhere in the nineteenth century,
faster growth of the labor force led to faster growth of output, and this effect
occurs in the periphery even now. It was particularly strong in the 1845-1914
period, when a large part of the extra population tended to be channeled to
where it was most useful, in the Americas. Since, as we have seen, the birthrate
would be fastest in the upswing, the increment to the labor force would be
highest in the downswing (the lag is rather less than half a long wave, but near
enough, particularly if we assume that the birthrate takes time to respond to the
economic situation). So this was a factor that would tend to weaken the wave,
and must have had a considerable effect in this direction, in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The weakening would have been more marked in the 1845-1914 period,
because the downswings of the wave - such as they were - would have generated
their own migration push, and thus made their own contribution to growth in
the Americas. In fact the most important factor in migration push may have
been neither growth of the labor force, nor slower growth of output, but a surge
in growth of productivity as a new technological style diffused. The migration
push generated was all the stronger when this diffusion undermined cottage
industries, as it did in Western Europe in the 1840s and in Southern and Eastern
Europe around the turn of the century (Thomas, 1973). We might add a fourth
factor, agricultural disasters of one sort or another - the 1840s potato blight, for
example - but it may be that these are not unconnected to technological
diffusion. [1]
It is highly unlikely that in the post-1914 period (as well as today) the
counter-cyclical effects of population feedback have been of any importance. If
the total output of peasant farmers in the periphery is higher than it otherwise
would have been because their labor force is larger, then it is hardly likely to
have a noticeable positive effect on the world economy. Indeed, if they put more
output onto world markets and depress primary product prices thereby, then it
will increase international inequality and (as I shall argue below) thus tend to
depress the world economy. Such will be the effect, also, of any increase in
intra-national inequality due to an oversupply of labor, particularly unskilled
(again, see below). What of the current echo of nineteenth century migration
push, in immigration to the USA? Following up the argument above, it seems
likely that the USA can benefit greatly nowadays from an increase in its labor
force; and given the qualifications of many of the immigrants, the countries of
emigration must be losing.
15.3. Loop 2: Easterlin-Modigliani Feedback
While the counter-cyclical effect of demographic factors have been declining into
insignificance, an interesting pro-cyclical effect has just appeared. (Here I would
acknowledge my debt to neoclassical economics. It is decent, I suppose, having
rejected one neoclassical idea, to make amends by borrowing another, albeit for a
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use for which it was not intended.) Modigliani's life-cycle theory of saving
explains differences in the proportion of income saved among different groups of
the population, by pointing to the effects of age differences (thus helping to
undercut the unfashionable Keynesian notion that wealth and poverty are largely
responsible). Put very simply, people of working age save for their retirement,
then (having retired) dissave. This is clearly true for a large part of the popula-
tion, but it used to be very much less so. In the last century, most working peo-
ple were able to save very little and, if they happened to outlive their capacity to
work, fell back on the charity of their children, other relatives, or (God help
them) the workhouse. Those few who owned most of the wealth did so as lan-
downers or entrepreneurs, and as such might well continue to accumulate till
their death, even if they passed the responsibility for day-to-day management to
their children or others. Even the old middle class of small entrepreneurs were
mostly in a similar situation. The relatively recent rise of the new middle class,
the salariat, and the secure blue-collar workers just below them began to make
the life-cycle theory of saving relevant. However, two even newer developments
helped to make an increasingly accurate description of part of the pattern of sav-
ing in the core economies: first, the rise of the occupational pension system as a
compulsory feature of middle-class (and increasingly, working-class) life; second,
the spread of the practice of purchasing a house with borrowed money. Previ-
ously, the feckless - like the poor still - might save little, live in a rented house,
and take their chance of a poverty-stricken old age. Now, in most countries, a
large (and ever-increasing) proportion of the working population is forced to
save: their pension contributions are deducted from their pay at source,/2] and
they are usually obliged to pay back the borrowings for their houses, before
retirement. Once retired, the careful might once have conserved their capital -
but now they usually have little choice (or need): the pension fund will dissave
for them, by paying them a regular sum until death. So saving is increasingly
carried out by the working population, dissaving by the retired (but note that
the new system has yet to have its full impact on that age group). Clearly the
rate of net saving, of subtraction from consumption expenditure, will depend on
the proportion of the population in the working-age groups, and to a lesser
extent on the proportion of retired people.
Let me give a specific example. Let us suppose the long wave lasts 50
years, 25 of upswing and 25 of downswing, and that the birthrate is decidedly
higher during the upswing. Let us suppose that workers begin to save at age 20,
and they save at a constant rate until retirement at 65. We see at once that five
years before the beginning of the downswing the number of new savers increases,
as those born during the baby boom grow up, and remains at the higher level for
the next 25 years, that is, through most of the downswing. Taken by itself, that
would provide just the effect we are looking for - a progressive decrease in the
propensity to consume, and thus a deflation of demand in the economy, more or
less at the same time as an increasing labor force needs more work and therefore
higher demand.
Can this entry effect be taken by itself? Should we not consider at the
same time the effect of exit from the saving labor force? As soon as we do, we
confuse the picture somewhat. The baby boom of the previous upswing will start
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to reach retirement age after 15 years of the current one, and the last will leave
the labor force 15 years into the downswing. This means an opposite effect,
reHationary while reducing the labor force, over a period that begins and ends
only five years earlier than the entry effect. However, there is good reason for
neglecting this exit effect, for the past and present. It relates to an age group 50
years older than the new entrants, which means that the total size of the age
group is smaller and there is a much smaller proportion of them in the
mortgaged-and-pensioned salariat. On the other hand, although we may be deal-
ing with a smaller absolute change in numbers than we see in the new entrants,
they may count double in that they do not simply cease to save - they dissave.
In fact, for the present long wave, the issue is settled by the effect of World
War II on the group of the men born between 1910 and 1925; from about 1975
onward the number of men retiring has been lower, not higher, than the long-
term trend. Therefore, since that time, the exit effect, whatever its strength, has
pushed in the same direction as the entry effect. In the future, when populations
and salariats are more stable, we can expect the exit effect to come into its own.
Having seen the reHectionary entry effect of the current baby slump start to
come through around 1990, we shall have to wait until 2010, unless retirement
ages are reduced, for the reHationary exit effect of the last baby boom to begin.
Thus we cannot expect demographic effects on saving to be neatly pro-
cyclical in the future: but it happens that they are highly pro-cyclical just at
present. We would expect them to be more pro-cyclical in countries where:
(1) There is a particularly high ratio of working age to retired population.
(2) The tendency of the working-age population to save, and retired to dissave,
is not lessened by the impact of a generous pay-as-you-go pension system
and health service.
(3) The birthrate since 1970 has been particularly low, so that the number of
dependent children is small: this makes it easier to keep up a high rate of
saving, as well as depressing demand for housing.
My research in this area is at an early stage, but it is notable that regard-
ing item (1) Germany and Japan lost a particularly large proportion of (then) 18
to 35 year olds between 1939 and 1945, which is now depressing the proportion
of retired people. This must be deHationary for them. On point (2), Italy has a
particularly generous pay-as-you-go state pension system; France has private
pay-as-you-go schemes in addition to the state scheme; and Sweden, in addition
to a very generous state scheme (hybrid pay-as-you-go/funded), has an excep-
tionally generous health system that effectively makes all conceivable health care
free for the old (see Castellino, 1982; Rosa, 1982; Stahl, 1982). These pay-as-
you-go elements may well reduce the deHationary Easterlin-Modigliani effects in
these countries. Finally, regarding (3), the West German birthrate has been not-
ably low since 1970 - well below the replacement rate, again deHationary.
This would lead us to expect a particular deficiency of internal demand in
West Germany and Japan; this appears to have existed at least since 1980, in
view of the unusually high public sector deficits in both, the huge Japanese trade
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surplus and the large West German trade surplus combined with average to high
unemployment.
15.4. Loop 3: Policymakers' Feedback
To anyone with some knowledge of modern history, the resemblances between
the last five years and the late 19208 are striking - not so much in the state of
the economy, although there are resemblances, but in the attitudes of policy-
makers and those they represent. In the 19208 monetary discipline was practiced
and interest rates were accordingly kept high; so it is in our time. Policymakers
were for fiscal discipline too, and managed to keep their budgets in surplus - our
governments are in deficit, but (at least outside the USA) most unwillingly and
as little as possible, given the state of their economies. (In fact, given that prices
are now rising, which tends to erode the value of outstanding public debt, while
then they were falling, and thus increasing their value, the fiscal stances, in
terms of the rate of change of real public sector debt, are much the same.) The
greatest similarity is in the attitude to make money by those already rich. There
was to be, in the late 1920s, no impediment to this activity. In the USA, con-
trols on mergers were left virtually unenforced by the Justice Department under
successive Republican presidents; in the UK cartels were allowed to flourish.
Trade unions, on the other hand, were regarded as obnoxious interference with
the market mechanism, and their increasing weakness was welcomed. Money
once made, should be kept: rates of taxation on the income of both corporations
and rich individuals were low. For the 1980s, this description holds almost
without modification - there is the single change of detail, and that is mergers
rather than cartels now flourish in the UK.
The development of such attitudes and policies early in the downswing is, I
am sure, connected with the complex process I have called inequality feedback,
(see Tylecote, 1988), and to be fully understood should be analyzed in that con-
text. Here, however, I propose to concentrate on what might be called the gen-
erational factors involved. Screpanti (1986) has usefully surveyed the literature
on this issue, some of which argues that a generation is formed or influenced by
its environment from birth to young adulthood, while others stress the much
shorter period of transition to adulthood, from the late teens and early twenties.
The latter view seems more plausible: childhood is a period of relative shelter
from the wider environment, in which the child is exposed within the family to
values that are likely to be traditional; even in school, the attitudes picked up
from peers and teachers have been formed over a long period of individual and
parental experience. It is on emergence from school, into higher education
and/or employment (or military service), that a period of intensive engagement
with the wider environment begins, which I take to be the most formative period,
so far as environmental influences are concerned. That gives us an age for for-
mation of attitudes of perhaps 20 to 25 (note that the people we are most con-
cerned with here are opinion-formers and policymakers whose education is likely
to be prolonged; working-class attitudes are likely to be formed earlier).
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The next point that concerns us is at what time do our opinion-formers and
policymakers acquire the power to form opinions and make policies. This we
may put (there is more agreement here) at some point in their forties. We are
dealing, then, with a lag of about a generation - perhaps 25 years - between, so
to speak, input and output. Not, let me stress, that our opinion-formers' and
policymakers' views are set in concrete from their twenties onward. On the con-
trary, they evolve and change in response to the new situations and intellectual
currents to which they are exposed on their way up the greasy pole. But their
choices are conditioned by the basic attitudes established during this formative
period.
Let me now give some examples. The British Tory, Harold Macmillan, had
served in trenches in World War I alongside his working-class contempories.
When he and his generation came to power in the 19408 and 1950s, it would
have been deeply repugnant to them to have engaged in any conflict with these
men, and their trade union leaders, which could decently have been avoided.
Their deepest instinct was for social harmony. (It may be that one element in
the different attitudes in US politics and business at this time was the lack of
men who had had such experiences.) A later generation, that of J.F. Kennedy in
the USA and Edward Heath in Britain, came to adulthood during the Great
Depression or just afterward, during World War II. For them, the conclusion
drawn was likely to be that the market mechanism, so much beloved by their
fathers, could not be left to rule the economy without extensive government
intervention whenever and wherever it seemed necessary. Thus, in their period
of power, in the late 1960s and early 19708, they resorted freely to welfare pro-
grams, fiscal reflation, income policies, etc. In this generation the right-wingers
are moderate and cautious.
The latter example relates to the adolescents of the downswing, who rule in
the late upswing. We now move on 10 or 20 years, to those who grew up in the
upswing. Those on the Left, who have roots in the working class, or at least
close connections with it, will know of the Depression from bitter childhood
experience or at least from much-discussed family experience. However, those on
the Right will for the most part have suffered little more than fleeting inconveni-
ences from the Depression; by the time they were ready to take a wider view of
it, it was gone. This generation's Right Wing learned from the upswing, their
upswing, One Big Thing: that the capitalist system, with its market mechanism,
is wonderful, and that interference with it is a nuisance. They may at first
accept their elders' cautious compromise policies intellectually, but their hearts
are not in them and, when - in the peak and early downswing - those policies
appear to run into trouble, this new generation of formers and makers is easily
persuaded that the fault was in the fact, not the form, of the compromises: away
with them, and back to pure doctrine! They associate themselves with aNew, or
radical, Right - not conservative, but reactionary - wishing to turn the clock
back to old inequalities of wealth and power (and largely, though briefly,
succeeding), promising (and inevitably failing) to restore old bonds of loyalty and
old structures of security: thus Thatcher, Kohl, Chirac, and those around
Reagan, thus also the men of the 19208, like Coolidge and Hoover in the USA
and Montagu Norman and Baldwin in Britain, whose ambition was to get back
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to the prices, the industrial relations, and the capitalist freedoms of the period
before 1914.
The victories of the reactionary Right of the 19208 turned to dust and ashes
a few years later, and those of their modern successors, such as they are, are not
likely to be much more enduring. Nonetheless, we are stuck, for years to come,
with this generation of the upswing - we may winkle the New Right out of
government, but how do we dislodge it from business, the mass media, the
bureaucracy, the judiciary...? (And if entrenched there, it is harder to beat in
politics.) Its predecessors proved slow learners during the 1930s; those in today's
New Right are also slow learners now. Here is an insight into the length of the
long wave: long upswings breed long years of reactionaries, who beget long
depressions.
Notes
[1] The diffusion of the "steam transport style" undermined the rural economy, reduc-
ing the demand for "outworkers" and thus forcing those with little land to concen-
trate on the crop - the potato - which has the highest yield per hectare. This
much facilitated the movement of disease.
[2] This is true only of funded pensions systems. Where pay-as-you-go is the rule, our
argument is weakened.
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CHAPTER 16
Reading the Economic Events of
the Last 15 Years from the
Long-Wave Theory Perspective
Tommaso Sinibaldi
16.1. Introduction
In the last 10 years there has been considerable resumption of interest in the
study of long-wave theory. Since around the early 19708 several scholars in
different countries (West Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and the
UK), simultaneously and independently have begun to review and to learn from
the ideas of Kondratieff (1926) and Schumpeter (1939), who are responsible for
the first developments of this theory, and to perform their own in-depth studies
on the topic.
According to the long-wave theory, the economies of industrialized coun-
tries are subject to long-term cyclical fluctuations (about half a century).
Different explanations have been proposed about the causes of these fluctuations.
According to Mensch (1975), who has studied and has attempted to verify
Schumpeter's intuitions empirically, such fluctuations are due to cyclicity of
equal duration in the technological innovation process. The fundamental techno-
logical innovations are not distributed in a uniform way in time, but tend to be
concentrated in certain periods, lasting 15 to 20 years, with about half a century
between them. Of course this explanation leaves the question of why this hap-
pens unsolved.
Instead, Jay W. Forrester and his group at MIT have built a model that
gives an "endogenous" explanation of the long waves:
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We believe the National Model now provides a theory of how the economic
long wave is generated. The process involves overbuilding of the capital sec-
tors in which they grow beyond the output rate needed for long-term equili-
brium. In the process, capital plant throughout the economy is overbuilt
beyond the level justified by the marginal productivity of capital. Finally, the
overexpansion is ended by the hiatus of a great depression during which
excess capital plant is physically worn out and financially depreciated on the
account books until the stage has been cleared for a new era of rebuilding
[Forrester, 1984].
Aside from the different theories on the wave generation mechanism, the
experts studying the subject have done an enormous job in the last 10 years of
collecting and classifying the data relative to the last two centuries of economic
history. This work has certainly reinforced the empirical evidence of the long-
wave theory.
An evaluation that finds unanimous agreement is that we have entered into
a warning phase of the wave since the early 1970s, a phase that should last
another 10 years or so.
In this paper I will take for granted that the long-wave theory is accepted
and, moving from this foundation, I will attempt to tackle two issues. In the
first place, I will attempt to show how the long-wave theory allows a reading and
an explanation of the economic events of the last 15 years that seem rather clear
and realistic. It seems to be an important issue owing to the fact that the
economic events of the last 15 years have led scholars, experts, and the public to
question the most accredited economic theories and the same credibility of
economic science. This explanation will be formulated primarily in terms of
inflation, interest rates, and public deficits.
In the second place, I will attempt to show with summary comparisons how
the economic policies followed by governments of industrialized countries have
been, at the outset of this wave's waning phase, considerably different from -
and substantially better than - that which occurred during the previous similar
phases, and the last in particular (1920s and early 19308).
16.2. Companies at the Beginning of the
Wave's Waning Phase
In the early 19708 the market economies of countries were (without realizing it)
at the end of a period of strong economic growth, lasting more than 20 years.
The business and company managers had no other experience in their profes-
sional life but that of a long, uninterrupted growth in production and in markets.
It is natural and understandable that they believed that the trend corresponded
to the natural order of things and was therefore destined to last indefinitely. On
the other hand, the critical and doubting voices of those (intellectuals, scholars)
who were far away from the daily imperative of business and would have been
able to give different analyses and forecasts were very few and weak. Thus
investments to increase capacity continued to be made. New factories were built
to turn out new automobiles, household appliances, and the materials necessary
for steel works, refineries, highways, and every kind of plant and infrastructure.
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Then, in only a very few years, almost all the markets rapidly reached the
saturation point. The investments made in previous years were excessive and
useless to a great degree and therefore destined inevitably to become losses to be
canceled from the accounting books.[11
In 1975 the industrialized world went through the first real and strong
recession after more than 20 years of uninterrupted growth: for the first time
production and consumption diminished in absolute value. The activity sectors
that had led the long previous development entered into a stage of long-term
stagnation owing to the phenomena of demand saturation. Around 1973, in
almost all the industrialized and market-economy countries, the maximum pro-
duction was reached of automobiles, household appliances, steel, base chemical
products, etc. Energy consumption as well, which is evidently a general indica-
tor of both production and consumption, reached a maximum around 1973-1974:
in the following years it stayed around the same value or decreased slightly.
In the business world the perception of a "change in climate" was fairly
rapid, though at intuitive and not rational levels. Many understood that some-
thing was "broken" in the mechanism of development without end. Already in
1977-1978 the companies stopped investing to increase capacity and sought the
most painless ways to cancel from the accounting books the losses relative to
wrong investments.
Obviously, a relatively simple way to obtain the result is to operate in a
context with high inflation and strong barriers to entrance. In the market
economies of industrialized countries there are strong barriers to entrance, as we
well know, because of the oligopolistic nature, accentuated primarily in the
highest capital-intensive sectors, for which of course the problems of over-
dimensioning of investments posed themselves most urgently.
The inflationary context, too, was given historically, not only because the
companies understood its utility and pushed in that direction, nor only because
it was theorized and backed by authoritive economists, but because the govern-
ments and even public opinion instinctively perceived it as a lesser evil and the
most flexible reply to the historical stage that was beginning.
16.3. Governments and Public Opinion:
The Growing Public Deficits
The stagnation of production and consumption that started in 1974 had growing
and considerable effects on employment. Two or three years later the companies
realized that the size of the market was stationary by then and turned their
efforts (and still continue to do so) toward goals of increasing productivity.
Therefore, unemployment could become higher and aggregate demand could
drop in a tightening up process such as that which occurred after 1929. The
governments instinctively resorted largely and increasingly to deficit spending.
Rereading the newspaper articles and the comments on the political econ-
omy of the 19208, one finds an impressive analogy with the 19708.[21 The coal
industry, for example, and railway construction, which were leading elements in
development for approximately half a century, had reached a stalemate position
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at the end of the 1920s. Similarly, in the 19708 the following industries reached
a stalemate position: automobile, oil, petrochemical, household appliances, Le.,
the industries that were the fulcrum of the strong development in the previous
25 years. Around 1980 we could have had another 1929 (Marchetti, 1983).
On the other hand, 30 years of critical reflection, in-depth studies, and
developments of Keynes's theory had put full employment at the top of economic
policy targets in all the industrialized countries. Some modest experimenting in
deficit-spending policies done in the 19508 and 19608 had made the politicians,
central banks, and managers in the public sector much more confident and
uninhibited in using this instrument.
These experiments were not actually real deficit-spending policies. When
Keynes wrote the General Theory he had a vivid memory of the Great Depres-
sion in which there was, in the USA, for example, a 30% drop in income in four
years. Therefore, he probably thought of public deficits on the order of magni-
tude of those that occurred in these years, if not higher, and not the 1-2 percent-
age points with respect to the GDP we had in the 19508 and 19608.
Nevertheless, consequent to these modest experiments, and above all to the
economic policy debate that accompanied them, in the early 1970s the Keynesian
theories and analyses became part, even though superficially, of the cultural and
social context. In this context hard deflationary policies such as those effected in
the early 1930s (see Table 16.1) were clearly out of question as was the pursuit of
the mythical goal of balancing the budget.
Table 16.1. Annual variations in consumer prices in the USA and in Italy between 1925
and 1935 (in %).
Year USA Italy
1925 + 2.5 +12.3
1926 + 0.9 + 7.8
1927 - 1.9 - 8.6
1928 - 1.4 - 7.3
1929 + 0.0 + 1.6
1930 - 2.3 - 3.1
1931 - 8.8 - 9.6
1932 -10.3 - 2.6
1933 - 5.2 - 5.9
1934 + 3.3 - 5.1
1935 + 2.4 + 1.4
(Sources: HutoricaJ StatUtic. 01 the Unikd State., Colonial TIme. to 1970, US Department of Com-
merce, 1975; Sommario Iii .tatUticM .toriche deU'Italia 1861-1975, ISTAT, Rome, 1976.
In the early 1970s, therefore, the industrialized countries were ready for the
first large and real experiment of deficit-spending policy. This policy was imple-
mented on a large scale and with profound similarities in all the market
economies of the industrialized countries. Starting from those years there is in
all these countries a clear trend to the growth of deficits. This growth shows
important differences from country to country; it is higher in countries such as
USA, Italy, Belgium, and Sweden, and smaller in France, the UK, and mainly
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West Germany. Nevertheless, the trend to a strong and general growth is evi-
dent.
Probably the future historian will give the politicians credit for having been
much more far-sighted in this circumstance than the economists. The majority
of the latter in the early 1970s called themselves Keynesian (though with
different marks and attributes), but very few suggested or supported a large and
growing recourse to deficit spending over long periods. Most preferred the role
of latter-day Cassandras and predicted catastrophes linked with the growth of
public deficits.
16.4. Long-Term Keynesian Policies?
All this also stems from a certain interpretation of the Keynesian theories that
was and still is prevalent: Le., that the analyses of Keynes, and therefore the
instruments of economic policy he suggested (deficit spending in particular),
refer substantially to the short cycle.
Obviously, Keynes could not tackle all the problems in the General Theory.
Moreover, the ideas he advocated were already so innovative for the cultural
context in which he operated that he certainly must have given himself - despite
the provocative approach that pervades the whole work - the exigency of gradu-
alism. To have the idea accepted that deficit spending in the short term could
be a fundamental instrument for controlling demand, and therefore income and
employment, must have already seemed to him - as it was - a very remarkable
result.
An exegesis of his analysis on deficit spending as referred to the short term,
therefore, is certainly not mistaken in literal terms, but in the deepest spirit of
the work probably it is.
In the chapters in which Keynes lets himself make more general and "mil-
lenarian" considerations (for example, in Chapter 8, 10, and 14) it seems to be
undoubtedly so:
When involuntary unemployment exists, the marginal disutility of labor is
necessarily less than the utility of the marginal product. Indeed it may be
much less. For a man who has been long unemployed some measure of
labour, instead of involving disutility, may have a positive utility. IT this is
accepted, the above reasoning shows how "wasteful" loan expenditure [31 may
nevertheless enrich the community balance. Pyramid-building, earthquakes,
even wars may serve to increase wealth, if the education of our statesman on
the principles of classical economics stands in the way of anything better
[Keynes, 1936].
It seems difficult to understand that the building of pyramids and the recon-
struction after an earthquake or a war as short-term anti-cyclic "operations."
Keynes's view on the subject was likely the following: that in certain
periods of time (one or two generations, he says in Chapter 24) humanity, or
better still the "advanced countries," would have completed the grant of capital
goods allowed by the state of technology and capable of "more than reproducing
itself" (Le., those that showed a marginal capital efficiency higher than zero).
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With this an era of relative scarcity of capital would have ended and the
"useless" investments would again be necessary (the pyramids of Egypt or the
cathedrals of the Middle Ages) - investments, we may add (but certainly Keynes
would have agreed), that have contributed so much to make the world we live in
beautiful and enjoyable.
The "useless" investments, in fact, have the precious nature of losing value
with abundance, and therefore they supply unlimited horizons to human activity
(and to policies backing the investments and the demand):
Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and doubtless owed to this its fabled
wealth, in that it possessed two activities, namely, pyramid-building as well
as the search for the precious metals, the fruits of which, since they could not
serve the needs of man by being consumed, did not stale with abundance.
The Middle Ages built cathedrals and sang dirges. Two pyramids, two
masses for the dead, are twice as good as one; but not 80 two railways from
London to York [Keynes, 1936].
According to Keynes the alternative to the "useless" pyramids of Egypt or the
Medieval cathedrals was, let us remember, war or earthquakes.
We shall not dwell further on the question of what Keynes really wanted to
say: intricate and of course open to opinion. The General Theory, as a few
other great works, is an inexhaustible source of new ideas and interpretations.
What seems to be much less a matter of opinion, instead, is the fact that in the
last 10 to 12 years we have had a historical verification of the practicality of
deficit-spending policies over long periods of time. We can well say today that
the capacity and the solidity of the financial structures were largely underes-
timated by the economists. Fifteen years ago, for example, when the ratio
between public debt and GDP in Italy was around 35% (see Figure 16.1), no one
would have sworn that it was possible that this ratio would exceed 100% without
reaching bankruptcy of the state and financial chaos well before it did. These
limits have been exceeded today, and the Italian situation is judged precarious
on more than one side, but the collapse did not occur, and life goes on. In other
countries, on the other hand, it seems that the historical memory of the not-so-
far-off past has been lost. In the United States, after these last few years of
"savage" growth of deficit, the ratio between public debt and GDP reached 35%,
Le., the same as in 1966, and much lower than that of all of the 19508, a time in
which no one worried much about the size of the public debt.
Therefore, the economies of the industrialized countries showed that they
could withstand deficit-spending policies that lasted over a time period of 10 to
12 years. The question now is how long can this continue. Let us see what reply
can be given with the long-wave theory.
16.5. The Long Wave of the Public Debt
Figure 16.1 suggests with good evidence that one can identify, for at least 30
years, a long wave of public debt. This wave seems, as is logical, to be counter
to the long wave of the economy. Around 1973 we would have reached the peak
of the economy's long wave and the public debt's lowest value. In the following
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Figure 16.1. Ratio between public deficit and GDP for Italy, USA, West Germany, and
France.
years the economy's wave cycle is waning and that of public debt is growing.
Since the entire long wave should have a duration of approximately 50 years, an
ascending or descending phase should last about 25 years. IT all this is true the
waning phase of the economy wave (and the increasing phase of the public debt)
should last about until the end of the 19908. Around 1985-1986, however, we
should be at about the middle of this phase. IT we make a further supposition
that the wave has a more or less sinusoidal trend, it is in approximately these
years that the low point of the public debt wave should be placed. The latter
would thus continue to grow until the end of the 1990s, but starting from
1985-1986 the speed of this growth should begin to diminish, i.e., the derivative
should reach its highest value. Since the derivative of the debt are the annual
deficits [4], from 1985-1986 the deficits (in the form considered of their ratio with
GDP) should begin to diminish slowly. This latter conclusion seems to be likely
enough in line with current forecasts.
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At this point, we may ask ourselves if and to what extent the economies of
the industrialized countries may withstand a prospect of public debt growth
(even though in decreasing rhythms) for another 10 to 12 years. This prospect
seems realistically tolerable for countries like the USA in which the ratio between
public debt and GDP is currently around 35%, or even more for West Germany
and France, countries in which this ratio is much lower. On the other hand, it
seems much riskier for countries like Italy (or Sweden or Belgium), countries in
which this ratio has or is starting to go over 100%. But it is very hard to make
reliable judgments on the subject: the way in which the industrialized countries
have tackled this waning phase of the wave is substantially new and the limits of
compatibility are not really known to anyone.
The whole subject has rather fragile empirical confirmation for the time
being. However, it is a rather conclusive consequence and a logical outgrowth of
the long-wave theory and of the way in which the waning phase of the wave was
actually met in these years by the economies of the industrial countries. If one
accepts the long-wave theory, these conclusions and forecasts may seem reason-
able and well founded.
16.6. The Inflation Wave of 1973-1980
Starting from 1973 and at least until 1980, there was a strong wave of inflation
in all the major industrial countries. From 1981 on this wave seems to have
turned into a waning phase, but some countries (Italy, for example) are still
experiencing the aftereffects.
A phenomenon of this kind - so broad and generalized - has no match for
as far back as 30 years in history: one must go back to the war to find anything
like it.
Rivers of ink have been spilled on the causes of this phenomenon and it
does not seem that this paper is the appropriate place to discuss this problem
further. What seems important to point out here, instead, is that on the basis of
the supposition of overall explanation that is proposed herein, the wave of
inflation of 1973-1980 was not an accident due to the two oil "shocks" or to some
other historical event, but was an organic element of the economic policies that,
almost "instinctively," the industrial countries put into effect to meet the waning
phase of the wave. The strong inflation rise of 1973-1980, in fact, allowed the
companies to put their accounts back in order, reabsorbing in a relatively pain-
less way the effects of mistaken (excessive) investments made in the previous
years. Between 1973 and 1980 almost all of the leading industrial countries had
negative real interest rates (see Table 16.e).
The debtors (the companies) were rewarded: it was a "soft" way to
discharge onto the holders of financial activities (families, but also, for example,
the petro-dollar sheiks) the cost of this mistaken investments.
Of course, there may be different opinions on how "fair" all this was from
the ethical viewpoint. It is hard, however, to deny that this solution was likely
the most concrete and the least painful for canceling those errors. The road
taken in this circumstance is, among other things, diametrically opposed to that
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Table 16.e. Real interest ratesa in some countries from 1953 to 1984 (in %).
USA France Germany, F.R. Italy UK Sweden Japan
1952-1962 +2.1 +1.7 +4.46 +3.6 +2.5 +1.1
1963-1972 +2.0 +1.8 +4.0 +2.8 +2.6 +1.7 +1.5c
1973-1980 -0.3 -0.8 +2.9 -3.9 -1.9 -0.3 -1.9
1981-1984 +6.5 +3.7 +4.9 +3.8 +4.4 +2.3 +4.9
aReal ez po8t interest rates calculated as simple algebraic difference between current interest
rates of medium long-term securities and actual price variation rates. The data relative to
beach period are the arithmetical average of annual data.
1956-1962.
c 1966-1972.
Table 16.9. Real interest ratesa in the USA and in Italy from 1925 and 1935 (in %).
Year
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
USA
+ 2.0
+ 3.4
+ 6.1
+ 5.6
+ 4.4
+ 6.6
+12.9
+14.9
+ 9.4
+ 0.5
+ 1.0
Italy
- 9.1
- 4.6
+11.9
+10.7
+ 1.9
+ 6.3
+12.8
+ 5.5
+ 8.6
+ 7.6
+ 0.9
aReal ez pcut interest rates calculated as simple algebraic difference between current interest
rates and retail price variation rates.
followed in the previous similar circumstance (according to long-wave theory),
Le., in the early 1930s. In those years, very violent deflationary policies were
practiced (see Table 16.9), benefiting the creditors (and this did little to help
economic recovery) and strangling the debtors (and this was fatal).
Prices fell violently: in the presence of very slow-moving nominal interest
rates and in a context of financial markets with very little flexibility and sophisti-
cation, this meant a sudden and dizzy rise in real interest rates. In the USA they
went from 4.4% in 1929 to 12.9% in 1931 and 14.9% in 1932. In Italy from 1.9%
in 1929 to 12.8% in 1931.
16.7. Real Interest Rates
In contrast, currently, after approximately seven years of negative real interest
rates (between 1973 and 1980), we have positive (and rather high) real interest
rates.
A simple and intuitive explanation of the latter phenomenon is that there is
a certain hysteresis of the nominal interest rate compared with the inflation rate.
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In the ascendant phase of the inflation process there are thus - above all if this is
rapid and considerable - nominal interest rates that grow with some delay com-
pared with inflation: this delay is translated in low and also negative real
interest rates, such as exactly what happened between 1973 and 1980. In the
descendant phase of the inflationary wave, instead, this delay in the adjustment
of the interest rate with respect to those of prices may be translated into positive
and rather high real interest rates. Of course, an important objection to this
rather simple reasoning is that a delay in the adjustment of the rates that by
now amounts to five years or more seems excessive.
It is necessary to consider at least two elements that have a considerable
role in explaining this delay. The first and obvious is that the strong and rising
public deficits of the last 10 to 12 years have created strong pressure on the rates
to rise. But if in the next few years a return, even though gradual, for the public
deficits should begin, the pressure on rates would be attenuated quite a bit. Let
us consider the case of a country (more or less the case of Italy) in which at
present the public deficit is around 15% of the GDP and total domestic credit
around 20% or so. The latter then is absorbed for about three-fourths to finance
the public deficit and only for one-fourth to finance the economy. A reduction of
one point of the deficit with respect to the GDP (from 15% to 14%), if the total
domestic credit stays more or less constant in percentage terms compared with
GDP, means that the "space" for the financing of the economy grows naturally
by one point compared with GDP (from 5% to 6%), i.e., it increase 20%. Of
course, the case of Italy is an extreme case. But in all the industrialized coun-
tries the percentage of total domestic credit absorbed by the financing of the
public deficit is by now close to 50% or above, therefore we have this "multi-
plier" effect of available space for credit to the economy.
A second factor of delay in the lowering of rates is perhaps due to the
ambiguous role that the banking system plays today in all the industrial coun-
tries. In fact, if on the one hand it has kept the traditional role of financer of the
sectors with structurally negative financial deficits, then on the other it has also
taken on the new role of opponent of the public sector as buyer itself or main
investor of the securities it issued. Thus, on both sides it has clear interest in
keeping the rates up and a high contractual power to do it.
To dwell further on this analysis would be out of place here. The few ele-
ments mentioned can give an explanation, even though brief, of why the real
interest rates have been persisting at high levels for more than five years now.
This does not mean that this must last much longer: the forces that are pushing
in the other direction would prevail and this would happen relatively soon.
Notes
[1] This summary interpretation of the facts is very like the analysis of Forrester and
his group at MIT. For details, see, for example, J.D. Sterman, An Integrated
Theory of the Economic Long Wave, Future8, April, 1985.
[21 See, for example, J.M. Keynes, 1931, E88aY8 in Per8ua8ion, Macmillan, London,
UK.
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[3] In a note Keynes clarifies that "loan expenditure is a convenient expression for the
net borrowings of public authorities on all accounts, whether on capital account or
to meet a budgetary deficit. The one form of loan expenditure operates by
increasing investment and the other by increasing the propensity to consume."
[4J Of course, this is not quite exact: the annual deficits can also be financed with
instruments other than borrowing (monetary instruments).
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Summary Points
Harvey Brooks
1. First of all I must confess to be both an amateur and an agnostic with
respect to long waves. I am an amateur in that I am not an economist and
I have not studied the vast outpouring of literature on the subject. I am an
agnostic in that I do not believe the long-wave hypothesis has been un-
equivocally established or disproved. The contemporary debate over long
waves in the "tide of human affairs" is quite reminiscent of the debates that
once used to be popular in my youth on climatic cycles, a field which, 60
years later, is about as fuzzy in the 1980s as it was in the 1920s. Cyclical
phenomena in inherently noisy systems are hard to establish, especially
when one is uncertain as to which variables are the appropriate ones to
focus on. Moreover, people are rightly skeptical of empirically established
cyclical phenomena in the absence of convincing mechanisms that could
plausibly produce such phenomena.
2. In my view the existence of a technological cycle or an S-curve is better
established than long waves, although as I said earlier, the question of what
really constitutes the unit of analysis or the appropriate ordinate for the S-
curve remains controversial. The most convincing examples seem to be the
long-term substitution of energy technologies and transportation modes,
which the IIASA group have shown us, and it is certainly suggestive that
the intervals between maximum, abstract penetration of those technologies
is close to the magic 50 years of the Kondratieff waves.
3. But a fundamental issue that I think has not been very much addressed in
this workshop is just how technology cycles could lead to long waves in
overall economic activity, and indeed in many other social variables as we
have had proposed at this meeting. I think there is indeed one possible
mechanism, and I think I can illustrate and explain it with two examples
that have been discussed in these sessions - that of transportation modes
and of the penetration of electric motors (and the consequent demand for
electricity). In the consolidation or takeoff phase of the technology cycle
the performance of the technology and the efficiency of its production is
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undergoing rapid improvements through many simultaneous mechanisms:
through economies of scale in production, through descent of the learning curve
in design and production, through learning by users (including the constant
discovery of new uses and the adaptation of the technology to these uses). Even
more important may be the indirect benefits in terms of convenience, reliability,
public image, cleaner environment, safety, etc., which are harder to quantify but
were emphasized in Vasko's presentation of the Yu and He paper. The steady
accumulation of benefits produces a virtuous cycle of declining cost and expand-
ing demand through price elasticity and through diffusion of information to
potential adopters or consumers of the technology. This virtuous cycle erects
almost insurmountable barriers against potentially superior technologies and
designs while the market is being penetrated in accordance with the detailed
mechanisms proposed by Brian Arthur and referred to by Professor Rosegger.
This barrier to innovation in the same domain persists until the market begins to
saturate and the socioeconomic benefits of the next increment of development or
improvement of the "technology in relation to costs begins to decline. At the
same time many dis-benefits such as pollution, safety, and resource consumption
problems begin to become apparent, often increasing nonlinearly with the scale
of application of the technology. It is in this maturing state that the technology
becomes once again susceptible to competition from a new technology in the
emergent phase. This competition is at first rather uncertain; it receives some
stimulus from the turbulence in prices, costs, and political attitudes that, as
Nakicenovic and Fontvieille pointed out, often accompany the mature phase of
the technology. It is at this point that a new technology life cycle may start,
launching a new long-wave upswing.
4. Several conditions would be necessary for this scenario that I have
stretched really to constitute an explanation of long waves.
a. First the technology would affect a very large segment of the economy
through its upstream and downstream linkages to other parts of the
economy. Automobiles and electric motors satisfy this criteria. Each
is coupled to many other simultaneous technology life cycles, such as
oil refining, suburbanization, growth of national markets, that are
different but tightly locked in with the auto cycle. The electricity
case also satisfies this criteria - productivity in manufacturing (as we
have seen), efficiency and declining cost, electricity generation, etc.
b. There must be a lot of other technology life cycles (TLC) that proceed
independently. In other words the economy must be truly dominated
by one technology cycle, which may be and usually is, composed of
many other technology cycles tightly linked to it. To me that is the
most uncertain and least easily established part of the hypothetical
picture I have described.
c. The technology must probably also be tightly linked to many other
social variables so that many social transformations go on simultane-
ously, which act to reinforce the technology cycle somewhat in the
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manner described in Dr. Weidlich's equations. (Incidently, the nega-
tive reinforcements described by Weidlich may also be important in
the mature phase.)
d. The technology cycle must have about a 50-year interval between
emergent and maturity phases. This is hard to explain, but seems to
be true of most of the technological trajectories explored by Nakiceno-
vic and Marchetti. This needs to be better understood. What is it
that governs the length of one TLC?
5. I think the scenario I have described is more attractive than efforts to
explain long waves by clustering of innovations, although such a clustering,
through their relation to underlying state of the art, described by Ayres in
his IIASA Research Report, may be a factor.
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